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Abstract
This thesis, which consists of three essays, uses empirical methods to study questions
in criminal procedure and employment antidiscrimination law.
The first chapter measures the consequences for offenders of expanding constitutional
criminal jury trial rights. I study the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey (2000), which extended beyond-a-reasonable-doubt jury factfinding (and
all the costs and complications it entails) to particular facts previously decided by judges
using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The limited holding of Apprendi and the
calculations required by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allow me to compare changes in the
sentence lengths of groups of offenders who were differentially affected by the decision. I find
that this expansion of jury trial rights benefited criminal offenders, reducing the average
sentence for those most affected by more than 5 percent.
The second chapter studies the prosecutorial charging response to the Supreme Court's
Apprendi decision. Using federal arrest, charging, and sentencing data to evaluate prosecu-
torial behavior, I find evidence that prosecutors reacted to the higher costs of factfinding by
reducing the number of counts filed against affected defendants by as much as 10 percent,
presumably magnifying the sentence reduction that would have occurred had prosecutors
not substituted charging resources toward unaffected defendants.
The third chapter, co-authored with Christine Jolls, examines the employment conse-
quences of the American's with Disabilities Act's (ADA) two major features-the discrimi-
nation prohibition and the "reasonable accommodations" requirement. Several studies have
suggested that the passage of the ADA might have reduced employment opportunities for
individuals with disabilities, but which particular feature or features of the ADA, if any,
caused this disemployment effect are unknown. Using state-level variation in pre-ADA legal
regimes to separately estimate the employment effects of the ADA's two substantive pro-
visions, we find strong evidence that the immediate post-enactment employment effects of
the ADA are attributable to the reasonable accommodations mandate rather than the fir-
ing costs associated with the antidiscrimination provision. Moreover, the pattern of effects
across states suggests, contrary to prior findings, that declining disabled employment after
the immediate post-ADA period may reflect factors other than the ADA.
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Chapter 1
Measuring the Consequences of
Criminal Jury Trial Protections
Abstract
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee criminal defen-
dants the right, to a jury trial and require that the elements of crimes be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Academics, judges, and practitioners generally assume that these consti-
tutional guarantees protect defendants. Recently, however, scholars and even members of
the Supreme Court have suggested that expanding jury trial rights may actually work to the
detriment of defendants given the existing rules and structure of the criminal justice system.
Others have argued that procedural protections such as jury trial options and higher stan-
dards of proof are irrelevant in light of significant prosecutorial resources and discretion. In
this paper, I seek to measure the consequences of expanding criminal jury trial rights. To do
so, I study the Supreme Court's landmark criminal procedure decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000), which held that a jury-not a judge-must decide beyond a reasonable doubt
any fact that causes the penalty for a crime to exceed a prescribed statutory maximum. I
use the limited reach of the Apprendi decision and the calculations required by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines to create groups of offenders who were differentially affected
by Apprendi's expansion of jury rights but who were otherwise comparable. By comparing
the change in sentence length of these groups pre- and post-Apprendi, I am able to identify
and measure the effect of the broader jury trial rights (including the higher standard of
proof) mandated by that case. I find that, this expansion in jury trial rights substantially
benefited criminal offenders, reducing the average sentence for those most affected by more
than 5 percent.
1.1 Introduction
Over the past five years, the Supreme Court has decided a number of seminal cases delin-
eating the scope of Sixth Amendment jury trial rights, and yet almost nothing is known
about the real-world consequences of these protections. We are not completely in the dark.
Legal scholars and members of the Supreme Court have speculated about the possible ef-
fects of expanding jury trial rights (e.g., Bibas 2001a, 2001b; King and Klein 2001b; Stuntz
2004). Unfortunately, their arguments come to inconsistent conclusions and are difficult to
quantify. Empirical work on the behavior of judges and juries is also not entirely absent.
For instance, the relative ability of juries and judges to arrive at accurate and predictable
decisions in criminal cases has received substantial scholarly attention (e.g., Eisenberg et
al. 2005).
Nevertheless, no study empirically examines the consequences of giving criminal defen-
dants a jury trial "option." This omission is a drawback of existing empirical work, which
typically compares the experimental, hypothetical, or selection-bias-corrected decisions of
judges to those of juries (see MacCoun 1993, pp.138-47; Helland and Tabarrok 2000). To be
sure, the across-the-board differences between judges and juries identified in the literature
make up part of what a jury trial right is "worth." But comparisons of jury performance
to judicial performance inclusive of cases in which a defendant would waive his jury trial
right necessarily ignore option value. Existing empirical studies discount or wholly ignore
the incentives and costs that shape the behavior of defendants and prosecutors, and, as a
result, the existing literature cannot assess the full consequence of jury trial protections.
A jury trial right, also includes more than a potential change in the identity of the
factfinder. Under American law, an important aspect of the expansion of criminal jury trial
rights has been the application of a higher standard of proof-proof beyond a reasonable
doubt-to facts otherwise decided by a preponderance of evidence. A few studies have
explored the differences between how these two standards are interpreted and applied by
judges and juries using survey responses and laboratory experiments (Kagehiro and Stanton
1985; Simon and Mahan 1971; Kalven and Zeisel 1966), but we know nothing about the
real-world consequences of combining better defendant access to a jury with a change in
the standard of proof.
In this paper, I evaluate the practical consequences for defendants of jury trial rights
by studying a rare and unexpected expansion of those rights. In June 2000, the Supreme
Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a landmark criminal procedure
decision that expanded the scope of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. The
decision granted criminal defendants the right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable
doubt certain facts that, under preexisting law, had been submitted to a judge and decided
by a preponderance of evidence.
Importantly, this expansion of jury trial rights did not necessarily benefit defendants.
As I discuss more fully in Section 1.3, the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defen-
dants a jury trial, but does not provide a right to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench
trial. Therefore, it is constitutionally permissible (and, in fact, legal under current federal
law) for prosecutors to "force" jury trials with respect to facts covered by the Sixth Amend-
ment when juries are prosecutor-friendly. In addition, Leipold (2005) has suggested that
judges may have become defendant-friendly, relative to juries, since the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines came into force. Under these conditions, it is possible for broader jury trial
rights to worsen defendant outcomes. Bibas (2001a, pp.1157-60), for example, has argued
that expanding jury trial rights to sentencing facts will hurt defendants by strengthening
prosecutors' bargaining positions, and members of the Supreme Court have cited his work
for that proposition.
To measure the consequences of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights, I use the
limited reach of the decision and the calculations required by the United States Sentencing
Guidelines to create groups of offenders who were differentially affected by the expansion
of jury rights under Apprendi but who were otherwise comparable. This difference-in-
differences approach is superior to comparing offender outcomes pre- and post-Apprendi
because simple before and after comparisons may capture much more than just the effect of
expanding criminal jury trial rights, such as changes in resource availability or other secular
trends in crime levels.
My empirical approach builds on three facts. First, Apprendi requires juries, rather
than judges, to find facts only when the defendant's sentence may exceed the maximum
statutory sentence for the charged offense. Second, because of the structure of the sentencing
guidelines, offenders in higher criminal history categories are by construction "closer" to the
relevant statutory maximum. Third, Apprendi did not affect criminal history factfinding-
the decision exempted facts of prior conviction. Therefore, by comparing the change in
the average sentence length of recidivist offenders pre- and post-Apprendi to the same
change in the sentences of relatively new criminals (while at the same time controlling for
observable differences between these groups), I am able to identify and measure the effect
of the broad:ler jury trial rights mandated by Apprendi. Importantly, as I show below, my
results are unlikely to be driven by changes in the composition of my treatment and control
groups because, in addition to Apprendi's explicit exception for facts of prior conviction, it
is not easy for criminal history determinations to be manipulated by prosecutors or judges.
I find that expanding jury trial rights substantially benefits defendants. Specifically, my
results suggest that the expansion of jury trial rights under Apprendi reduced the sentences
of those in higher criminal history categories by about six months or more than 5% of the
mean sentence for those groups. For purposes of comparison, a recent paper studying racial
and gender disparities in sentencing finds "large, persistent" effects in that context that are
similar to the effect of expanded jury trial rights I estimate here (Schanzenbach 2005, p.84;
see Schanzenbach and Tiller 2005, p.33).
Understanding the consequences of criminal jury trial rights has grown in importance as
the scope of these rights has become more controversial and open to change. The holding of
Apprendi was unexpected, and academics, practitioners, and judges uniformly perceived the
Supreme Court's decision as opening a new era in criminal sentencing procedure. Consistent
with this prediction, Apprendi was followed a few years later by Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004), which established that the Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants
the right to have all aggravating sentencing facts decided by a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Following Blakely, however, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), which effectively undermined a defendant's access to a jury
trial on aggravating sentencing facts (previously binding under the guidelines) by making
the consequences of those facts advisory and therefore subject to judicial decision making.
Because of these decisions, Congress and state legislatures must now choose between
determinate sentencing systems that provide defendants with jury trial rights and what
are essentially indeterminate or advisory sentencing systems in which judges are free to
evaluate sentencing facts by a preponderance of evidence. The real-world consequences of
this policy decision are potentially very important, but-until now-entirely unknown. My
results inform this choice by providing evidence that, relative to advisory systems in which
judges by and large follow sentencing guidelines, determinate systems with jury trial rights
will lead to lower average sentences.
The remainder of this paper motivates and presents my empirical work. In Section
1.2, I briefly describe how federal sentencing practice has evolved recently and explain the
Supreme Court's Apprendi opinion (and the cases that followed) in more detail. In Section
1.3, I examine the academic debate over the likely consequences of expanding jury trial
rights. Section 1.4 describes my data and explains my empirical approach. In Section 1.5, I
describe my empirical model and report my basic results. Section 1.6 addresses robustness
issues. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Sentencing Guidelines and Criminal Factfinding
In crafting federal sentencing policy, Congress has historically relied on judges to evalu-
ate the existence, relevance, and importance of sentencing "facts"-facts related to the
crime, the victim, the criminal's course of conduct and likely future propensities (Stith and
Cabranes 1998). Before the 1970s, this practice was uncontroversial. Congress typically
enacted a statute that defined a crime in terms of key elements, appended a wide penalty
range (e.g., ten to twenty years), and then left it to judicial discretion to set appropriate
punishments within the minimum and maximum for a violation of the statute.
A political coalition favoring sentencing reform emerged in the 1970s, however. The
alliance included groups concerned with racial and class discrimination in sentencing, as
well as critics worried about the "soft on crime" tendencies they perceived in the sentencing
practices of certain federal judges. Both groups were troubled by reports of substantial
sentencing disparities, which they attributed to judicial abuse of discretion (see Anderson,
Kling and Stith 1999). By the early 1980s, Senator Ted Kennedy and President Ronald
Reagan led the movement for federal sentencing reform, and in 1984 the federal Sentencing
Reform Act (SRA) was passed with bipartisan support (Stith and Cabranes 1998, pp.38-48).
The SRA was designed to reduce sentencing disparities by mandating that federal judges
set penalties according to guidelines that explicitly and uniformly incorporated "relevant"
mitigating and aggravating facts. The "guidelines" were promulgated by a semi-independent
commission, the United States Sentencing Commission (which draws commissioners from
the judiciary and elsewhere), and were extensive, complicated, and detailed from the outset.
For approximately fifteen years, these guidelines mechanically "generated" the sentences
federal criminals received: each aggravating fact increased a defendant's offense level by
a fixed amount, which in turn translated into a fixed increase in the required sentencing
range. If a judge found many aggravating facts, the mandatory guidelines sentence would
substantially exceed the minimum statutory sentence for the underlying offense.
The practical consequence of sentencing under the mandatory guidelines was that judges,
not juries, were determining facts that dramatically increased offender sentences (Schanzen-
bach and Tiller 2005, pp.9-10). At the same time, however, judges lost nearly all of their dis-
cretion to select a sentence anywhere within the minimum and maximum statutory bounds
for a crime. The guidelines reduced the discretionary range to a few months, with the
constraints set by a limited number of guidelines-relevant "facts." Judges did retain sen-
tencing power in the sense that they could unlawfully manipulate their factfinding, but the
SRA both required judges to record their factual conclusions and made judicial factfinding
subject to appellate review.
Sentences have always been constrained by statutory maximums (see U.S.S.G. §§5G1.1,
5G1.2), but under the new guidelines system, which maximum applied could turn on a
judge-found fact. Thus, a pre-Apprendi "statutory maximum" could potentially be any
maximum that was provided for by the statute containing or related to an offense. Take,
for example, a defendant convicted of a relatively minor drug crime under 21 U.S.C. §841
(which specifies many distinct drug offenses). If, as a predicate to convicting the defendant,
the jury determined that the crime involved at least a small quantity of drugs, courts
nevertheless considered it legal to sentence above the statutory maximum for the minor
offense if the judge concluded by a preponderance of evidence that a very large quantity of
drugs had actually been involved. This was considered permissible because larger quantities
of drugs were dealt with elsewhere in the statute and because a larger quantity determination
provided for a much higher maximum sentence. Put another way, pre-Apprendi, a judge-
found fact could shift an offense from one statutory provision to another (with a higher
maximum).
The Supreme Court was faced with the constitutionality of a state-level version of that
sentencing situation in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The defendant
in that case was convicted of a firearms crime that carried a statutory penalty range of
five-to-ten years. At the defendant's sentencing, the prosecutor sought a "hate crime"
enhancement, which the court subsequently granted based on the judge's conclusion, by
the preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was racially motivated. The defendant
was sentenced to a 12-year prison term, which was in excess of the statutory maximum for
the crime of conviction. The Supreme Court concluded on June 26, 2000, that the 12-year
sentence violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his right to
have the fact of his racial motivation proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Importantly, however, the Supreme Court's holding did not extend to all sentencing
facts. Apprendi does not require a jury to determine criminal history facts, which are
both necessary and important in calculating a federal sentence under the sentencing guide-
lines. This feature of Apprendi originated in the Supreme Court's then-recent decision
in Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that past offenses
need not be proven to the jury for the purpose of applying a recidivist statute. The Court
admitted that Almendarez- Torres appeared inconsistent with the underlying rationale of
Apprendi, and some justices have continued to suggest that the Court reconsider the jury's
role in determining facts of prior convictions (see, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct.
1254, 1264 (2005)). The wording of the Court's holding in Apprendi, however, is precise
about the types of facts that were covered: "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (p.490).
Even excluding criminal history facts, Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights did not
eliminate the judicial determination of aggravating facts. Apprendi specified a particular
set of conditions under which a defendant had a right to have a jury, not a judge, determine
sentence-enhancing facts, and until Blakely and Booker were decided (in June 2004 and
January 2005, respectively) judges continued to decide many facts not covered by Apprendi
just as they had prior to the decision. Facts implicated by Apprendi's rule requiring beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt jury factfinding shared three characteristics. First, the fact could not
be one of prior conviction. Second, the fact, if found, had to increase a sentence. Third,
the fact had to cause the sentence to "bump up" against the statutory maximum for the
offense.
As I demonstrate in Section 1.4, Apprendi's limited scope in these three respects makes
it possible to construct a quasi-experiment in which sentencing data can be used to study
the consequences of broader jury trial rights.
1.3 The Jury Trial Rights Debate
The word "right" itself suggests something of value. Yet significant debate has emerged in
the legal literature over the consequences of expanding jury trial rights for defendants in the
context of existing criminal procedure, especially given the dominance of plea bargaining.
Legal scholars have made every possible prediction about the consequences of broader jury
trial rights. Apprendi and Blakely may have raised the necessary standard of proof for
certain facts and may have provided defendants with a jury trial "option," but these gains
could be minuscule or offset by the interaction of broader rights with existing features of
the criminal procedure landscape. In this section, I summarize the arguments in the legal
literature over the likely consequences of broader jury trial rights and then organize those
arguments around the predictions of a simple plea bargaining model (see Appendix).
In a provocative article in the Yale Law Journal, Bibas (2001a) asserts that Apprendi-
like expansion of jury trial rights may work to the detriment of criminal offenders by allowing
prosecutors to force hostile jury trials. In the federal system a jury trial right renders a jury
the default factfinder, and prosecutors have the right to veto a jury trial waiver under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23. Therefore, if judges are defendant friendly relative to juries
or if judges can at times blunt prosecutorial or legislative excesses (Bowman and Heise 2001,
2002; Leipold 2005), a broader jury trial right may increase sentences because prosecutors
will be free to force a jury trial when the jury is expected to favor the prosecution.
Bibas also suggests that defendants may be harmed by expanded jury trial rights because
prosecutorial jury trial costs exhibit substantial scale economies. On this account, both the
benefits to defendants of pleading guilty and the costs to prosecutors of a jury trial are so
high that the only realistic consequence of adding a jury trial right to the determination of
sentencing facts may be that defendants virtually always plead guilty to Apprendi-covered
facts instead of litigating them-potentially successfully-before a judge. The intuition is
that if a prosecutor is forced to take one fact to a jury, the additional cost of taking all
other facts to a jury is relatively low. A jury trial as to all facts is highly risky for most
defendants, and therefore the average defendant may prefer to concede Apprendi-covered
facts rather than hazard a failed plea negotiation. Ultimately, however, Bibas admits that
the consequences of broader jury trial rights under Apprendi must be empirically evaluated
(p.1167).
King and Klein (2001b) disagree with the counterintuitive notion that expanding a
defendant's jury trial rights might strengthen a prosecutor's bargaining position. They
argue instead that broader jury trial rights should unambiguously benefit criminal offenders.
If a sentencing-relevant fact is newly covered by Apprendi (i.e., the fact, if found, would
increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum), they note
that the fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, as a practical matter,
defendants are likely to have more influence over the identity of their factfinder. While
prosecutors may technically be able to defeat a jury trial waiver, the cost of doing so is
high, meaning that under many circumstances, defendants will have a choice between a
jury and a judge. Structurally, broader jury trial rights may insulate defendants from
overly aggressive prosecutors and judges.
To organize and synthesize these competing contentions, I present a simple model of
factfinding with criminal jury trial rights and standards of proof in the Appendix. The
model assumes that a defendant can try to waive a jury trial right, but that prosecutors
can defeat that waiver at some cost, a move that is allowed under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23. I take into account that the expected outcomes of bench trials and jury trials
may differ, that jury trials are more expensive for prosecutors than bench trials, and that
a prosecutor's decision to object to a jury trial waiver may be costly in other ways (e.g.,
irritating the judge). The model generates empirical predictions by allowing the comparison
of a defendant's expected outcome with a post-Apprendi jury trial right to that under the
prior judicial factfinding regime. Figure 1 depicts the policy change for sentencing facts.
It is straightforward to show, perhaps counterintuitively, that under cer tain conditions
defendants are made worse off by an expansion of jury trial rights. Specifically, if there
are many cases in which a judge using a "preponderance of evidence" standard is more
defendant-friendly than a jury using a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (perhaps
because judges view guidelines sentences as overly harsh), but objecting to a jury trial waiver
is less costly to the prosecutor than allowing a bench trial, then a jury trial rights expansion
can harm defendants on average (see Appendix for more detail). Whether these conditions
are satisfied, and, if so, whether there are any significant consequences for defendants, are
empirical questions.
Taking a different, non-bargaining approach, Stuntz (2004) argues that expanded crim-
inal procedural protections, like Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights, will have no effect
on defendant outcomes because "litigants in criminal cases do not bargain in the shadow
of the law. Rather, they bargain in the shadow of prosecutors' preferences, budget con-
straints, and political trends" (p.2548). Stuntz asserts that because federal substantive law
gives federal prosecutors almost unlimited power in charging a defendant, almost any fed-
eral crime can be framed and then prosecuted in a way that can plausibly jail a criminal
almost indefinitely. His view thus suggests that an expansion of jury trial rights under
Apprendi or later under Blakely should not matter (or not matter very much) to offenders'
sentencing outcomes. Prosecutors will simply implement, low-cost changes such as altering
how criminals are charged (in particular, charging them with more offenses, thereby making
sentencing facts irrelevant) to achieve the same results.
The arguments made by the authors above and other scholars (e.g., Lillquist 2004)
have identified a number of provocative ideas and competing effects, from the potential
benefits of strategic commitment, to the value of the jury option, to the effect of raising
the standard of proof, to the idea that prosecutors make, in effect, all important decisions
in criminal law. But analytical scholarship on the possible consequences of Apprendi (and,
for that matter, empirical work that studies judge and jury decision making outside of
the broader strategic environment in which criminal procedure operates) does too little to
assist policy makers and judges in understanding the likely aggregate effects of expanding
Sixth Amendment protections. In the remainder of this paper, I seek to contribute to this
debate by empirically assessing the consequences-both the direction and the magnitude-
of expanding jury trial rights.
1.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
Legal scholars have argued variously that Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights has hurt
defendants, that it has helped them, and that procedural protections like jury trial rights
simply do not matter. The important message from this dialogue in the legal literature,
however, is simply that the consequences for offenders of jury trial rights cannot be known
without looking to actual data. No jury rights scholars have sought to measure the effects of
broader jury trial protections, even though understanding those consequences is necessary
both for improving sentencing policy and broadly understanding how criminal procedure
and its protections translate into real-world outcomes.
Below, I use sentencing data from the United States Sentencing Commission and the
structure of the federal sentencing guidelines to measure the effect of Apprendi's expansion
of jury trial rights on defendant sentence length. To do this, I create a test that combines the
limited holding of Apprendi with the method by which sentences were calculated under the
then-mandatory federal guidelines. I use a difference-in-differences estimation approach,
employing either simple means comparisons or a regression framework to calculate my
estimates. Although not perfect, difference-in-differences techniques are quite robust, as I
explain in more detail below (see Card and Krueger 1995; Angrist and Krueger 1998, 2001).
My empirical work has two key building blocks:
1. Apprendi held that a Sixth Amendment jury trial right applies to most sentencing
facts that, if found, would generate a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.
2. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, recidivist offenders (i.e., those in higher crim-
inal history categories) will be, holding all else even, closer to the applicable statutory
maximum than offenders with little or no criminal history.
The first. building block tells us that if broader jury trial rights "matter" to defendant
sentences at; all, the effect should be stronger (and thus potentially measurable) for cat-
egories of offenders who are closer, all else even, to the applicable statutory maximum.
The second building block tells us that, under the guidelines, for any particular offense,
criminal offenders in higher criminal history categories will be closer to the statutory max-
imum. Therefore, if sentencing outcomes change in some systematic way for offenders in
high criminal history categories (relative to low criminal history categories) around the time
Apprendi was decided (and that change is not easily attributable to some other cause), then
this change can be interpreted as evidence of the consequences of broader jury trial rights.
The approach I take estimates the "net" effect of the expansion of jury trial rights under
Apprendi, meaning that it captures both (1) the underlying consequences of the new right
to a jury trial for specific facts and of the higher standard of proof for those facts and (2) the
effect of prosecutorial and judicial attempts to counteract (or magnify) the underlying effect
through charging adjustments and factfinding manipulation. Given that such discretion is
a permanent feature of the criminal justice system, this aggregate measure is the one of
interest. The "net" effect calculated by my empirical approach is best interpreted as a
lower bound on the consequences of expanding of jury trial rights generally. I am unable to
compare the outcomes of a pure "control" group and a pure "treatment" group, but instead
must compare a "less affected" group and a "more affected" group. Apprendi did not
implicate high recidivists who were nowhere near the statutory maximum, but potentially
did affect new criminals who had many aggravating offense facts. Moreover, Apprendi
did not apply to all aggravating sentencing facts. Even after Apprendi, an aggravating
sentencing fact continued to be decided by a judge by a preponderance of evidence so long
as the fact in question did not push a defendant over the statutory maximum. In other
words, Apprendi affected fewer offenders and covered fewer sentencing facts than would a
jury trial right applicable to all aggravating sentencing facts.
My basic empirical approach might be problematic if Apprendi "changed" the compo-
sition of groups compared in the test described above. For example, if Apprendi made it
more or less difficult to prove criminal history facts (these are sentencing facts, after all,
which can cause a sentence to exceed the statutory maximum), then offenders who would
previously have been placed in one criminal history category might instead be placed in
another after Apprendi. If that were the case, then the effect measured would in part be an
artifact of the shifting composition of the groups compared. But, as noted above, Apprendi
did not change how criminal history facts were determined-the holding of the Apprendi
decision expressly excluded facts of prior conviction or, more generally, criminal history
determinations from its coverage.
My approach might also raise concerns if Apprendi caused or allowed prosecutors or
judges to manipulate the determination of criminal history facts. But, under the guidelines,
prosecutors were limited in their ability to manipulate basic criminal history determinations,
and, more importantly, they had no incentive to reduce an offender's criminal history score,
a move that, would be necessary to account for my results, as I explain in more detail below.
Judges were also limited in their ability to manipulate basic criminal history determinations,
and, in any event, because judicial manipulation is likely to be visible, I am able to control
for it statistically.
Therefore, neither the Apprendi decision nor the behavior of prosecutors or judges is
likely to have altered the composition of criminal history groups. Moreover, my empirical
approach controls for differences over time in observable demographic changes in compo-
sition. As a result, using sentencing data from the United States Sentencing Commission,
which I describe below, I can evaluate the consequences of expanding jury trial rights by
comparing the outcomes of individuals who are in different criminal history categories but
are otherwise demographically comparable.
1.4.1 Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines
My empirical approach makes use of the mechanical calculations required by the guidelines
during my sample period (1998-2001). A judge calculating a presumptive guidelines sentence
begins by determining the base offense (according to the indictment, information, or plea
agreement), and identifies a base offense level. If the offender pled guilty to robbery, for
example, the 2004 version of the guidelines (U.S.S.G. §2B3.1) specifies a mandatory base
offense level of 20. Next, a judge considers the applicability of specific offense characteristics.
For a robbery offense, there are seven different characteristics the judge must address, such
as whether and how a firearm was used in the commission of the crime (§2B3.1(b)(2)) and
how much was lost as a result of the crime (§2B3.1(b)(7)). If the robbery occurred during a
carjacking, for example, the judge would add two levels to the already-earned 20. Additional
offense characteristics would add to the total, since, in general, offense characteristics are
not mutually exclusive.
Once the base sentencing offense level and additional level increases due to offense
characteristics have been totaled, the guidelines direct that a judge make further adjust-
ments (see U.S.S.G. §1Bl.1(c)). In the robbery context, a judge would be required to ask,
among many other possibilities, whether the offense was a hate crime (§3A1.1), whether
the offender played an aggravated role in the crime (§3B1.1), whether a minor was used
to commit the crime (§3B1.4), and whether the offender subsequently obstructed justice
(§3C1.1). There are more than ten additional non-exclusive adjustments that can be made,
and each adjustment can add from one to four levels to the total offense level. Next, the
judge repeats the earlier steps for other offenses, if there are other offenses, and then applies
a set of rules (§3D1.1 to §3D1.5) to combine all offense calculations into one final offense
level.
The judge's next task is calculating an offender's criminal history category. The judge
does not use the indictment or the plea agreement to establish criminal history, but instead
relies on an agent of the court, a probation officer, to draft a presentence report (§6A1.1).
The defendant is not entitled to waive the preparation of the report (§6Al.l(b)). The
probation officer is not a member of the prosecutor's team, but is directed by and reports
to the sentencing judge (Cohen and Fields 2004) and plays a fairly central and independent
role in determining sentencing outcomes (Bunzel 1995). A probation officer does receive
information from the prosecution, so it is conceivable that prosecutors, post-Apprendi, may
be able to affect probation officers' criminal history determinations by altering the types of
information shared.
As a general matter, however, it is no easy task for prosecutors to influence an offender's
criminal history category because probation officers and the reports they submit to the court
are at least somewhat insulated from manipulation. Consider a recent description of the
probation officer's task:
By order of the court, the officer makes a thorough investigation - a presentence inves-
tigation - into the circumstances of the offense and the offender's criminal background
and characteristics. The officer gathers information in two ways: by conducting inter-
views and by reviewing documents. The cornerstone of the investigation is the interview
with the offender, during which the officer inquires about such things as the offender's
family, education, employment, finances, physical and mental health, and alcohol or
drug abuse. The officer also conducts a home visit to assess the offender's living con-
ditions, family relationships, and community ties and to detect alcohol or drugs in the
home. Besides interviewing the offender, the officer interviews other persons who can
provide pertinent information about the offender and the offense, including the defense
counsel, the prosecutor, law enforcement agents, victims, the offender's family and as-
sociates, employers, school officials, doctors, and counselors. The officer also reviews
various records and reports, including court records, financial records, criminal history
transcripts, probation/parole/pretrial services records, birth/marriage/divorce records,
school records, employment records, military service records, school records [sic], med-
ical records, and counseling and treatment records. The officer verifies the information
gathered, interprets and evaluates it, and presents it to the court in an organized, objec-
tive report called the presentence report (Federal Corrections and Supervision Division
2000, p.1).
This description is surely aspirational, but it does indicate that probation officers do not
generally rely entirely on prosecutors for their information. Furthermore, because prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys can object to material included or missing in the report as well
as to the preliminary guidelines calculations made by the probation officers (see U.S.S.G.
§§6A1.2, 6A1.3), it seems highly unlikely that probation officers would systematically de-
pend on prosecutorial information without some attempt to verify the information they
receive.
That does not mean that prosecutorial manipulation of criminal history facts does not
occur, however. In particular, when a plea agreement includes a stipulation under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure ll(c)(1)(C) as to criminal history, that stipulation may be
accepted by the court even when it is not entirely accurate. But manipulation of criminal
histories in plea agreements, if it were common and if it had any effect, would affect only
plea-bargained cases. Empirical analysis of only those cases that went to trial provides a
partial check on this, although there is the possibility that Apprendi-induced manipulation
might have a selection effect, causing a different set of cases to be resolved through plea
bargaining. Below I find that broader jury trial rights had effects on offender sentences
both in jury and plea-bargained cases (see Tables Al and A2), indicating that prosecutorial
manipulation of criminal history categories through plea agreements cannot alone account
for my results.
The broader possibility that prosecutorial manipulation might affect my results seems
remote. The numbers of offenders in each criminal history category pre- and post-Apprendi
remain remarkably stable (see Figures 3 and 4). More importantly, it is difficult to construct
a plausible story capable of explaining my results in which a prosecutor would find it newly
worthwhile--i.e., on account of Apprendi-to stipulate to an inaccurate criminal history
category or to alter the type of criminal history information provided to a probation officer.
One might think, for example, that a prosecutor could benefit post-Apprendi from
manipulating criminal history information downward if a certain sentencing fact would cause
the guidelines sentence for an offense to exceed the statutory maximum with, but only with,
the inclusion of a prior conviction. But criminal history information essentially increases
an offender's sentence with certainty. More importantly, under Apprendi a prosecutor was
free to have a judge determine sentencing facts so long as the sentence was capped by the
applicable statutory maximum (Bibas 2001a, pp.1158-59). As a practical matter, this means
that a prosecutor's decision to reduce an offender's criminal history score could never have
increased an offender's statutory exposure and would have more likely than not reduced it.
Alternatively, consider whether prosecutors might have found it newly worthwhile to
force an offender's criminal history score upwards. Doing so would worsen the Apprendi
problem for those offenders, but since criminal history facts are perhaps easier to prove than
other facts---especially in light of the Apprendi exception-manipulating criminal history
facts in this way might have freed up additional resources to fund newly required jury trials
as to certain sentencing facts. To see how this incentive might have affected the composition
of my comparison groups, note that there is both a substitution and income effect to an
increase in the cost of proving only certain sentencing facts, at least assuming prosecutors
have limited resources. Because the price of proving offense facts, but not criminal history
facts, rose with Apprendi, the rule in that case should have led to an unambiguous decrease
in a prosecutor's willingness to use offense-related sentencing facts and an ambiguous effect
on the attractiveness of criminal history facts because income and substitution effects would
have worked against each other.
But even if the substitution effect dominated, this prosecutorial manipulation story
runs against the results I find below, which show a reduction in sentences for high criminal
history types. To generate that effect, prosecutors would have had to push low-sentence
offenders into higher criminal history categories. This is at odds with the substitution
theory identified above because the increase in the cost of prosecuting offense-related sen-
tencing facts would have applied only to those "close" to the statutory maximum-in other
words, high-sentence offenders. As a result, if it were to have any effect at all, this sort of
prosecutorial manipulation would weaken my findings.
Once a probation officer has collected all the information relevant to an offender's crimi-
nal history, he translates that data into criminal history points using guideline §4Al.1. The
guideline directs the probation officer (and judge) to apply certain point scores for each
of an offender's previous convictions, where the number of points assigned to each earlier
crime turns on the seriousness of the offense and how recently the crime was committed
(§§4A1.1, 4A1.2).
During the period I study, judges were required by law to incorporate all information
covered by the guidelines into the calculation of an offender's sentence, since provisions of
the sentencing guidelines were mandatory unless specifically stated otherwise (18 U.S.C.
§3553(b)(1)). Schanzenbach and Tiller (2005) have argued that sentencing judges use their
factfinding and legal decision making discretion to pursue their political preferences and will
"manipulate the rules and structure of the Sentencing Guidelines to the extent possible"
(p.4). Yet accounting for judicial manipulation of offense-level factfinding and the strategic
use of offense-level departures is important to an accurate measurement of the aggregate
consequences of jury trial rights. If judges can reduce, magnify, or completely eliminate
the benefits or burdens of Sixth Amendment rights, the effects of this behavior should be
included in the final analysis of the value of those rights.
The results of my empirical work might be misleading if judicial manipulation extended
to altering criminal history determinations, however, because I would not be comparing
the same types of offenders pre- and post-Apprendi. But there is nothing to suggest that
judges might have manipulated criminal history factfinding determinations in response to
Apprendi. Judges typically accept probation officers' presentencing recommendations and
are required by law to include in their sentencing calculations criminal history information
of which they are aware. Moreover, the trends in the numbers of offenders in each criminal
history category remain remarkably stable around the time of the decision (see Figures 3
and 4).
In Section 1.6 below, I address the fact that a judge can legally "depart" from a criminal
history determination under U.S.S.G §4A1.3 if the judge believes that an offender's crimi-
nal history score does not accurately reflect his actual history. Departures do not drive my
results. As Schanzenbach and Tiller (2005) note, "the Criminal History Category is more or
less set by past judicial determinations and is not as easily manipulated as the adjustments
to the offense level calculations" (p.7 n.7). And unlike other sentencing adjustments, crim-
inal history issues are rarely litigated. All of this goes to show that, like an offender's basic
demographic information, criminal history scoring was unaffected by the ruling in Apprendi
and can therefore be used to create comparison groups.
After the court settles on a criminal history category, the judge turns to Chapter 5,
Table A, of the applicable sentencing guidelines manual (see Figure 2). The judge finds the
correct sentencing guidelines range by locating the cell where the offender's "offense" level
and "criminal history category" intersect. For example, if an offender had a clear record
and was convicted of robbery (a base offense level of 20) with no offense characteristics or
other upward adjustments, he would receive a sentence of between 33 and 41 months. Prior
to Blakely, unless a judge exercised his departure power, this range was mandatory under
the guidelines.
1.4.2 U.S.S.C. Sentencing Data
The Sentencing Commission has collected data on federal sentencing outcomes for years
as required by law under the SRA. 1 The U.S.S.C. collects this data primarily for use in
evaluating whether its sentencing guidelines are effectuating their purposes such as, most
importantly, reducing federal sentencing disparities (see U.S.S.C. 2004a). The quality of
the Commission's data, at least with respect to individual (as opposed to organizational
offenders), appears to be very high. The Sentencing Commission recently described the
data collection process in a publication reviewing studies of the SRA's effectiveness:
Each federal court is required by law to transmit several sentencing-related documents
to the Commission. Presentence reports, judgment of conviction forms, statements of
reasons, and plea agreements are received for the vast majority of felony and serious
misdemeanor cases. Staff in the Commission's Monitoring Unit assign each case a unique
identifier and enter information on over 200 variables involving guideline applications,
offender characteristics, and case processing factors. Expansion of the dataset has added
elements through the years (U.S.S.C. 2004a, p.D-1).
U.S.S.C. analysts and criminologists interested in studying rehabilitation and recidivism as
well as race- and sex-based sentencing disparities have used this data for years (see, e.g.,
Hofer, Blackwell and Ruback 1999). The variables collected are not uniform over all years,
but generally include timing data (month of sentence), court data (district and circuit of
the sentencing court), demographic data (race, sex, age, education, citizenship, residency
status, and other information, such as income and number of dependents). Further, as the
'The Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center makes federal sentencing data available to the public, as
does the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. I use data
from 1998 to 2001. Less detailed federal sentencing data is available back to the early 1990s.
above description notes, information is collected regarding the offender's sentence, including
not only the final tally, but also how the sentence was actually calculated (e.g., offense level,
criminal history category, offense characteristics, and adjustments).
Legal scholars and economists have recently begun to use these data (see, e.g., LaCasse
and Payne 1999; Mustard 2001; Schanzenbach 2005; U.S.S.C. 2004a, App.A), though for
many important questions this data set alone is insufficient to study the causal relationships
of interest. The data include a number of important demographic and court variables
(the most significant omission is probably the identity of the sentencing judge), which can
plausibly be treated as exogenous, but almost all of the remaining variables collected are
ultimately jointly determined outcomes.
Accordingly, the quasi-experiment generated by the Supreme Court's unanticipated
decision in Apprendi is a rare opportunity to study the consequences of a significant change
in jury trial rights, as well as a major shift in federal sentencing policy.2 My analysis uses
three years of sentencing data: FY 1999, FY 2000, and FY 2001. Apprendi was decided on
June 26, 2000,3 so I am able analyze 21 months of pre-Apprendi sentencing and 15 months
of post-Apprendi sentencing.4 The total number of observations is large, as suggested by
the Sentencing Commission's description of the collection procedure above.
Only those offenders who were convicted (and therefore received some sort of sentence)
are observed. If Apprendi had an effect on the likelihood that an accused offender was
ultimately convicted, my results may not capture the full effect of the change. But no
one has suggested that Apprendi would affect offenders on the guilt/innocence dimension
(nor is it clear exactly how this might happen); rather, Apprendi works at the margin of
sentences, on the facts that raise a sentence from a base level upon conviction. Relatedly,
2 Apprendi was preceded by Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 277 (1999). The Apprendi Court described
Jones as "foreshadowing" the holding in Apprendi (p.476), but the ruling in Apprendi was in sharp contrast
to existing precedent and is generally viewed as a dramatic departure from previous law. Apprendi has been
described variously as the start of a "revolution" (Greenhouse 2002) and as having sent a "shock wave" (Lane
2002) throughout the legal community. King and Klein (2000) also discuss the case's likely implications.
"Because I only observe the month that an offender was sentenced, I treat all sentencing in the month of
June as occurring pre-Apprendi.
4 The Supreme Court decided a few other federal criminal law cases around the same time as Apprendi.
See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (June 12, 2000) and Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120
(June 5, 2000). But these cases dealt with the definition of particular crimes, and there is no evidence to
suggest that the crimes in question would be correlated with criminal history categories.
only individuals who are arrested and prosecuted can be convicted, so if Apprendi influenced
the probability that a criminal was arrested or prosecuted, my results may not be entirely
accurate. However, it seems even less likely that a change in a procedural rule would work
along the arrest or decision to prosecute margin.
The original data set was trimmed to eliminate certain aberrational cases: an observa-
tion was dropped if the offender was being resentenced; if the offender had a missing total
prison sentence; if a non-prison type of sentence was imposed; if the offender was sentenced
to community confinement; or if the offender was sentenced to more than a day but less than
a month in prison or to time served.5 The outcome variable, length of sentence in months,
ranges from 0 to 990 months. Life sentences were recoded as the maximum recorded sen-
tence. Schanzenbach (2005, p.68) excludes life sentences, finding they matter very little.
I do not do this, since many sentencing facts can lead to the imposition of life sentences,
especially for drug crimes (see King and Klein 2000, App.A). 6
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the data I use for my analysis, with the data set
divided into 6-month intervals. The column of means for the third and fourth quarters of
fiscal year 2000 includes all offenders who were sentenced for the three month periods before
and after Apprendi. Therefore, comparing the column containing the first two quarters of
fiscal year 2000 and the first two quarters of fiscal 2001 offer an initial picture of whether
Apprendi had any effect on the types of offenders progressing through the criminal justice
system. The only notable change is the decline in the number of offenders receiving a jury
trial, though this may be part of a long-term trend toward more prevalent plea bargaining.
I discuss this trend in more detail below.
1.5 Empirical Model and Basic Results
The limited scope of Apprendi's holding, when combined with the guidelines' grid approach
to calculating sentences, makes the decision almost ideally suited for studying the conse-
5 This process removed a total of 13,805 cases (or 2,920 cases, 1,914 cases, 2,630 cases, 4,096 cases, and
2.245 cases, respectively). Mustard (2001, p.298) and Schanzenbach (2005, p.68) note similar reductions in
their samples after eliminating missing or irrelevant data.
6 1f I omit life sentences, the magnitude of my coefficients drops by about half (they remain easily statis-
tically significant), suggesting that guaranteeing a federal jury trial option reduces a prosecutor's ability to
win a life sentence. presumably following a jury trial.
quences of broader jury trial protections. Apprendi expanded jury trial rights in a very
precise way--to cover, in addition to traditional elements of a crime, sentencing facts that
would cause a sentence to exceed the applicable statutory maximum. Therefore, if there
exists a group of offenders whose sentences are "closer" to the statutory maximum in a
predetermined way, then it is possible to identify the direction of any effect and measure
the potential magnitude of applying jury trial rights to sentencing facts. In this section, I
begin to evaluate the effect of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights on sentence length.
1.5.1 Graphical and Means Analysis
Figures 5 and 6 show the evolution of sentence means by criminal history types over my
sample period. As Figure 2 shows and the discussion above notes, guidelines sentences are
based on an offender's placement in one of six basic categories (I-VI). For ease of compari-
son, I have combined the six categories into three larger groups (low-level (I & II), mid-level
(III & IV), and high-level (V & VI)) with each group containing two categories (Figure
5) and two even larger groups (low-level (I, II, III) and high-level (IV, V, VI)) with each
group containing three categories (Figure 6). Both figures reveal a narrowing in average
sentence length between criminal history types around the time Apprendi was decided, of-
fering preliminary evidence that broader jury trial rights under Apprendi benefited criminal
offenders.
Table 2 presents a similar pre- and post-comparison (using three groups) looking directly
at the differences in mean sentences. Pre- and post-Apprendi offenders in any particular
criminal history group are very similar demographically. (Similarly, Figures 3 and 4 show
the evolution of the number of offenders in two different criminal history groupings, revealing
that the groups appear markedly stable around the time of Apprendi.) The table suggests
only a few slight differences over time, and there is no evidence of a shifting composition for
any of the groups--something we might expect to see if, for example, prosecutors or judges
began to manipulate criminal history findings or if other unobserved changes or trends were
at work.
There is one exception: the percentage of offenders pleading guilty has grown over the
period coinciding with Apprendi and that growth seems slightly larger for the high criminal
history group. 7 This growth, however, may be the product of the long-lived and continuing
trend toward fewer and fewer jury trials (Fisher 2003; Mnookin 2005). The Sentencing
Commission recently concluded that "[i]t is clear from the data that plea bargaining has
continued, and even expanded, in the guidelines era. Guilty plea rates steadily increased
from 87 percent in the years preceding the guidelines to 96.6 percent in 2001" (U.S.S.C.
2004a, p.30). 8 Moreover, higher plea bargaining rates alone, however interesting, cannot be
interpreted as an outcome that is necessarily pro-defendant or pro-prosecutor-the evolution
of plea rates tells us little about the overall consequences for offenders over time without
knowing the sentences that result from the agreements. 9
Across criminal history groups, there are some interesting differences: repeat offenders
appear to offend earlier and are more likely to be male, non-white, and less educated, findings
which are consistent with the Sentencing Commission's Recidivism Project (U.S.S.C. 2004b,
pp.1l-15). But these differences do not change over time. This suggests that pre-Apprendi
offenders can serve as a control for evaluating differences in outcomes in the post-Apprendi
period. Other than a differential rise in plea rates for higher criminal history types, the only
notable difference across the three groups pre- and post-Apprendi is an outcome-average
sentence length.
The differences in average sentences calculated in the far-right column of Table 2 suggest
preliminarily that broader jury trial rights benefit defendants. Sentences for offenders in
the low criminal history group changed only slightly, if at all. Compare this "no change"
result to the criminal history categories in the two lower panels. For offenders in the
middle category (categories III and IV), simple calculations indicate that Apprendi (and its
requirement that certain facts be proved to a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt) reduced
the average sentence by over 4 months (a 7% reduction in the mean sentence) relative to
those in the low criminal history category. The effect of Apprendi appears significant in
7In results not reported here, I have preliminarily explored whether there is a relationship between
Apprendi and plea bargaining. I find that offenders more likely to be covered by Apprendi were slightly
more likely to plead guilty, though my results are not particularly robust.
sFor an early assessment of the effect of the guidelines on plea bargaining rates, see Karle and Sager (1991)
and Dunworth and Weisselberg (1992), who generally find mixed results. with reduced plea bargaining post-
guidelines for some offenses.
91 focus here on the end-of-the-day outcome for defendants-the sentences they receive. Many have
deplored the use of plea bargaining, regardless whether plea bargained sentences mimic those that would
have been produced by jury trials (e.g., Alschuler 1983).
the bottom panel also--offenders in the highest criminal history category (V and VI) had
sentences that were on average almost 6 months shorter (approximately a 6% reduction).
Importantly, the accuracy and interpretation of the estimates in Table 2 do not depend
on whether offenders in the three criminal history groups are similar to each other; in fact,
we know that they are not: offenders in the different groups have noticeable differences in
their observable demographic characteristics. A simple comparison of means is nonetheless
valid so long as the characteristics of offenders within a criminal history category do not
change differentially across groups around the time that Apprendi was decided. If there were
a uniform change in offender characteristics or offense severity over time (due to a "get tough
on crime" campaign, for example), then all that would have to be shown in order for the
unadjusted difference-in-differences estimates in Table 2 to hold is that the change was not
correlated with or specific to any of the particular criminal history categories.
On the other hand, if prosecutors were able to manipulate offenders' criminal history
groups and for some reason began moving offenders with less serious crimes into higher
criminal history categories around the same time as Apprendi was decided, the differences
displayed in Table 2 might be misleading. Alternatively, if individuals in higher criminal
history groups began around the time of Apprendi to commit less serious offenses (or com-
mit them with fewer aggravating circumstances), then the results above again might be
inaccurate. But the pre- and post-Apprendi averages listed in Table 2 offer no evidence of
any change in group composition, nor do the numbers of offenders in each group change
much over time (see Figures 3 and 4). As I noted above, it is also difficult to devise a
prosecutorial or judicial manipulation hypothesis that both makes sense and could gener-
ate the results in Table 2. Nevertheless, to further reduce the possibility that alternative
explanations account for the differential changes in sentence length calculated above, the
next subsection employs a regression framework.
1.5.2 Regression Analysis
Although the differences in group means in Table 2 are suggestive, I am able to control for
other potentially confounding factors by using regression analysis. I identify the relationship
between the expansion in jury trial rights introduced by Apprendi and average offender
sentence length by estimating the following equation using ordinary least squares:
Sentenceij~ = a + fARaceijt + ,2Educationijt + f3Ageijt + 04 Sexijt
+ f35NumDepijt + f 6 GuidelinesYearijt + , 7Apprendit
+ fsCrimHistijt + fgApprendit x CrimHistijt + Eijt (1.1)
where i indexes criminals, j indexes districts, and t indexes month of sentencing. The
dependant variable is sentence length in months.
To account for disparate sentencing treatment on the basis of demographic differences,
I employ the following controls: Race is a vector that includes three dummy variables
(for black, white, and Hispanic, with other omitted); Education includes five dummies for
different levels of attainment (high school, vocational or military training, some college,
college degree, and some graduate training, with no high school diploma omitted); Age
includes dummies for different age groups (18-29, 30-44, 45-60, and greater than 60, with less
than 18 omitted); Sex is one if the offender is a male; NumDep is the number of dependants;
and GuidelinesYear is a vector of dummy variables to control for any amendments or other
changes over time in the Guidelines Manuals used to sentence defendants. 10
The variable Apprendi is a dummy variable equal to zero for months before and including
June 2000 and equal to one thereafter. CrimHist is a vector of varying dimension, made
up of either two (high/low), three (high/mid/low), or six (I-VI) dummy variables, designed
to capture the direct effect of criminal history on offender sentences. If there were no
other trends or changes during my sample period, the coefficient estimated on Apprendi
would capture the effect, and only the effect, of the decision's expansion of jury trial rights
on all groups, but since the timing of the decision might well be correlated with other
developments, a simple calculation of the difference between the pre- and post-period is
unlikely, in general, to be very reliable. However, because it is possible to identify groups in
the pre- and post-period that are differentially affected by Apprendi, yet otherwise similar,
one can use the regression equivalent of the difference-in-differences estimator applied in
Table 2 to identify the consequences of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights.
10I do not report or discuss at any length the direct relationships between these demographic variables
and sentence length because at least some of them have been studied by others (see, e.g.. Schanzenbach
2005; Mustard 2001; Hofer, Blackwell and Ruback 1999; U.S.S.C. 2004a, App.A). My results are consistent
with these researchers' findings and intuition.
The variables of interest here are the interactions Apprendi x CrimHist. The rule of
Apprendi did not affect all types of offenders equally: Apprendi only bites as an offender's
sentence for a particular offense approaches the statutory maximum. Since those offenders
in a higher criminal history category are more likely to be near the relevant statutory
maximum, Apprendi x CrimHist represents at least part of the effect of Apprendi on
defendant sentence length. Alternatively, Apprendi x CrimHist may be interpreted as the
disproportionate effect of expanding jury trial rights on those more likely to be affected by
the decision. As noted above, unlike in more standard difference-in-differences applications,
well-defined groups do not exist in this quasi-experiment. The sentence for an individual
with no criminal history points can be constrained (because of offense characteristics and
upward adjustments) by the statutory maximum. My estimates should thus be interpreted
as lower bounds on the effects of Apprendi's expansion of the jury trial right.
More formally, one can interpret this approach to measuring the consequences of Ap-
prendi's broadening of jury trial rights as a reduced-form substitute for an instrumental
variables model in which the causal variable of interest is "the probability that Apprendi
binds" and where the instruments are criminal history categories. Ideally, I would observe
the probability that Apprendi binds, and then instrument for that probability with the
criminal history categories (because Apprendi's binding is endogenous to sentence length).
This implies that the OLS coefficients on Apprendi x CrimHist are scaled by the differ-
ence between criminal history groups in the proportion of cases where Apprendi binds. For
example, if Apprendi never applied to low criminal history types, but applied only 50% of
the time to recidivists, then the effect of expanding jury trial rights would be double the
estimate since there is only a 50% difference in Apprendi coverage. 11
I begin my analysis using only two criminal history categories (high and low). The
results are recorded in Table 3. I find that Apprendi's broadening of jury trial rights
reduced the average sentence of offenders in the high criminal history category (relative
to those in the low criminal history category) by approximately 6 months, which is over
10% of the mean sentence of all offenders and more than 5% of the mean sentence for high
criminal history offenders. Including demographic controls thus does not change the gist of
"In subsection 1.6.1 below, I explore this issue more fully by limiting my sample to offenders who are
systematically more likely to be affected by Apprendi. As expected, the magnitude of the estimates I calculate
are much larger.
the simple differences in means presented in Table 2. For offenders more likely to be affected
by Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights, sentences dropped by around 6 months relative
to the post-Apprendi sentences received by other types of federal offenders.
Table 3 also reports coefficient estimates on selected demographic variables described
above. These estimates (reported and unreported) are straightforward in their interpreta-
tion: college-educated, older, white, and female offenders are likely to receive lower sen-
tences, all else even. These results should be interpreted descriptively, not causally. Educa-
tion and race are also correlated with income, which obviously affects legal representation
and much more. I do not control for underlying offense characteristics here, so it may be
that shorter sentences of, say, women may be attributable to less severe offenses.
The first column of Table 3 presents results from the estimation of equation (1.1) de-
scribed above. In the remaining columns, I add further controls to reduce the possibility
that, an omitted variable may bias my results. In the second column, I control separately
for citizenship, residency status, number of dependents, and the year of the sentencing
guidelines manual that was applied to the case. I introduce the first two because non-U.S.
citizens or residents are not distributed uniformly across criminal history categories (per-
haps as a result of deportation, which may prevent them from being repeat offenders) and
the treatment of non-citizens or residents may have changed over time.
In the third, fourth, and fifth columns, I add fixed effects to control for district and
month effects. The inclusion of District, Circuit, Month, and Circuit x Month are de-
signed to ensure that my results are not driven by differences between districts (or circuits)
or by any trends specific to a particular circuit or set of circuits. 12 Apprendi applied uni-
formly to all districts (and all appellate circuits), and there was no preexisting district or
circuit legal variation (all circuits had previously adhered to the approach invalidated in Ap-
prendi). But the geographic distribution of offenders in different criminal history categories
might not be uniform-repeat offenders, for example, could plausibly be concentrated in
particular districts-and districts may have been on different pre-Apprendi trends. There-
fore, it is important to control for such trends when possible. Relatedly, Schanzenbach
12For example, when district effects are introduced, inter-district variation is eliminated; instead, offenders
within a particular district are compared, and the effects are then aggregated. The month fixed effects control
for time trends that are common to all offenders. regardless of their criminal history status. As a consequence
of including month effects. I cannot separately estimate the coefficient on Apprendi.
and Tiller (:2005) argue that a district judge's use of discretion might turn on the political
leanings of the circuit court judges reviewing his decisions. The inclusion of circuit and
district controls can protect against such effects biasing my estimates. Importantly, when
included, none of these controls eliminates or much reduces the magnitude or significance of
the estimated coefficient on Apprendi x CrimHist. The broader jury trial rights established
by Apprendi reduced offender sentence length by approximately 6 months. 13
To ensure that aggregation of the criminal history categories is not the source of the
findings in Table 3, I report in Table 4 and Table 5 results for three and six criminal history
categories, respectively. If anything, the two category grouping depressed the estimated
effect of Apprendi. In Table 4, I find that the middle-level (III-IV) criminal history offenders
received a lower sentence by a magnitude of between 4 and 5 months. The effect on high-
level (V-VI) criminal history offenders was more substantial-sentences were reduced by
almost 7 months.
In Table 5, with the first criminal history group serving as the base line, the estimates
show that offenders in successively higher criminal history categories typically experience
ever-greater sentence reductions following Apprendi. Four of the five coefficients increase
steadily in magnitude with the highest criminal history offenders faring the best of all. The
fact that the five coefficients are not quite monotonically increasing is a bit of a puzzle,
given my identification strategy. My estimates suggest that offenders in criminal history
category IV do particularly well (or category V offenders do particularly poorly) post-
Apprendi, almost as well as those in the highest category (VI). Importantly, the standard
errors on the estimates cannot rule out a monotonically increasing set of coefficients even as
they do rule out the possibility that high criminal history offenders did not see a significant
post-Apprendi decline in their sentences relative to low criminal history types.
One further way to explore whether the aggregation of offenders into criminal history
categories affects my results is to re-estimate equation (1.1) using criminal history points
'
3The outcome variable in my data-prison sentence in total months-is capped at 990 months. More than
95% of the offenders observed received a lower sentence, but those who received life sentences or received a
sentence of more than 990 months are not correctly coded, and this fact may affect my results. I address
this problem by re-estimating my basic equation using a tobit framework. My results are reported in Table
A3, and are consistent with the results reported in Table 3. In the second through fifth columns of Table
A3, I report estimates from fixed-effects tobit specification. Estimating nonlinear models in the presence of
fixed effects can generate significant bias because of incidental parameters. but Greene (2004) showed using
Monte Carlo methods that with tobit. any such bias may be small. Even if any bias is potentially large.
the estimated fixed-effects results are broadly consistent with the ordinary tobit results and with the OLS
results.
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rather than criminal history categories. In Figure 7, I plot the point estimates of Apprendi x
CrimHistPts (the interaction of Apprendi with an offender's total number of criminal
history points) against the difference in the average sentence of the pre- and post-Apprendi
periods. The results are striking-the evidence strongly suggests that expanding jury trial
rights substantially favors offenders.
Figure 7 is useful at demonstrating the robustness of the pattern in the data, but
it should be viewed with some caution for two reasons. First, criminal history points
themselves are not particularly relevant to sentencing once an offender tops out at 13 points
(see Figure 2), and so it may be that criminal history point determinations are less reliable
at very high levels. Second, the regression underlying the figure generates many estimated
coefficients (one for every criminal history point total received, which, for some observations
in my data, set, exceeds fifty) and substantially reduces the precision of my estimates,
especially at higher numbers of criminal history points. The number of offenders in each
criminal history point group drops below 500 after the 20-point threshold (the cutoff for
Figure 7), and the scatter becomes more dispersed and less informative (with significant
outliers in both directions).
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I demonstrate the robustness of my basic finding that broader criminal rights
mandated by Apprendi substantially benefited criminal offenders. I use two criminal history
groups (I-III versus IV-VI), as in Table 3, for the remainder of the paper, though different
criminal history groupings arrive at similar results. As noted elsewhere, to the extent that
Apprendi affects Category II or Category III offenders, my estimates will understate the
effect of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights.
1.6.1 Verifying the Intuition
My empirical approach makes use of the fact that Apprendi only binds when an offender's
sentence approaches the statutory maximum. As I described in Section 1.2, the phrase
"statutory maximum" has a very particular meaning in the Apprendi context. Before
Apprendi, a judge-found fact could essentially increase the statutory maximum for a crime
by moving the locus of the offense to a different provision, thereby allowing offenders with
high criminal history determinations or otherwise aggravated offenses to receive a higher
sentence. After Apprendi, this was no longer possible in some cases. A jury had to pass
on any fact that would shift the offense to a higher statutory maximum if the offender's
sentence would fall above the original statutory cap.
Therefore, if the sentence reductions I estimate are truly a consequence of broader jury
trial rights and not some secular trend or correlation, the effect of broader jury trial rights
I measure should be much larger for those offenses that contained "nested" maximums or
"add-on" provisions, in which Apprendi would more likely apply, relative to offenses in
which Apprendi could have played no role. King and Klein describe these two categories as
follows:
"[A]dd-on" statutes impose a higher maximum for any offense (or for a large subset
of crimes) following proof at sentencing of a specified aggravating fact. Statutes that
add prison time to what would otherwise be a statutory maximum if a firearm was
used, or if there was injury to a victim, or if the crime was committed while on pretrial
release, are additional examples of "add-on" statutes that are subject to the Apprendi
rule.... "Nested" statutes are those that include provisions that define a core offense, but
peg higher sentence ceilings to the presence of aggravating facts as determined by the
sentencing judge. The carjacking provision examined by the Court in Jones v. United
States and the firearms offense interpreted in United States v. Castillo are examples
of such "nested" statutes, as are theft statutes that set the sentence maximum using
the sentencing judge's determination of the value of the item stolen, and drug statutes
that boost maximum sentences for increasing quantities of drugs (King and Klein 2000,
p.331)
I verify that my estimates of Apprendi's consequences are in fact stronger where Ap-
prendi should matter more in two ways. First, many have suggested that Apprendi's effects,
if they were to be felt at all, would affect those charged with drug crimes-in particular,
crimes under provisions containing nested penalties, such as 21 U.S.C. §§841-846 (Lillquist
2004, p.706; Lewis 2001, p.618). Therefore, I re-estimate equation (1.1) using a sample
that includes only offenders convicted of crimes classified as being primarily drug-related.14
Table 6 presents my results. When I restrict my analysis to drug-related cases only, the
estimated effects of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights are substantially higher in
magnitude (at a minimum, 10% higher) than the basic results I report in Table 3.
14As I describe in more detail below, the propriety of comparing offenders sentenced under drug statutes
before and after Apprendi depends on whether prosecutorial charge manipulation alters the composition of
offenders sentenced under those provisions.
Second, using a set of federal statutes collected by King and Klein (2000, App.A) that
are either "nested" or susceptible to "add-ons," I re-estimate equation (1.1) on a sample
containing only offenders whose primary offense fell under at least one of the statutes that
King and Klein identify. Estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7, and are strongly
corroborative of the broader jury rights interpretation of the effects in Table 3. I estimate
that high criminal history types convicted under these statutes received sentences as much
as 10 months shorter because of Apprendi.15 To dismiss these estimates as unrelated to the
expansion of jury trial rights, a plausible alternative explanation would need to explain why
recidivist offenders sentenced under "nested" federal drug statutes, for example, seemed to
do remarkably better post-Apprendi than all other groups. 16
1.6.2 Ruling Out Judicial Manipulation
As I noted above, an offender's criminal history status is largely predetermined. Judges rely
on probation officers to calculate a criminal history score, and there is rarely litigation over
facts of prior conviction. Because criminal history determinations are basically "fixed," I am
able to compare the sentencing trends of different criminal history categories to estimate
the consequences of broader jury trial rights. But judges are not required to be passive
in the determination of criminal history scores. In fact, under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3, judges are
given the power to depart from a preliminary criminal history determination. 17 A change in
judicial departure practice around the time of Apprendi-or even in response to it-might
confound my results if judges began to shift certain offenders into different criminal history
categories.
15If I run equation (1.1) on a data set omitting all sentences premised on Apprendi-relevant statutes,
my estimates drop dramatically. Under all specifications, I can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
on Apprendi x CrimHist from the two sample sets are the same. Still, the estimates using data without
Apprendi-relevant offenses are not zero.
16Apprendi's holding may have systematically affected all criminal prosecutions, not just those to which
the rule literally applied. For example, if broader jury trial rights raised the costs of prosecuting certain
crimes and prosecutorial resources are limited, we would expect to see consequences of the decision in all
post-Apprenda sentencing outcomes. Presumably, a systematic effect would also alter low criminal history
offender prosecutions, causing my results to underestimate the true consequences of expanding jury trial
rights.
'
7 Judges are given the power under 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) to depart from the guidelines range if there exists
an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree., not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Sentencing Guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described." For the commission's departure policy statement, see U.S.S.G. §5K.2.0.
Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 have already offered evidence against this possibility by
showing that the differences in offender composition across criminal history categories did
not change after Apprendi. To further rule out judicial departure behavior as a source of my
results, I re-estimate equation (1.1) after dropping all offenders with sentence calculations
that included a departure related to criminal history.18 The estimates, contained in Table
8, are almost identical to those reported in Table 3. In part, this consistency can be
attributed to the fact that departures related to criminal history are rare. Nevertheless,
judicial departure behavior with respect to criminal history does not appear to underlie
the empirical evidence that expanding jury trial rights benefit defendants by reducing their
sentences.
To further explore the effect of departures on my results, I also re-estimate equation (1.1)
on a sample that excluded all cases involving departures of any kind. The results, reported
in Table 9, suggest that, if anything, judicial departure behavior may have compensated for
or masked the effects of expanding jury trial rights. If departures are removed entirely, I
find that offenders in the high criminal history category experience an average reduction in
their sentences of almost 10 months, which is approximately 10% of the mean sentence for
high criminal history types. Care must be taken when interpreting these numbers, however,
because cases in which departures occur are different from those in which a judge opts for
a presumptive guidelines sentence. The differences in estimates may thus be due to non-
departure differences (in unobserved characteristics) between the two sets of observations.
1.6.3 Controlling for Offense Types
Sentencing ranges are offense-specific. My empirical approach thus runs the risk of capturing
changes over time in the types of crimes that high and low criminal history offenders commit
instead of the effect of Apprendi's expansion of jury trial rights. For example, if for some
unknown reason recidivists became more likely on average to commit less serious crimes
around the time of Apprendi, my empirical approach would incorrectly attribute the lower
average sentence for offenders with significant criminal histories to Apprendi's expansion of
jury trial rights.
'
8 Specifically, I omit all observations in which a judge gave one of the following three reasons for departing
from the presumptive guideline range: "General adequacy of criminal history," "Other adequacy of criminal
history," or "Criminal history overrepresents involvement." 3,945 observations are dropped.
By using information on the types of offenses for which offenders are convicted, I can
significantly reduce the likelihood that my results are driven by a shift in the kinds of crimes
committed around the time of Apprendi.19 Controlling for offense types (as opposed to the
crime committed) is an imperfect solution to this problem.20 Other than demographic and
geographic variables and the rare exception of criminal history scores, sentencing outcomes
are all jointly determined, meaning that the sentence a defendant receives and the statute
under which he receives it may shift in response to a procedural innovation like Apprendi.
But this concern is minor when offenses are grouped, since there is only so much room
for manipulating a charge (fraud cannot be turned into murder, for example). Changes in
charging practices might have included bringing more or fewer charges, or shifting charges
to a related statutory provision, but switching to an entirely different offense type would
have been uncommon.2 1 Therefore, I re-estimate equation (1.1) adding a series of dummy
variables to control for differences in offense type. Table 10 reports my results. Although
the magnitude of the estimates drops slightly, I continue to find that Apprendi's expansion
of jury trial rights benefited offenders: average sentence length for offenders with substantial
criminal history records dropped by over 5 months.22
1.6.4 Anticipation and Adjustment Concerns
The proper definition of pre- and post-periods is central to empirical work using a quasi-
experimental framework. If comparison periods are poorly defined, it can be difficult to
know exactly what effect the researcher has captured. Fortunately, in this study, the precise
date of the legal change is well-known-Apprendi became law on the (lay the Supreme
19ldeally, I would like to compare the sentencing trends of offenders who committed the same crime and
who were otherwise identical except for their falling into different criminal history categories.
2 0Schanzenbach (2005) attempts to account for offense "seriousness" by using cells of the sentencing
guidelines table as control variables. Given the nature of my project (in which, by hypothesis, Apprendi
may put downward or upward pressure on the offense level), I cannot use this approach.
2 1The drawback of using a broad categorization of offenses, of course, is that the larger the group, the
less the researcher is able to avoid comparing apples and oranges-i.e., offenders who committed different
crimes with different statutory ranges.
2 2 In future work, I plan to link offender sentencing records with arrest and investigation data. Because
this sort of data is collected at an early stage in the criminal justice process and relies on the decisions of
a different set of actors, it is more likely to be predetermined and not open to manipulation by prosecutors
and judges. As a result, I can use this data either directly or by way of an instrumental variables framework
to control for biases due to offense-type trends without fear of introducing an endogeneity bias.
Court announced the ruling, June 26, 2000, and the case's holding was both significant and
well-publicized (e.g., Greenhouse 2000). Moreover, because I have monthly (as opposed to
yearly) data, I am able to draw a clean line between the time periods I compare.
Nevertheless, if prosecutors or defendants, anticipating Apprendi's outcome, altered
their behavior prior to the policy's implementation, then my estimates may understate the
true magnitude of any effect. This seems unlikely, however. The ruling in Apprendi was
unexpected, even after the Court granted certiorari. A pre-decision leak of a Supreme Court
ruling seems highly unlikely given the procedures and norms of the Court. In any event, the
leaked holding would have to have been both broadly disseminated and credible in order to
prompt prosecutors and defendants to invest in altering their behavior prematurely. There
is no evidence to suggest that this story is a reasonable possibility.
Another possible "anticipation" scenario, though also unlikely, is that once the case
was before the Supreme Court defense lawyers sought to delay sentencing or the resolution
of an appeal for those cases in which there were plausible Apprendi arguments. On this
account, Apprendi-friendly cases (for example, cases with high criminal history scores or
many aggravating facts that were particularly close to the statutory maximum) would have
been shifted to the post-period. This strategy appears inconsistent with my findings, how-
ever, since offenders close to statutory maximums also typically receive higher sentences.
If anticipation effects were present, we would expect to see sentences rise post-Apprendi,
when in fact they fell. Shifting of this sort is also inconsistent with Figures 3 and 4, which
show a steady flow of sentences around Apprendi.
Another set of concerns may arise if prosecutors or defendants were slow to understand
or adjust to a broader interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. In that case, including
the months immediately following Apprendi in my sample might skew my results. In the
sentencing context, plausible reasons for slow adjustment include cognitive failures on the
part of overworked prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys and the simple information
problem of attorneys not fully appreciating how Apprendi affected their practice. Prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys may also have been overwhelmed by the fallout of the decision
itself. For example, in the wake of Apprendi, federal prosecutors faced the burden of fil-
ing thousands of superseding indictments to account for the change in the law. Moreover,
sentencing under the guidelines is complicated, and the Supreme Court's announcement
of a new rule does nothing to ensure that relevant players (including probation officers)
interpret and apply the rule correctly from the outset. The threat of appellate review and
the adversarial environment may have provided incentives to learn quickly, but nevertheless
the immediate post-Apprendi period may not have been representative of behavior under
broader jury trial rights generally.
I treat these issues by re-estimating equation (1.1) on data that excludes the six months
prior to and following Apprendi. The twelve-month window ought to eliminate any anticipa-
tion effects generated by the Court's granting of certiorari as well as accord prosecutors and
defense counsel half a year to adjust to Apprendi's new requirements. In Table 11, I report
my results, which demonstrate the robustness of Table 3's baseline estimates. Repeating
this exercise using a number of other variations does not change the outcome-omitting the
five months, four months, and three months before and after Apprendi, as well as removing
the first nine months of my sample, makes no difference. In all cases, Apprendi systemati-
cally reduced the sentences of high criminal history category offenders by approximately 6
months.
1.6.5 Controlling for Pre-existing Sentencing Trends
Comparisons of outcomes from pre- and post-periods must control for trends that might
cause period "averages" to misrepresent the real behavior of an outcome variable over time.
For example, although the simple means in Table 2 are suggestive of what happened before
and after Apprendi was decided, the higher "average" for high criminal history types in the
pre-period may mask a downward trend. It is possible, in other words, that at the end of
the pre-Apprendi period, immediately before Apprendi, the actual average sentence length
was much lower than the pre-period's overall average. Similarly, it is possible that the lower
"average" for the same group in the post-Apprendi period masks a higher starting point
and a lower ending point-i.e., a downward trend that is correlated with Apprendi.
Figures 5 and 6 (which plot the average prison sentence for each of three criminal history
groups using a three-month running average) allow an initial assessment of these concerns:
neither figure shows a trend for any of the criminal history categories pre-Apprendi. Around
the time of Apprendi, however, the average sentences for offenders in the higher criminal
history groups appear to drop, especially in the first six months, and, in the case of Figure
6, especially for the highest criminal history type. On the whole, nothing indicates that the
regression results are capturing some other confounding trend.
To further reduce the likelihood that my estimates capture a pre-existing trend in sen-
tencing, I re-estimated equation (1.1), adding a linear time-trend and trend-squared. I
report the results in Table 12. Adding a trend does not alter the basic message of my
results-in fact, the results are almost identical to those reported in Table 3.
In Table 13, I present estimates from a regression similar to equation (1.1) but where
Apprendi and Apprendi x CrimHist had been replaced with three-month period dummies
and interaction of those dummies with CrimHist. If Apprendi x CrimHist were capturing
the consequences of an unrelated trend or some other change during the sample period (say,
10 months before Apprendi), we would see negative estimates emerge that much earlier.
Instead, the pattern of the coefficients supports the interpretation that it is Apprendi's
expansion of jury trial rights that reduced offenders' sentences. There is one exception:
two periods before Apprendi was decided, the estimate of the interaction is negative. But
this unexpected negative coefficient occurs during the period in which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for Apprendi, a finding which is indicative of anticipation effects (which
are in turn controlled for in subsection 1.6.4, where I omit that period). In sum, I find
nothing in the data to indicate that my results are a spurious consequence of non-Apprendi
dynamics in sentencing.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the consequences for defendants of expanding Sixth Amendment criminal
jury trial rights. I use the limited reach of the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, the calculations required by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and
individual-level sentencing data to create groups of offenders who were differentially affected
by Apprendi's expansion of jury rights but who were otherwise similar. By comparing the
change in sentence length of these groups before and after Apprendi, I am able to identify
and measure the effect of the broader jury trial rights mandated by that decision. For those
most affected, I find that broader jury trial rights reduced sentences by over 6 months or
more than 5 percent.
My finding that expanding Sixth Amendment jury trial rights reduces offender sentences
has important and immediate policy relevance. The recent string of decisions in the Supreme
Court has left the future of federal sentencing policy unclear (Rosen 2005). Blakely, decided
last year, extended the logic of Apprendi to aggravating sentencing facts generally (not
only facts that cause an offender's sentence to "bump up" against the statutory maximum),
and therefore expanded jury trial rights much further than Apprendi did. Blakely did
not expressly address sentencing under the federal guidelines, but if it had, my results
suggest that Blakely would likely have substantially reduced the sentences of many federal
defendants.
When the Supreme Court applied the logic of Blakely to the federal sentencing guide-
lines early this year in Booker, however, it put the scope of jury trial rights firmly in the
hands of Congress. Booker ruled in effect that aggravating facts under the federal sen-
tencing guidelines must be decided by juries and proved beyond a reasonable doubt only
if those facts have mandatory consequences. If aggravating facts have only discretionary
consequences--that is, if the sentencing judge need not impose a higher sentence if the fact
is found-then the fact can be determined by a judge and proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Thus, the Court's decision forces Congress to choose between "mandatory"
guidelines (beyond a reasonable doubt jury factfinding) or "discretionary" guidelines (pre-
ponderance of the evidence judicial factfinding and discretion). My results imply that the
path selected by Congress and the states will have serious consequences for offenders.
My empirical work also speaks to larger questions about the real-world effects of crim-
inal procedure. First and foremost, it suggests that procedural protections meaningfully
influence actual outcomes, presumably by constraining powerful prosecutors. The debate
over whether the "shadow of the law" is shrinking in the criminal procedure context is a
case in point: the answer, at least according to the results of this study, is that prosecutors
are significantly constrained by jury protections and heightened proof requirements. My
conclusion that expanding jury trial rights reduces average sentence length also supports
the notion that changes in criminal procedure will affect substantive criminal law. The
expansion of jury trial rights has in effect reduced criminal penalties, and one would expect
that to influence the ability of criminal law to deter potential offenders.
In future work, I plan to address the "how" question that emerges from my findings.
What role do prosecutors and judges play in animating-or undermining-jury trial pro-
tections? Do offenders with broader jury trial rights benefit through, for example, less
severe charges, bargaining concessions, or acquittals on additional counts? In other words,
do prosecutors use the same strategies, but simply fail more often? Or do they change
their approach in an attempt to "undo" procedural protections? This study and its results
indicate that, as commentators at the time of the decision believed, Apprendi changed the
legal landscape of criminal procedure. It thus provides a rare and useful tool to disentangle
how players in the criminal justice system behave, and perhaps more importantly, what
goals they seek to achieve.
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1.9 Appendix: Plea Bargaining with Jury Trial Rights
Jury trial rights, when they exist, are part of a complicated bargaining-oriented litigation
environment in which the differences between judge and jury decision making and the cost
of factfinding play important roles in determining outcomes and strategy (Bibas 2001a,
2001b). And, since almost all federal criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains,
prosecutorial and defendant responses at stages prior to the actual application of broader
jury trial rights must be taken into account when evaluating possible consequences. In
this Appendix, I build a simple plea-bargaining model that incorporates (1) differences in
judge and jury decision making, (2) prosecutorial factfinding costs, and (3) the sequential
structure of criminal prosecution. I conclude that under certain conditions, expanding jury
trial rights may worsen offender outcomes.
1.9.1 Model Preliminaries
I model federal factfinding as a four-stage bargaining game (see Baker and Mezzetti 2001;
Reinganum 1988, 2000; Grossman and Katz 1983). I make a number of simplifying as-
sumptions to make the model tractable and capable of offering testable predictions. First, I
assume that defendants maximize their utility by minimizing their sentence. Second, pros-
ecutors seek to maximize the cost-adjusted sentence imposed (meaning that prosecutors
price sentences and trade off the benefits of a longer sentence with the costs of achieving
that sentence). I do not explicitly include the cost of defense for criminal defendants, both
to simplify the game and because in a large percentage of cases the government pays for
criminal defense. 23
Following Reinganum (2000), I assume that a defendant commits an offense with severity
x before he enters the formal legal system. The defendant knows the true value of x, but
the prosecutor only knows that x is a random variable X, which is distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function F(-), with density f(-) and support [., ±]. If the
defendant is innocent, severity (x) is close to zero. The prosecutor charges the defendant
with having committed an offense with severity 2. The court has the same information
that the prosecutor does-in particular, the court knows F(-) and that charges above t
cannot be supported by evidence. Consequently, prosecutors do not charge higher severity
levels, since a (law-abiding) court would unilaterally throw out or reduce the charges. I
also assume that prosecutors charge the maximum possible severity even though it may
sometimes be in their interest to charge less.
Once the crime (if any) has been committed and the prosecutor has charged the highest
possible severity level, the "game" between the prosecutor and the defendant begins. The
purpose of the game is for a court of law to determine the severity of the crime, either
through a plea bargain, a jury trial, or a bench trial. The severity of the crime (once
23Also, to avoid unnecessary formalism, I largely gloss over two very important earlier stages: (1) the
decision to commit a crime and (2) the decision to bring charges.
determined) translates into a sentence that increases in length with severity (through a
judge exercising discretion or mechanically applying a set of mandatory guidelines).
As Figure Al shows, the prosecutor and defendant alternate in making decisions, each
moving twice. First, the prosecutor makes a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain offer (xp) to the
defendant. Second, the defendant chooses whether to accept that offer. If the defendant
accepts the offer, the game ends.
If the defendant rejects the plea offer, the game enters the third stage: the defendant
must choose whether to accept a jury as a factfinder or "waive" that right by requesting a
bench trial. A federal jury trial right works by setting a jury trial as the default, meaning
that a jury will be used unless the defendant moves to substitute a judge. If the defendant
selects a jury, the jury determines the severity, and the defendant is sentenced on the basis
of that determination.
If the defendant waives the jury, the game enters the fourth stage, at least under federal
law (and the law of many states): the prosecutor must choose whether to allow the waiver
or to object, thereby forcing a jury trial (see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23).24 This last stage may
be practically unimportant for a number of reasons (Leipold 2005, pp.21-22), but Bibas
(2001a, p.1158) places particular importance on its possible consequences when arguing
that broader jury trial rights have the potential to burden, not benefit, criminal offenders.
1.9.2 Factfinding Outcomes and Prosecutorial Costs
So far I have set out the aims of prosecutors and defendants, what they know, and how and
when they are allowed to make decisions. To resolve how defendants and prosecutors will
behave, what outcomes will result, and under what conditions, two more features of the
bargaining environment must be defined: (1) how factfinders (judges and juries) determine
severity, and (2) what costs prosecutors and defendants face.
I define the jury factfinding outcome (or severity determination) as Ojr(a, x, 5, w) and
the judge factfinding outcome as Ojd(a, 7r, ). The parameter a represents the standard of
proof (a E {abrd, ape}, with Obrd = "beyond a reasonable doubt" and ape = "preponderance
of the evidence"). A higher standard of proof applied to the same evidence results in a
lower determination of severity, all else even. Formally, I define a such that abrd > ape
and O0/oa < 0. The parameter 7r is a signal of fact severity such that E(r) = x, with
r - G(-) on the support [, Lr]. 7r is positively correlated with actual severity, meaning that
a higher 7r is more likely to come from a defendant who committed a more severe crime.
The parameter .t is the fact severity charged, and w E {objection, no objection}, captures
the effect on the outcome, if any, of a prosecutor's having objected to a jury trial waiver
(see the discussion of prosecutorial costs below).
24For cases involving this rule, see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); United States v.
Duarte-Higareda. 113 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1997). Fisher (2000, p.1072) and Kurland (1993, pp.32 1-2 3
& nn.39, 40, 42, 43 & 45) discuss this rule and its state-level counterparts.
The key feature of these definitions relates to the signal of severity, r. x and 7r are
positively correlated and only the defendant knows x, so the defendant has different (better)
information about the likely outcome of any trial. Because the information sets of the
prosecutor and defendant differ, it is possible in equilibrium for plea offers to be rejected
by defendants. 25
Costs are important in this bargaining environment because, as noted above, prosecutors
prefer a higher "cost-adjusted" sentence, all else even. In the last stage, the prosecutor
has to decide whether to object to a jury trial waiver if the defendant attempts to waive
his jury trial right. But objecting is not free. I assume that objecting to a bench trial
insults or annoys the judge (Klein 2004, p.1353 n.20), who can punish the prosecutor by
manipulating his procedural and evidentiary rulings. Prosecutors regularly cite this "cost"
to justify their decision not to object to a jury waiver (Leipold 2005, p. 2 2 n.57). Therefore,
Ojr(a, 7r, Ino waiver) > Oj,(a, w, tIwaiver). That is, a jury trial by default does not
produce the same outcome (in fact, it always produces a higher sentence) as a forced jury
trial. Once a defendant waives his jury trial right, the prosecutor may still prefer a jury to
a judge (because a jury trial with a judge hostile to the prosecutor may still result in higher
expected sentence than a bench trial), and he may decide to force a jury trial, although doing
so is costly (above and beyond any extra resources made necessary by a jury trial). Define
the resulting difference in sentences as Aw,(.), where Aw,(.) = Ojr(a, 7r, ýno waiver) -
Ojr(o , 7, l waiver) > 0.
A prosecutor will not exercise his ability to "undo" a defendant's decision to waive a
jury trial, even if a lower sentence will result, if the costs of objecting to that waiver are
sufficiently high. Unless Aw is very small, however, the illusory "option" still has some
value above and beyond a jury-only scheme, because even an attempt to waive the jury
trial right has the defendant-friendly consequence of forcing the prosecutor to annoy the
judge.
There is a second cost the prosecutor must take into account when a defendant has a jury
trial right: a jury trial requires more prosecutorial resources than a bench trial because of
the additional time and resources required to explain law and evidence to a lay jury and/or
because the rules of evidence can exclude the least expensive methods of demonstrating
necessary facts. 26 I define Cjr() and Cjd(X), as the total cost (in sentence-length units)
25I assume that x is not correlated with the difference, if any, in the expected outcomes of judges and
juries. If a jury is defendant-friendly, not only is it defendant friendly for all levels of x, but the difference
between a judge and jury outcome is constant. If this condition does not hold, the game becomes more
complicated because the defendant would reveal usable information to the prosecutor at both the plea
bargaining stage and at the waiver stage. For example, when the prosecutor makes a plea offer on the basis
of F(x), if the defendant accepts, the prosecutor updates his prior understanding of the severity distribution
to F(xlplea accepted). In other words, the prosecutor learns of a higher lower bound for actual severity. If
the assumption above were not made, this would affect his later decision of whether to object to a waiver.
26The government often pays (some of) a defendant's legal fees, and so I do not consider separately the
increased cost to a defendant of a jury trial. A more complicated model would consider the possibility that
defendants might be resource constrained. If so, there is likely to be a strategic incentive for prosecutors
to force a jury trial in order to raise their rivals' costs. The cost parameter can alternatively be taken to
represent the difference between the incremental costs for prosecutors and defendants. Because a prosecutor
of trying the facts charged t to a jury and judge, respectively. I also define the additional
cost of a jury trial as Ac(=) - Cjr(t) - Cjd(.), again where 5 represents the severity level
the prosecutor seeks to demonstrate to a particular factfinder.
I assume that all cost information is known to both prosecutors and defendants and
that it costs the prosecutor (weakly) more to prove a fact to a jury than to a judge, i.e.,
that V 2, Ac > 0. This difference-which represents the additional cost for a prosecutor to
prove facts in a system with jury trial rights-is one reason why some commentators have
argued that expanding jury trial rights will benefit defendants.
1.9.3 Solving for Equilibrium Strategies and Outcomes
I can now assemble all of these pieces and describe how expanding jury trial rights may affect
the outcomes for prosecutors and defendants. I can also state the empirical conditions under
which defendants, according to the model, will be better or worse off in terms of expected
sentences under broader jury trial rights. To do this, I begin with the last stage of the game,
the prosecutor's decision whether to object to a waiver, and then work backward toward
the plea bargaining stage.
If the defendant attempts to waive his jury trial right, the prosecutor will object if the
judge is relatively defendant-friendly and the costs of forcing a jury trial are sufficiently
low. IMore precisely, the prosecutor will object if:
E[Ojd(a,7r,)] < E[Ojr(abrd,7r, lwaiver)]- Ac( )
Using the definition of Aw, the conditions under which a prosecutor will object can be
rewritten to make explicit the costs a prosecutor faces:
E[Ojr(Ubd,7r, ,lno waiver)] - E[Ojd(a, 7, t)] > A,(±) + Aw( )
This Objection Condition has a simple interpretation: A prosecutor will not exercise his
ability to "undo" a defendant's decision to waive a jury trial, even if a lower sentence is
expected to result, if the costs of objecting to that waiver are sufficiently high. In the limit,
as A(~() + Aw(±) -4 oo, defendants have a full jury trial option, since prosecutors will
not object to a waiver no matter how defendant-friendly a judge may be. On the other
hand, as Ac(±) + Aw(2) -4 0, the prosecutor will always force a jury trial if the prosecutor
expects that a jury will produce a higher sentence. If juries are always prosecutor friendly,
then there is no jury trial "option" at all-the defendant has no choice but to have facts
determined by a hostile jury.
Given the prosecutor's response, when will a defendant choose to "attempt" a waiver?
If we assume that A,() > 0 (i.e., objecting to a waiver is costly to a prosecutor), the
bears the burden of proof, it is at least plausible that it is disproportionately more expensive for prosecutors
to put facts to a jury than it is for a defendant to defend a jury trial.
defendant will waive his jury trial option if:
E[Ojd(a,7r, t )] < E[Ojr(Ubrd, 7r, •Ino waiver)]
This Waiver Condition's interpretation is even more straightforward. The defendant will
only waive his jury trial right if he believes the judge is defendant-friendly relative to a
jury.27
Importantly, the defendant prefers to waive his jury trial right if the Waiver Condition
holds even if he knows the prosecutor will object. This is true by assumption, since A, (.) >
0. If Aw(.() is low (but non-negative) such that E[Ojd(O, 7r, t)] < E[Ojr(abd, 7r, lwaiver)] <
E[Ojr(abrd, 7r, tlnowaiver)], the prosecutor will force a jury trial, but the defendant prefers
this forced trial to not waiving because the judge punishes the prosecutor. If A,(±) is
high, such that E[Ojd(a, 7r, )] < E[Oj,(abrd, 7r, ~ nowaiver)] < E[Ojr(abrd, 7r,~Iwaiver)],
the defendant will waive and hope for an objection, but the prosecutor will prefer judicial
factfinding (unless, for some reason, Ac(±) is sufficiently negative).
For any set of cost parameters and judge/jury disparities, the Objection Condition and
the Waiver Condition ensure that one of three possible outcomes emerge, if the plea bargain
offer is rejected:
(no waiver, N/A) === default jury trial
(waiver, objection) ==> forced jury trial
(waiver, no objection) ===> bench trial
The equilibrium that results depends on the relationship of the expected jury outcome
to a judge outcome, the cost (in terms of expected outcome) to the prosecutor of objecting
to a waiver, and the additional cost to the prosecutor (in financial terms) of a jury trial,
relative to a. bench trial. Very shortly, I will examine how these possible outcomes compare
to what a defendant would face without a jury trial right.
Before studying the possible consequences of expanding jury trial rights, it is important
to account for the fact that very few criminal prosecutions actually end in either a bench
or jury trial--over 90% of criminal prosecutions are resolved through plea bargaining. The
goal of this paper is to study the real-world consequences of broader jury trial rights, and,
in the existing criminal justice system, the response of plea bargaining behavior to legal
changes is central to any empirical sentencing project. Therefore, it is necessary to ask how
a prosecutor's plea offer (and a defendant's decision whether to accept) is determined in a
factfinding system that includes a jury trial right.
27My notation assumes that a judge does not punish a defendant for exercising his jury trial rights, or,
put differently, a judge does not reward the defendant for waiving his jury trial right. Some have suggested
otherwise, noting that defendants may be rewarded by a judge at sentencing for waiving their jury trial rights
(see Bibas 2001a, p. 1 155 n.346). This possibility can be easily incorporated into the model by assuming that
a judge is systematically more friendly in a jury rights system than in a judicial factfinding system.
Which of the three possible outcomes the prosecutor anticipates absent a plea bargain
will determine the plea offer he makes to the defendant in stage one of the game. The
prosecutor offers a plea xp that trades off the costs of taking the case to trial and the loss
(in terms of a lower sentence) of offering an overly lenient plea bargain. The defendant will
accept the bargain if the plea offer is lower than the sentence he expects to receive if he
rejects the offer.
Formally, he will accept a plea offer of x, if xp • E,[O(ir)Ix] or if xp 5 f O(7r)
g(7rx)d7r. Because the prosecutor only knows the distribution of x, from the prosecutor's
perspective the probability that the defendant will accept the plea offer is B(xp) = P(xp •
fr O(7r)g(7rJx)dr) = P(xp 5 E,[O(r)Ix]). Note that B'(xp) < 0, which has the intuitive
interpretation that the probability that the defendant will find the plea bargain attractive
(given x) declines as xp increases.
The prosecutor will make a plea offer that maximizes the expected "cost-adjusted" sen-
tence S. Thus, the prosecutor selects xp to maximize B(xp). (xp) + (1 - B(xp)) . (E,[O(r)] -
C). The first order condition with respect to x, is B'(xp) .Xp + B(xp) - (E,[O(7r)] - C)
B'(xp) = 0. Solving for x, yields:
S= (E7[O(Tr)]- C) B'(xp)
The first term is the prosecutor's expected "cost-adjusted" trial outcome. The second term
- ,_•_• which is positive since B'(xp) < 0, represents the prosecutor's share of the surplus
created by the bargain. Therefore, the prosecutor offers a discount from the expected trial
outcome E[O(7r)], which is designed to increase the defendant's likelihood of accepting the
plea (thereby saving the prosecutor factfinding trial costs) without giving away too much.
Notice that B'(xp) < 0 and L < 0, which has the straightforward interpretation that
the length of plea offers will decline the more it costs a prosecutor to put on the trial.
Since jury trials are more expensive for the prosecutor than bench trials, equilibrium plea
bargained sentences will drop as a system moves more toward jury trials, even if judges and
juries produce identical outcomes.
Notice also that > 0. This condition captures the classic idea that plea bargains
will mimic appropriately discounted trial outcomes, or that pleas will be negotiated in the
"shadow" of the trial.28 The higher the expected sentence at trial, the more aggressive the
prosecutor will bargain, by offering a higher xp. The defendant accepts the bargain xp if
he believes (conditional on his knowledge of x) that his expected trial sentence is higher.
In equilibrium, defendants will both accept and reject plea offers, because defendants have
superior knowledge regarding what is likely to happen at trial.
28This model assumes that prosecutors care about costs by assuming that they will trade off a higher
sentence to save resources. This is not necessarily the case, as Stuntz (2004) makes clear. Therefore, if
empirical analysis were to show that there was no effect of expanded jury trial rights, it might mean that
the assumptions of the model need modification.
1.9.4 Possible Consequences of Expanding Jury Trial Rights
The foregoing analysis aims to make specific and concrete the important features of a jury
trial right. But to evaluate the theoretical consequences of giving defendants jury trial
rights, I must compare the outcomes of factfinding with a jury trial right, to the outcomes
of a regime that lacks this feature. Prior to the Apprendi line of cases, defendants had no
jury trial right as to sentencing facts-all such facts were decided by judges. Therefore, the
appropriate baselines for comparison are the outcomes that emerge from judicial factfinding.
Figure A2 depicts a factfinding game with only judicial factfinding (i.e., without a jury
trial right). The judicial factfinding game is simple. If the defendant rejects the plea offer,
the outcome is Ojd(Ubrd, 7r, t).29 If the defendant accepts the bargain, the sentencing is xp.
The problem the prosecutor solves in choosing the plea offer is identical to the game with the
federal jury trial right above. The key difference is that, if bargaining fails, the two jury trial
outcomes (with waiver and objection or without waiver) are not available. The introduction
of these possibilities (and their effect on plea bargaining) generate the "consequences" of a
jury trial right. We can organize these consequences into three propositions.
First, if on average judges are defendant-friendly relative to juries, but not so friendly
that it pays for the prosecutor to object to a jury waiver, then the defendant's position has
not changed, and a jury trial right is irrelevant. This occurs if the Waiver Condition is
satisfied, but the Objection Condition is not, so defendants and prosecutors both prefer
judicial factfinding. There are a number of ways this can happen. For example, it might
be that judges are very defendant-friendly, but the costs to the prosecutor of objecting are
extremely high. Alternatively, the costs to objecting might be very low, but the benefit to
the defendant of choosing a judge or a jury might be even more slight, though positive. For
the set of cases in this category, nothing has changed: the prosecutor's plea offer xp should
be identical, since the consequence of the defendant's refusal is judicial factfinding in either
scenario.
Second, if judges are defendant-friendly on average, but objecting to a jury trial waiver
is less expensive to the prosecutor than allowing a bench trial, then the defendant is worse
off, and a jury trial right harms the defendant. This occurs if the Waiver Condition and the
Objection Condition are both satisfied, so the defendant prefers a judge, but the pros-
ecutor is willing to force a jury trial. The defendant, in other words, is incapable of
exercising any jury trial "option." This may be because objecting is inexpensive to the
prosecutor, or because the benefit to the defendant of a bench trial is very high. The de-
fendant also suffers at the plea bargaining stage. The Objection Condition is satisfied by
assumption, so E[Ojd(O, r, ý)] < E[Ojr(abrd, i, r.Iwaiver)] - Ac(), which can be rewrit-
ten E[Ojr(Ubrd, r,: Iwaiver)] - Cjr( ) > E[Ojd(a,7 r,t)] - Cjd(:), which means that the
E[O(7)] - C term in the prosecutor's offer equation increases. Differentiating xp with re-
spect to E[O(r)] - C generates a positive derivative, which tells us that the prosecutor's
offer will be less lenient.
29 The Apprendi line also raised the standard of proof for sentencing facts from "preponderance of evidence"
to "beyond a reasonable doubt." Incorporating that change into the analysis is straightforward, as I describe
below.
Third, if juries are defendant-friendly on average, then the defendant is better off, and
a jury trial right benefits a defendant. This occurs because the Waiver Condition is not
satisfied, so the defendant prefers the jury trial and will not attempt to waive. Although
costs matter to plea bargaining outcomes, whether the Objection Condition is satisfied is
itself irrelevant. In these cases, the defendant is unambiguously better off with a federal jury
trial right, because the jury is defendant friendly and it is more expensive for the prosecutor
to prosecute. If the case goes to trial, the defendant will wind up better off with a more
defendant-friendly judge. The trial will also cost more to prosecute to a jury. During plea
bargaining, the prosecutor will take both of these effects into account and, since > 0,
A,(.) > 0, and > 0, he will reduce the plea offer.30
The conclusion of this analysis is that the consequences of expanding federal jury trial
rights (in which a prosecutor can object to a jury trial waiver) turn on the relative defendant
friendliness of judges and juries and the particulars of prosecutorial costs. An important
conclusion is that if (1) forcing a jury trial is fairly inexpensive to a prosecutor and (2)
judges are relatively more defendant-friendly than juries, then defendants will be worse off,
both in the terms of trial outcomes and plea bargains. Another important finding is that
if prosecutorial costs are high, the defendant has a true jury trial option, and is therefore
unambiguously better off. Which of these scenarios accurately characterizes the effects of
expanding jury trial rights is the empirical question that this paper seeks to answer in
Sections 1.4 through 1.6 above.
1.9.5 Raising the Standard of Proof
In this section, I incorporate the fact that the Apprendi line of cases did more than expand
jury trial rights as I describe above. Those cases also required that all facts covered by a
jury trial right be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (see Bibas 2001a, pp.1156-58). The
model itself is sufficiently general to account for the change in standard of proof required
under Apprendi: the standard of proof was already included in the definition of how judges
and juries arrived at severity determinations. I assumed above that Ojr(abrd, ir,.,w) <
Ojr( •e, 7r,r,w) and Ojd(rbrd, 7r,.t, w) < Ojd(ape,, 7r,, ,w), where a represents the standard
of proof. This assumption means that for both judges and juries, a higher standard of proof
always moves the severity determination in favor of the defendant, at least weakly. This
shift will also be reflected in plea bargains, because x > 0. Scholars have suggested
that judges and juries might interpret and apply standards of proof differently (Kalven and
Zeisel 1966; Eisenberg et. al 2005, p. 7 n.31) and therefore a change in standards might
have different consequences for judge and jury determinations, but those differences too are
captured in the post-Apprendi judge and jury outcomes, as I have already defined them.
Otherwise, the mechanics of the game are unchanged.
30 1f one expands the game to include a prosecutor's charging decisions, it is possible to show that, for
cases in this category, the prosecutor would charge fewer defendants or charge each defendant with lesser
crimes. This is because proving facts has become more expensive, and so, at the margin, it is optimal for
the prosecutor to be less aggressive.
The change in the standard of proof must be incorporated, however, because it fur-
ther limits the circumstances under which expanding jury trial rights might harm defen-
dants.31 For defendants to be worse off with broader jury trial rights, the satisfaction of
both the Waiver Condition and the Objection Condition is necessary, but not sufficient: it
is possible that the defendant prefers a judge to a jury for a given standard of proof, but
would prefer a jury with a higher standard of proof to a judge with a lower standard of
proof. More precisely, for the set of cases in which the Objection Condition is satisfied,
and Ojr(abrd,7r, t,W) < Ojd(Upe,7r, t,w) < Ojr(ape, 7r, ,W), defendants would have been
harmed by expanding jury trial rights but for the benefits of the higher standard of proof.
Since the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a central feature of the constitutional
jury trial rights afforded defendants in the United States, I amend the second proposition in
subsection 1.9.4 to account for this feature: if a judge using a "preponderance of evidence"
standard is more defendant-friendly than a jury using a "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard, but objecting to a jury trial waiver is less expensive to the prosecutor than allowing a
bench trial, then the defendant is worse off, and a jury trial right harms the defendant.
1.9.6 Introducing versus Expanding Jury Trial Rights
The Apprendi line of cases did not introduce criminal jury trial rights, but rather expanded
existing jury trial rights to cover sentencing facts. Offense facts (or elements) were already
covered by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. An important question is whether the
existing application of jury trial rights to offense facts has any significance for assessing the
possible consequences of expanding jury trial rights to sentencing facts. By appending to
the model above a preceding set of factfinding stages (with jury trial rights) in which offense
facts are determined, it can be shown that the consequences of existing jury trial rights turn
on the particular contours of the prosecutorial costs detailed above-the additional cost of
prosecuting a trial to a jury as opposed to a judge, and the cost of objecting to a jury trial
waiver-as well as on how judges and juries make their factfinding decisions.
The introduction of a preceding set of offense factfinding stages generates effects that run
in both directions between offense factfinding and sentencing factfinding-all outcomes are
determined endogenously. First, behavior and outcomes in the offense factfinding portion
of the game affect the initial conditions of the sentencing factfinding game. For example,
if prosecutorial jury trial costs display significant scale economies, a prosecutor may face a
much lower Ac during sentence factfinding if offense facts were presented to a jury, which
might cause a prosecutor to object to a jury trial waiver or reduce his plea offer, if a
jury trial would follow, since jury trial costs figure into those decisions. Second, precisely
because behavior and outcomes in the offense factfinding stage have effects at the sentencing
factfinding stage, prosecutors and defendants will adjust their behavior to account for the
consequences of their decisions at later stages. For instance, a prosecutor may be able
31 It also magnifies the benefits for those defendants whose position was already improved by the extension
of jury trial rights.
to commit to forcing a jury trial (and therefore may exact a better plea bargain) at the
sentencing stage by having presented offense facts to the jury. The prosecutor will take this
positive externality into account when deciding whether to object to a jury trial waiver.
A detailed model of the differences between "expanding" and "introducing" jury trial
rights is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting how an expanded model
might make a difference in a defendant's position relative to the simple model above. Be-
low, I briefly discuss how an expanded model might play out under a number of different
conditions.3 2 The analysis is informal, and is organized around a defendant's preferences
over judges and juries for offense and sentencing factfinding. Although a model in which
jury trial rights are "expanded" rather than "introduced" is more realistic in its complexity,
understanding the consequences of broadening jury trial rights requires empirical analysis.
To determine the existence, direction, and magnitude of any effect, data are necessary.
There are two plausible ways to model "broader" jury trial rights. One way is to
view pre-Apprendi defendants as having a jury trial right as to some facts, but not as to
others, and treat all facts as if they are negotiated and determined simultaneously. On this
approach, the prosecutors offer a plea bargain knowing that, if the offer is rejected, some
of the facts will be determined by a judge while the defendant will have a jury trial right
as to the others. The Apprendi-line simply extended jury trial rights as to all facts. A
second way to interpret "broader" jury trial rights is to view the prosecutor and defendant
as bargaining over a longer sequential game, with a game to determine offense facts followed
by a similar., if not identical, game to determine sentencing facts. I take the second approach
here.
Case #1: Assume that a defendant prefers a jury for both offense and sentencing
facts. In the simple model, I showed that providing a jury trial right always improves a
defendant's position if a jury is defendant-friendly relative to the judge.
Now consider an expanded model in which jury trial rights already exist for offense
facts. In the Fpre-period, if plea bargaining fails, the defendant selects a jury for offense
factfinding, but will be legally forced to rely on judicial factfinding for sentencing facts. In
the post-period, because the defendant always prefers a jury, the defendant will exercise
his jury right for sentencing facts. If prosecutorial jury trial costs display significant scale
economies, then, because plea bargaining fails with positive probability at the sentencing
stage, the prosecutor will offer a more severe sentence xp at the offense stage because jury
trial costs as to offense facts drop, but not by as much as his sentencing fact plea offer will
drop, as a consequence of the defendant's credible jury trial threat.
Conclusion: The defendant will usually be better off with broader jury trial rights, but
to a lesser extent than in the simple model. The defendant might be worse off if the scale
economies of a jury trial are so great that the cost of trying all facts to a jury falls below the
32• refer to the period before the Apprendi-line of cases, when there were jury trial rights only for offense
facts, as the pre-period. and the period after jury trial rights are extended to all facts as the post-period.
For simplicity, I ignore the consequences of change in the standard of proof, since its role is no different than
in the simple model.
total cost of trying offense facts to a jury and sentencing facts to a judge. In the expanded
model, the prosecutor can mitigate some of the consequences of the broader jury trial rights
by changing his behavior at the offense stage.
Case #2: Assume the defendant prefers a jury for offense facts but a judge for sen-
tencing facts. In the simple model, I showed that the defendant is in the same position
with or without a jury trial right if he prefers a judge, unless the costs to the prosecutor of
forcing a jury trial are sufficiently low.
Now consider an expanded model. In the pre-period, if plea bargaining fails, the de-
fendant selects a jury for offense facts and enjoys the required judicial factfinding at the
sentencing stage. In the post-period, if the costs of objecting to a jury trial waiver at the
sentencing stage are very high, the prosecutor has an incentive (at the margin) to raise
his offense fact plea offer to the defendant, although not by enough to compensate for the
lower plea offer he must make at the sentencing stage. But if the costs of objecting are
fairly low, and if prosecutorial jury trial costs display significant scale economies, then the
prosecutor can do more: he might find it pays to significantly lower his plea offer at the
offense stage, raising the chances of a jury trial, which in turn lowers the costs of objecting
to a jury trial waiver to the point where the prosecutor will prefer to force a jury trial at
the sentencing stage. Note that the defendant will also adjust his behavior at the offense
stage. The prosecutor may make his plea offer worse at the sentencing stage to force a jury
trial, but the defendant will find it optimal to accept a worse plea bargain, considering the
strategic advantage that declining the offer gives to the prosecutor.
Conclusion: The defendant may be better or worse off with broader jury trial rights. In
the expanded model, the prosecutor will alter his behavior during the offense stage (which
the defendant will be only partially able to undo) at least at the margin, and may do so
dramatically of the prosecutor can commit to forcing a jury trial at the sentencing stage.
Case #3: Assume that a defendant prefers a judge for offense facts but a jury for
sentencing facts (the reverse of case #2). In the simple model, I showed that a preference
for a jury rights means that a jury trial right benefits a defendant.
Now consider an expanded model. In the pre-period, if plea bargaining fails, the defen-
dant waives his jury trial right (if the prosecutor does not object) as to offense facts and is
constrained by the judicial factfinding at the sentencing stage. In the post-period, now that
he is given a choice, the defendant will always select a jury at sentencing, but he may wish
he could commit to waiving his right. The reason is that the prosecutor, in anticipation of
being required to put on a jury trial at the sentencing stage, may find it optimal to force a
jury trial at the offense stage as well. If the costs to the prosecutor of objecting to a jury
trial waiver are very high, then the prosecutor does not change his behavior at the offense
stage (if he raised his plea offer, and it was rejected, the defendant would waive his jury
trial right and the prosecutor would allow it, given the prosecutor no cost savings later). If
prosecutorial jury trial costs display significant scale economies, however, then the fact that
a jury trial will happen with positive probability at the sentencing stage will lower the costs
of objecting to a jury trial waiver, perhaps to the point where it becomes optimal for the
prosecutor to object to the waiver and force a jury trial. If the defendant gains less from
having a jury at the sentencing stage than he loses from a forced jury trial at the offense
stage, then he is worse off with broader jury trial rights.
Conclusion: The defendant may be better or worse off with a broadening of jury trial
rights. In the expanded model, it is possible that the inability of the defendant to commit
to waiving a jury trial at the sentencing stage will lead a prosecutor to force a jury trial at
the offense stage.
Case #4: Assume that a defendant prefers a judge for both offense and sentence facts.
In the simple model, I showed that a jury trial right will worsen a defendant's position if
the costs of objecting to a jury trial waiver are low.
Now consider an expanded model. In the pre-period, the defendant will attempt to waive
his jury trial right as to offense facts, and will enjoy obligatory judicial factfinding. In the
post-period, the prosecutor has a new option of forcing a jury trial right as to sentencing
facts. If a judge is sufficiently defendant-friendly during sentencing (or the costs of objecting
to a jury trial waiver are sufficiently low), then the prosecutor will object and force a jury
trial, making the defendant worse off. But, in addition, if prosecutorial jury trial costs
display significant scale economies, then the costs of objecting to a jury trial waiver decline
at the offense stage. This decline in jury trial costs will not affect the offense stage plea
offer or judicial determination, unless the decline is so great that it becomes optimal for
the prosecutor to object to a jury trial waiver, in which case the defendant is hit twice-a
worse factfinder if the plea bargaining fails, and a worse plea offer. Note that if a forced
jury trial at the offense stage reduces the costs of objecting enough so that the prosecutor
prefers a jury trial at sentencing, then these effects are mutually reenforcing.
Conclusion: The defendant is always worse off under broader jury trial rights. In the
expanded model, scale economies of jury trial rights may allow a prosecutor to force a jury
trial as to both sentencing facts and offense facts, whereas, prior to the expansion, judges
would find all facts.
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Agplication Notes:
1. The Offense Level ( 1-43) forms the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. The Criminal History Category (I- VI) forms the horizontal axis of the Table. The intersection
of the Offense Level and Criminal History Category displays the Guideline Range in months of imprisonment. "Life" means life imprisonment. For example, the guideline
range applicable to a defendant with an Offense Level of 15 and a Criminal History Category of I11 is 24-30 months of imprisonment.
2. In rare cases, a total offense level of less than 1 or more than 43 may result from application of the guidelines. A total offense level of less than 1 is to be treated as
an offense level of 1. An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.
3. The Criminal History Category is determined by the total criminal history points from Chapter Four, Part A, except as provided in §§4B1. 1 (Career Offender) and






Figure 3: Number of Cases By Month
(High and Low Criminal History Grouping)
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Notes: Figure plots running three-month weighted average of offender count by criminal history group.
The low criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I, 11, and 1I1; the high-level group
consists of offenders in categories IV, V, and VI. Month "0" is the first month during which Apprendi
applied.
Figure 4: Number of Cases By Month
(High, Mid, and Low Criminal History Grouping)
Number of
Offenders
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Relative Months of Sample
Notes: Figure plots running three-month weighted average of offender count by criminal history group.
The low criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I & 11; the mid-level group consists of
offenders in Categories III & IV: the high-level group consists of offenders in Categories V & VI. Month
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Figure 5: Average Sentence Length
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Relative Months of Sample
Notes: Figure plots running three-month weighted average sentence in months by criminal history
group. The low criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I, II, and III; the high-level
group consists of offenders in categories IV, V, and VI. Month "0" is the first month during which
Apprendi applied.
Figure 6: Average Sentence Length
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Notes: Figure plots running three-month weighted average sentence in months by criminal history
group. The low criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I & II; the mid-level group
consists of offenders in Categories III & IV; the high-level group consists of offenders in Categories V
& VI. Month "0" is the first month during which Apprendi applied.
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Table 2: Pre-Apprendi/Post-Apprendi Differences
Low-Level Criminal History 10/1998 - 6/2000 7/2000 - 9/2001 Difference
Age 34.903 34.810 -0.093
(0.049) (0.057) (0.075)
White (Proportion) 0.704 0.717 0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Male (Proportion) 0.801 0.804 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Jury Trial (Proportion) 0.049 0.034 -0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High School (Proportion) 0.221 0.222 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Sentence (Months) 35.170 34.994 -0.176
(0.283) (0.318) (0.425)
Obs. 56,121 40,753
Mid-Level Criminal History 10/1998 - 6/2000 7/2000 - 9/2001 Difference
Age 32.413 32.347 -0.066
(0.067) (0.075) (0.101)
White (Proportion) 0.617 0.621 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Male (Proportion) 0.929 0.926 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Jury Trial (Proportion) 0.047 0.032 -0.015
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
High School (Proportion) 0.167 0.166 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Sentence (Months) 63.941 59.382 -4.560
(0.727) (0.703) (1.011)
Obs. 19,643 15,494
High-Level Criminal History 10/1998 - 6/2000 7/2000 - 9/2001 Difference
Age 33.870 33.824 
-0.046
(0.074) (0.085) (0.113)
White (Proportion) 0.578 0.571 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Male (Proportion) 0.956 0.958 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Jury Trial (Proportion) 0.063 0.043 -0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
High School (Proportion) 0.124 0.133 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Sentence (Months) 103.449 97.562 -5.887
(1.222) (1.209)[ (1.719)
Obs. 12,520 9,460
Notes: Data are from the United States Sentencing Commission. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below estimates.
Table 3: Basic Regression Results-High and Low Criminal History















































































































Circuit and Month x
Circuit Effects




Notes: The dependent variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust
standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-
Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or II1). The symbol * represents
statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of
MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month
effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 4: Basic Regression Results-High, Mid, and Low Criminal History















































































Circuit and Month x
Circuit Effects




Notes: The dependent variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust
standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHistMID equals one for a
post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of Ill or IV (and equals zero if otherwise). Apprendi x
CrimHistHIGH equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of V or VI (and zero otherwise)
The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects
were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is
absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimnHistMID and Apprendi xCrimHistMID are identified.
Table 5: Basic Regression Results-Six Criminal History Categories

























































































































































Notes: The dependent variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: robust standard
errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHISTX equals one for a post-Apprendi
offender with a criminal history category of X (and equals zero if otherwise), where X is a number between 2 and 6. The symbol
* represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in
place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the
month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHISTX is identified.
Figure 7: Change in Average Sentence Length
Post-Apprendi by Criminal History Points







Notes: Figure plots unweighted coefficients estimated on Apprendi xCrimHisiPts in the basic
model with controls for U.S. Citizenship, U.S. Residency, Number of Dependents. District, Month,





Table 6: Drug Offenders Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi -0.572 -0.686 -1.033
(0.879) (0.879) (0.854)
[1.22] [1.215] [1.097]
Apprendi x CrimHist -7.775 -7.751 -7.400 -7.535 -6.786
(2.733)** (2.733)** (2.646)** (2.649)** (2.650)*
[2.978]* [2.9821* [2.7791** [2.418]** [2.3621**
CrimHist 63.762 62.705 60.617 60.675 60.333
(2.003)** (2.009)** (1.948)** (1.950)** (1.933)**
[2.3831** [2.385]** [2.245]** [1.920]** [1.871]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 65,415 65,415 65,415 65,415 65,415
Notes: Sample includes only offenders classified as having committed a drug-related offense. The dependent variable is
sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on
CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a
criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at
5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for
computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but
Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 7: "Add On" And "Nested" Statutes Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi -0.678 -0.702 -0.219
(0.978) (0.979) (0.963)
[1.200] [1.203] [1.105]
Apprendi x CrimHist -10.037 -10.064 -9.924 -9.996 -8.892
(2.896)** (2.897)** (2.818)** (2.821)** (2.831)**
[2.631]** [2.635]** [2.516]** [2.175]** [2.270]**
CrimHist 68.422 68.039 64.966 64.999 64.590
(2.149)** (2.153)** (2.092)** (2.094)** (2.084)**
[2.110]** [2.102]** [2.047]** [1.797]** [1.843]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 53,929 53,929 53,929 53,929 53,929
Notes: Sample includes only those offenders sentenced under one of the selected "nested" or "add on" statutes collected in
King & Klein (2000 Appendix A). The dependent variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The
symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were
used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed
by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 8: Cases Without Criminal History Departures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 1.274 1.004 1.327
(0.565)* (0.563 (0.558)* -
[0.834] [0.790] [0.816]
Apprendi x CrimHist -6.261 -6.598 -6.520 -6.543 -6.574
(1.416)** (1.407)** (1.381)** (1.381)** (1.390)**
[1.574]** [1.540]** [1.547]** [1.178]** [1.197]**
CrimHist 44.021 45.612 45.273 45.275 45.303
(1.023)** (1.028)** (1.017)** (1.017)** (1.017)**
[1.246]** [1.226]** [1.195]** [0.965]** [0.965]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 144,775 144,775 144,775 144,775 144,775
Notes: Sample excludes those offenders whose sentencing included a depature related to criminal history. The dependent
variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on
CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a
criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if 1, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at
5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for
computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but
Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 9: Cases Without Guidelines Departures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 1.681 1.410 1.598
(0.831)* (0.828) (0.822)
[1.240] [1.211] [1.224]
Apprendi xCrimHist -9.248 -9.678 -9.746 -9.773 -9.990
(2.045)** (2.032)** (1.997)** (1.997)** (2.008)**
[2.228]** [2.192]** [2.173]** [1.661 ]** [1.682]**
CrimHist 50.436 52.215 51.910 51.907 52.062
(1.475)** (1.479)** (1.468)** (1.468)** (1.467)**
[1.824]** [1.8101** [1.7191** [1.360]** [1.357]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 91,520 91,520 91,520 91,520 91,520
Notes: Sample excludes those offenders whose sentencing included a guidelines depature of any kind. The dependent
variable is sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on
CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a
criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if 1, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at
5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for
computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but
Apprendi xCrimHiist is identified.
Table 10: Controlling for Offense Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 0.776 0.684 0.896
(0.517) (0.517) (0.512)
[0.631] [0.629] [0.627]
Apprendi x CrimHist -5.686 -5.685 -5.529 -5.534 -5.539
(1.248)** (1.248)** (1.225)** (1.226)** (1.234)**
[1.349]** [1.346]** [1.358]** [1.094]** [1.106]**
CrimHist 48.650 48.184 46.989 46.970 46.961
(0.947)** (0.945)** (0.933)** (0.934)** (0.933)**
[1.133]** [1.125]** [1.104]** [0.917]** [0.918]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x
Circuit Effects
Obs. 148,517 148,517 148,517 148,517 148,517
Notes: Dummies for offense type are included as independent variables. The dependent variable is sentence length in
months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are
reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of
IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance
at 1%. Circuit and Month xCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns
(4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 11: Omitting Twelve-Month Period Around Apprendi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 4.603 4.368 5.011
(1.111)** (1.112)** (1.103)**
[1.351]** [1.368]** [1.387]**
Apprendi x CrimHist -6.409 -6.386 -6.049 -6.056 -6.065
(1.577)** (1.577)** (1.548)** (1.549)** (1.559)**
[1.515]** [1.512]** [1.556]** [1.271]** [1.290]**
CrimHist 48.906 48.416 47.260 47.245 47.230
(1.161)** (1.160)** (1.147)** (1.147)** (1.145)**
[1.134]** [1.130]** [1.084]** [0.961]** [0.9481**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 97,665 97,665 97,665 97,665 97,665
Notes: Sample excludes offenders sentenced in the six months before and after Apprendi. The dependent variable is
sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on
CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a
criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at
5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for
computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but
Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 12: High and Low Criminal History with Linear Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi -2.304 -2.176 -2.594
(0.884)** (0.880)* (0.870)** -
[1.167] [1.147] [1.114]*
Apprendi x CrimHist -6.157 -6.498 -6.355 -6.400 -6.393
(1.347)** (1.339)** (1.314)** (1.314)** (1.323)**
[1.461]** [1.434]** [1.417]** [1.107]** [1.128]**
CrimHist 42.968 44.568 44.247 44.255 44.249
(0.975)** (0.980)** (0.970)** (0.970)** (0.970)**
[1.151]** [1.130]** [1.098]** [0.902]** [0.907]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 148,569 148,569 148,569 148,569 148,569
Notes: A linear trend and trend squared have been included as independent variables. The dependent variable is sentence
length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth
are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history
category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents
significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease.
In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table 13: Three-Month Interaction Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5 Periods Before x CrimHist
4 Periods Before x CrimHist
3 Periods Before x CrimHist
2 Periods Before x CrimHist
I Period Before x CrimHist
I Period After x CrimHist
2 Periods After x CrimHist
.3 Periods After x CrimHist
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Notes: The reported coefficients are interactions between criminal history (IV, V, and VI) and three-month period dummies.
The variable X Periods Before(After) xCrimnHist equals one for an offender with a criminal history category of IV, V. or VI (and
equals zero if 1, II, or II) sentenced X three-month periods before(after) Apprendi was announced. The dependent variable is
sentence length in months. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on
CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents
significance at 1%. Circuit and Month xCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease.
Table Al: Jury Trial Cases Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi -12.630 -12.195 -9.814
(7.771) (7.762) (7.784)
[7.886] [7.869] [8.542]
Apprendi x CrirnHist -32.142 -30.536 -29.611 -30.758 -33.577
(15.415)* (15.307)* (14.950)* (14.927)* (15.416)*
[16.203] [16.014] [16.803] [13.126]* [12.402]**
CrimHist 116.715 115.049 115.436 116.315 116.483
(10.243)** (10.208)** (10.058)** (10.036)** (10.305)**
[12.377]** [12.008]** [12.555]** [9.887]** [9.734]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x
Circuit Effects
Obs. 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573 6,573
Notes: The sample includes only offenders convicted by a jury. The dependent variable is sentence length in months.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in
square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or
VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%.
Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and
(5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table A2: Plea Bargained Cases Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 2.660 2.434 2.532
(0.443)** (0.440)** (0.435)**
[0.718]** [0.672]** [0.731]**
Apprendi x CrimnHist -2.338 -2.661 -2.564 -2.560 -2.492
(1.068)* (1.060)* (1.038)* (1.038)* (1.045)*
[1.178] [1.125]* [1.119]* [0.6641** [0.677]**
CrimHist 36.771 38.104 37.716 37.694 37.629
(0.735)** (0.737)** (0.725)** (0.725)** (0.726)**
[0.781]** [0.752]** [0.710]** [0.486]** [0.477]**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x X
Circuit Effects
Obs. 141,407 141,407 141,407 141,407 141,407
Notes: The sample includes only offenders who pleaded guilty. The dependent variable is sentence length in months.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in
square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or
VI (and equals zero if I, II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%.
Circuit and MonthxCircuit effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and
(5), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
Table A3: Tobit Results-Correcting for Right-Hand Censoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apprendi 1.130 0.866 1.210
(0.488)* (0.485) (0.488)*
Apprendi x CrimHist -6.190 -6.528 -6.397 -6.412
(0.651)** (0.648)** (0.657)** (0.663)**
CrimHist 42.995 44.593 44.279 44.276
(0.424)** (0.424)** (0.435)** (0.440)**
Additional Controls
U.S. Citizenship/Residency X X X X
District Effects X X X
Month Effects X X
Circuit and Month x
Circuit Effects
Obs. 148,569 148,569 148,569 148,569 148,569
Notes: The dependent variable is sentence length in months. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Apprendi x
CrimHist equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if 1, II, or
IIl). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%; ** represents significance at 1%. Circuit and MonthxCircuit
effects were used in place of MonthxDistrict effects for computational ease. In columns (4) and (5), the Apprendi main effect
is absorbed by the month effects, but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.











Figure A3: Possible Consequences of Broader Jury Trial Rights
Jury Trial
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Prosecutors are private individuals as well as public agents. They are instructed to bring
all appropriate charges against alleged offenders in an even-handed way, but limited budget
and personnel resources make extensive prosecutorial discretion necessary, and prosecutors
may have preferences that are inconsistent with their public mandate. A growing empirical
literature seeks to identify what, precisely, prosecutors "maximize" when allowed the nec-
essary freedom to operate in a resource-constrained environment. There is some evidence
that prosecutors value career advancement and preserving the status quo, for example, but
much less is known about what instruments prosecutors use and how freely they can pursue
these ends. In this paper, I examine whether (and how and by how much) prosecutorial
charging decisions respond to a pro-defendant tightening of procedural requirements. I use
federal arrest, charging, and sentencing data to evaluate the charging response of prosecu-
tors to a Supreme Court decision that affected groups of offenders differently. I find some
evidence that prosecutors reacted by reducing the total number of counts filed against af-
fected defendants by as much as 10%, presumably magnifying the sentence reduction that
would have occurred had prosecutors not substituted charging resources toward unaffected
defendants.
2.1 Introduction
Prosecutors have a general rule to determine whether they ought to bring a charge against
a defendant: prosecute all crimes that can reasonably be proven, but otherwise leave the
policy decisions and the scope of procedural protections to others. Students of prosecutorial
practice have long argued, however, that prosecutors, as a practical matter, play by different
rules. In order to maximize their visibility, success, and effectiveness as well as to preserve
their limited resources, prosecutors may manipulate the charges they bring in order to
induce easy plea bargains or to assure a target sentence is reached.' Prosecutors may also
use their charging discretion to preserve the status quo when policymakers or courts attempt
to reform the criminal justice system either substantively or procedurally.
In this paper, I study how prosecutorial charging behavior responded to a shift in con-
stitutional criminal procedure. In June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Apprendi
v. New Jersey that the Sixth Amendment applied to certain sentencing facts,2 meaning
the newly covered facts had to be proven to a jury instead of a judge (unless waived), and
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by the lower preponderance of
the evidence standard. This procedural shift had the effect, under certain circumstances,
of increasing the cost and difficulty for prosecutors of proving these facts.3 Despite the
legal and practical significance of Apprendi for litigants and the criminal justice system
generally, nothing systematic is known about whether or how prosecutors reacted to the
new requirements.
Understanding how prosecutors respond to procedural change is key to understanding
how these public agents allocate their limited resources and what they seek to accomplish
with their decision making. For example, prosecutors solely focused on proving that a
1Some of this manipulation may be related to "charge bargaining," in which prosecutors adjust the
charges they bring as a result of plea negotiation to assure a guilty plea from the defendant. But charge
manipulation is potentially much more general. Prosecutors may alter the way they charge a defendant
without making any assumptions about whether a plea bargain will be struck, or even when a prosecutor
prefers to go to trial.
2 The text of the case can be found in the U.S. Reporter at 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3 Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. which were mandatory during the time of this study, a
defendant's sentence is calculated using a complicated combination of proven offenses and sentencing facts.
See Campbell and[ Bemporad (2003) for more detail on how federal offenders were sentenced during this
period.
crime occurred and that particular sentencing facts were applicable should have asked only
whether Apprendi applied to the circumstances of the case and, if so, whether there was
sufficient evidence to meet the new proof requirement before a jury (or whether there were
sufficient resources to satisfy the higher burden) for the relevant sentencing facts. If not or if
the question were close, then the prosecutor might understandably decide not to argue the
sentencing facts in question. But the new constitutional rule did not change the procedural
requirements with respect to base offenses, and so, in theory, a prosecutor should not have
altered the set of basic charges brought against a defendant.4
If, however, prosecutors also seek other goals,5 then the higher cost of proving sen-
tencing facts may lead to a broader set of responses-but only if prosecutors have the
instruments and freedom (i.e., the discretion) necessary to vary their response. For exam-
ple, if prosecutors are able to alter how they charge a defendant easily, a prosecutor may try
to "undo" some of the consequences of the procedural innovation by substituting away from
more expensive sentencing enhancements toward additional offense counts. 6 Alternatively,
a prosecutor may view the prosecution of an Apprendi-affected defendant as more expensive
overall, and so decide to substitute resources toward other defendants. This latter sort of
prosecutorial reaction would essentially magnify the consequences of the policy change.
I use federal arrest, charging, and sentencing data to examine how prosecutors use
their discretion over base-offense charging decisions to respond to an increase in the cost of
proving sentencing enhancements. Although my empirical approach cannot identify ideal
treatment and control groups, I find evidence that prosecutors reduce the number of counts
for those affected by the price increase by approximately 10%, relative to other offenders
who were not affected by the decision in Apprendi.
If valid, this conclusion has a number of implications. First, prosecutors appear to have
significant discretion in their charging decisions and appear willing to use that discretion
4 Put differently, from a legal perspective, base offenses and sentencing facts are generally not substitutes
for one another. They are separate inquiries.
5Alternative goals might include maximizing the sentence for a defendant. minimizing resource use when
achieving a particular sentence, or avoiding cross-defendant sentencing disparity.
6The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines dictate that, in most cases, counts related to the same set of events run
concurrently, and so additional proven counts may not always increase a sentence. On the other hand. there
are many exceptions. and if the count relates to a different set of events, the sentences might be "stacked."
See generally USSG §3D1.1-5. In addition, evidence suggests that additional counts on average lead to a
higher overall sentence (Wilmot and Spohn 2004).
to respond to policy changes. Second, prosecutors may view base-offense counts as comple-
ments for sentencing facts, in line with their specific legal definitions and functions. Third,
the data indicate that prosecutors may magnify the consequences of procedural innovations
by reallocating their resources across defendants in response to price changes. Finally, the
reduction in the number of counts documented here may explain in part the reduction in
sentence length that Prescott (2006) shows was experienced by Apprendi-affected offend-
ers. It is not possible to distinguish the reduction in sentence length caused directly by
the procedural change from the reduction caused indirectly by charging manipulation, but
the positive correlation between counts and sentence length suggests changes in charging
behavior played a role.
The remainder of this paper motivates and presents my empirical work. In Section 2.2,
I review the empirical literature on prosecutorial incentives and behavior. In Section 2.3, I
use a simple model of prosecutorial behavior to develop a set of testable hypotheses. Section
2.4 describes my data and explains my empirical approach. In Section 2.5, I present my
empirical model and report my results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Prosecutorial Behavior and Discretion
Prosecutors are public officials directed to carry out specific public tasks, and yet they
exercise "largely uncontrolled discretion" in deciding whether and how to prosecute someone
charged with a crime (LaFave 1970, p.532).7 In the sentencing guidelines era (in which
judges are precluded in large part from checking the charging and bargaining behavior of
prosecutors), concern over prosecutorial behavior has become even more pointed (see, e.g.,
Richman 2003, pp.750-51). There is a considerable legal literature discussing the extent
of prosecutorial discretion (and its accompanying theoretical costs and benefits), but less
empirical work exists on the scope of discretion and whether or how prosecutors exercise it
(O'Neill 2005).
As a legal matter, prosecutors are essentially free to prosecute who they want. when
they want, and how they want (Brown 2004, pp. 331-33). Courts and legislatures have cir-
7Various reasons have been offered for the existence of this discretion: overcriminalization of primary
activity. prosec utorial resource constraints, and the need for individualized justice (see LaFave 2000. pp.533-
35: NDAA 1991. pp.127-28).
cumscribed prosecutorial behavioral only to a very limited extent (e.g., strictly prohibiting
racially motivated prosecutions). 8 In part, this "hands-off' legal approach has its source in
"separation of powers" ideas, but it is also unavoidable when funds are limited and when
important, difficult, and costly-to-review decisions are necessarily and regularly made by
many agents.
Professional organizations have established norms to improve the likelihood that dis-
cretion is used to further criminal justice aims.9 Prosecutors are also regulated by their
respective executive. The U.S. Department of Justice, for instance, publishes the "Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution" in its U.S. Attorneys' Manual. 10 The federal government also
issues memoranda and guidelines to its prosecutors from time to time to limit the inap-
propriate exercise of charging discretion." This guidance, if effective, implies that while
prosecutors require sufficient discretion to exercise their judgment in a particular case, they
are ultimately public agents who will (generally) aim to maximize social welfare.
8One possible counterexample is the application of real offense sentencing in the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines, which was intended to generate sentences based on what actually happened, as opposed to how a
prosecutor chooses to charge someone. The fact that prosecutors control much of the information a court
sees is an obvious limitation to this technique.
9 For example, the National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA") has established guidelines that
prosecutors "should file only those charges [they] reasonably believe[ can be substantiated by admissible
evidence at trial" (Standard 43.3) and that prosecutors "should not attempt to utilize the charging decision
only as a levcrage device in obtaining guilty please to lesser charges." (Standard 43.4). Standard 42.4
states that a prosecutor should not consider his or her "rate of conviction" or the "personal" or "political"
advantages that result from a particular prosecution.
'(On the surface these rules appear to significantly limit a prosecutor's discretion. For example, federal
prosecutors "should charge...the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's
conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction" (Principle 9-27.300) and should file additional
charges only when they are "necessary to ensure that the information or indictment [a]dequately reflects
the nature and extent of the criminal conduct involved, and provides the basis for an appropriate sentence
under all the circumstances of the case; or [w]ill significantly enhance the strength of the government's case
against the defendant or a codefendant" (Principle 9-27.320). But commentary on the principles signals
that prosecutors retain substantial discretion, allowing prosecutors to weigh various factors so as to best
carry out the public purposes of criminal law (see also Rabin 1972, p.1042). The rules are precise about
forbidden goals, however: "In determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take other
action against a person, the attorney for the government should not be influenced by: (1) [t]he person's
race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs; (2) [t]he attorney's own
personal feelings concerning the person, the person's associates, or the victim; or (3) [t]he possible effect of
the decision on the attorney's own professional or personal circumstances" (Principle 9-27.260).
"1For example, in 1987, after the federal sentencing guidelines went into affect, the Department of Jus-
tice published the "the Redbook," which addressed prosecutorial discretion and charging policy under the
guidelines. The Redbook admits the necessity of discretion, but "underscores the impropriety of dismissing
provable charges and excludes charge bargains based on factors other than the weakness of the case, such
as caseload pressure" (Nagel and Schulhofer 1992. p.507). Nagel and Schulhofer (1992) offer (a now-dated)
discussion of I)OJ directives to U.S. Attorneys.
For years, however, scholars have questioned that assumption, generating an empirical
literature interested in discovering what prosecutors are actually trying to accomplish when
they exercise their charging discretion. Early attempts to understand the use of prosecuto-
rial discretion focused on the effects of legitimate defendant and offense characteristics or
resource constraints. Rabin (1972), for example, argues that prosecutors use their discretion
to improve their conviction rate (p.1046), given various considerations (e.g., caseload, type
of offense, special characteristics of the defendant, adequacy of the case. and equality of
treatment). 12 The charging consequences of "extra legal factors," such as gender, race, and
ethnicity, have also received attention (see O'Neill 2005, pp.8-18).
Recent empirical work has expanded this domain to include other possible prosecutorial
goals, focusing most notably on career concerns. Boylan (2005) finds that the length of
prison sentences, but not the conviction rate, is positively related to later career success for
prosecutors. Boylan and Long (1999) present evidence indicating that when monitoring is
poor (either very small or very large U.S. Attorneys' offices), federal prosecutors typically
plea bargain less often. They interpret this as evidence that prosecutors, all else equal, seek
trial experience to better their future careers. 13 Glaeser et. al (2000) conclude that federal
prosecutors choose to pursue cases with more "career-enhancing" features, like a wealthy
or well-known defendant or the use of a private defense attorney, who might be a useful
contact in later jobs.
More directly relevant to this paper are studies of prosecutorial responses to public policy
innovations. Bjerk (2005) examines state-level three-strikes laws implemented throughout
the 1990s, and finds that "prosecutors become significantly more likely to lower a defendant's
charge to a misdemeanor when conviction for an initial felony arrest charge would lead to
sentencing under a three-strikes law" (p.591). He interprets this result as indicating that
prosecutors are circumventing these laws "because of their own preferences and resource
constraints" (p.623).1 4 Nagel and Schulhofer (1992) examine the response of U.S. Attorneys
12Rabin's analysis was based on interviews with prosecutors, and so it is not surprising that prohibited
considerations (career concerns, etc.) were not mentioned. Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2001) and O'Neill
(2003) are more recent studies in a similar vein.
13Simnilarly, Boylan and Long (2005) show that U.S. Attorneys are more likely to leave their positions in
districts with high private-sector salaries, and that, in those districts, prosecutors are more likely to take
their cases to trial to gain experience.
1 Bjerk hints that this prosecutorial resistance may have its source in the inflexibility and severity of these
to the implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines, and find that a majority of
prosecutors did not circumvent the guidelines through charging decisions, but a "substantial
minority" did--for example, by dismissing § 924 weapons charges to reach a plea bargain
(pp.551-52)----and did so because they did not like the guidelines, empathized with the
defendant, or were not appropriately trained or monitored (pp.556-57).
Kessler andl Piehl (1998) ask directly what prosecutors seek to accomplish with their
discretion by evaluating how prosecutors responded to California's Proposition 8, which
imposed mandatory minimums on repeat-offenders of particular crimes. 15 Their data show
that the imposition of mandatory minimums raised the sentence length not only for affected
offenders, but also for offenders convicted of factually similar crimes. They interpret this
"spillover effect" to mean that prosecutors use their discretion neither to realize social
p)refernces nor to circumvent legal changes, but instead to maximize some more complicated
set of (unknown) preferences.
Miethe ('1987) investigates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by testing for a hy-
pothesized "hydraulic" effect after Minnesota's sentencing guidelines were put in place in
1980 (p.155). A hydraulic effect occurs when a mandated reduction of discretion in one
part of the system generates greater use of discretion elsewhere, typically undermining the
goals of the reform. Miethe finds that the implementation of sentencing guidelines (which
limited judicial discretion at sentencing) did not lead to significant changes in prosecuto-
rial charging or plea bargaining practices that could not be explained by case or offense
attributes. He concludes that, if prosecutors have significant discretion, they choose not
to exercise it to circumvent the reform, perhaps because a number of internal (norms) and
external (relationships) constraints.
This paper contributes to this literature in at least three ways. First, it examines the
prosecutorial response to a pro-defendant policy change, not a pro-prosecution or neutral
policy change (e.g., typically sentencing reforms). Second, it studies the response to a
constitutional and procedural reform. Procedural reforms may ultimately translate into
laws, but his empirical work does not speak to the question of prosecutorial motivation.
'
5 Kessler anl Piehl hypothesize, first, that prosecutors may use their discretion to carry-out social pref-
erences, in which case later legal changes just formalize those preferences, and, second, that prosecutors'
preferences may differ from society's, and thus prosecutors may seek to undermine changes in criminal justice
policy.
substantive changes in outcomes, but prosecutors may react to them differently. Further,
given its constitutional basis, prosecutors may not view the legal change as coming from out-
of-touch or politically driven policymakers. Third, the paper uses federal data to study how
federal prosecutors use their discretion to respond to changes in their legal environment. 16
In the next part, I describe the prosecutor's basic problem, and evaluate the possible
responses to the procedural change studied below. As I show, the prosecutor is essentially
a consumer with a budget constraint, and the Supreme Court decision can be interpreted
as increasing the price for one of the prosecutor's "goods" (in this case, the ability to use
sentencing facts to increase a defendant's sentence length). As an empirical matter, we know
relatively little about a prosecutor's preferences, but by making reasonable assumptions
about the structure of those preferences, it is possible to explore their content using the
results presented in Section 2.5 below.
2.3 Prosecutorial Behavior and Testable Hypotheses
In this part., I develop three empirical hypotheses of prosecutorial decision making using a
straightforward model of prosecutorial behavior. I assume that the prosecutor makes his
charging and sentencing-related decisions to maximize his overall utility, given the cost and
expected outcome (in sentence length) of each decision, and total available resources. There
are two basic decisions a prosecutor must make when optimizing. First, the prosecutor must
determine how to allocate a fixed set of resources to the prosecution of a single offender,
where the offender's sentence is calculated using the sum of an offense-related base sentence
and an additional sentence enhancement due to sentencing factors.1 7 Second, the prosecutor
must decide how to allocate resources across multiple criminal defendants.
By imposing reasonable assumptions, the structure of this problem can be analyzed
using a two-stage budgeting approach (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, pp.122-27). I
begin with the prosecutor's problem, which, for defendants i = 1...n, is:
Max. Up(x ,X. X 2 X 2. .. x. X n) s.t. E -p i- + .+ - <!, (2.1)
16Federal prosecutors and state prosecutors practice in very different environments. and none of the work
focusing on prosecutorial responses to policy changes studies federal prosecutors.
'"See Campbell and Beinporad (2003) for an explanation of these calculations.
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where xo is the sentence length attributable to base offenses, xi is sentence length attribut-
able to sentencing enhancements, p3 is the cost to the prosecutor of x', all for offender i,
and M represents the prosecutor's total resources.
I assume that prosecutors care only about the total sentence length an individual of-
fender receives, not its component parts.18 Therefore, if prosecutors were constrained only
by prices and total resources, xo and x, would be perfect substitutes, and a difference in
price would generate a corner solution. Proving any particular set of sentencing facts, how-
ever, requires an offense on which to base those facts, so substitutability is, at a minimum,
not perfect. Therefore, I take a prosecutor's preferences to be weakly separable:
Max Up (d,(xl, Ix), di(X2, X2),. . ,dn(xn, x))
n i i i . i
s.t. E o Po + xS pS < M, (2.2)
where Up is increasing in di(xio, xi), the total sentence for offender i.19 Prosecutors clearly
make tradeoffs across defendants, but they are complex, and I do not assume any particular
structure for Up, (see, e.g., Kessler and Piehl 1998).
Two-stage budgeting is a natural approach to thinking about prosecutorial behavior.
Prosecutors must prove different offense facts and different sentencing facts for each offender,
but prosecutors clearly group these choices at the offender level. So, if it becomes more
difficult to prove a particular fact for an offender, and, as a consequence, it becomes more
difficult to raise the overall sentence for that offender, a prosecutor may change his allocation
of resources across some or all offenders. For a particular initial allocation. it is possible to
analyze the various consequence of a change in Ps for some subset of defendants.
For any particular offender i, and a given budget constraint m, a prosecutor will maxi-
mize d(xo, x,,). If sentence length attributable to base offenses and sentencing enhancements
"'Boylan (2005) recently offered evidence that prosecutors seek to maximize sentence length rather than
conviction certaintly, and so I use that assumption here. This is a common assumption in the economics
literature (see Landes 1971, Reingenaum 2000). An alternative assumption would be that prosecutors have a
target, sentence, but the analysis would then be transformed into the dual of this problem, with a prosecutor
minimizing his expenditure to achieve a given sentence.
19For some values of xo and x., d(xo,. xs) is presumably approximately xo + s,. but because there can be
no enhancements without an appropriate base offense, d must equal 0 when xo = 0. Additional otherwise
possible combinations are similarly ruled out by the mechanics of the sentencing guidelines and criminal
codes.
are both normal goods, then dx* (po, Ps, m)/ops < 0, but the consequence for ((po, ps, m) is
indeterminate, because the substitution and income effects work against each other. Thus,
if the cost of proving sentencing enhancements increases, it is unclear whether a prosecutor
will charge a defendant with more or less.
In allocating resources across defendants, an increase in the Ps for defendant i will
increase the composite price per unit of sentencing length charged.20 If sentence length is a
normal good, the sentence length sought against defendant i will drop, while the change in
sentence length sought against other defendants, for example, defendant j, is indeterminate.
For example, if the price increase generates a strong substitution effect, the total sentence
length charged against j will increase and, conditional on the shape of d*(po,Ps), both
sentencing enhancements sought and base offense counts alleged should increase. If, on the
other hand, the income effect dominates, the total sentence length charged against j will
drop, typically both xj* and x*, but not by as much as it drops for i.
Charged sentence length may be an inferior good, however. For example, prosecutors
may find, for political or other reasons, that they cannot reduce the sentence length they
charge for certain defendants. Alternatively, charged sentence length for defendants i and
j may be complements. For instance, career or other prospects may be better advanced by
having low variance in sentence outcomes across defendants. Two forty-year sentences may
be preferable to a 100-year sentence and a one-year sentence, even though total sentence
length would be higher with the latter option. Therefore, under some circumstances, a rise
in p' may generate a reduction in charged sentence length for j that exceeds the reduction
in charged sentence length for i. These relationships generate three testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis #0. If the price of sentencing enhancements p, increases for offender i,
but prosecutors are not budget constrained or they are unable to raise or lower x. or x,
then charged sentence length for offender i should not change relative to charged sentence
length for offender j.
Hypothesis #1. If the price of sentencing enhancements p, increases for offender i
and di(xo,x ) and dj(x', x,) are normal goods, then charged sentence length for offender i
should drop relative to charged sentence length for offender j.
2 0Above I assumed that prosecutors only care about overall sentences, but because of the legal relationship
between sentence length due to sentencing enhancements and sentence length due to base offenses, the two
cannot be perfect substitutes. Accordingly. the composite price for prosecuting most offenders will rise.
Hypothesis #2. If the price of sentencing enhancements p, increases for offender
i and di(xo, xi) is an inferior good or if di(xo, x) and dj(xo,x) are complements, then
charged sentence length for offender i should rise relative to charged sentence length for
offender j.
The latter two hypotheses assume that prosecutors have the ability to respond to a
change in price. If prosecutorial discretion is tightly circumscribed by law or by professional
norms, and charging behavior is therefore disassociated from cost (Hypothesis #0), the
above model may properly characterize prosecutorial incentives, while mischaracterizing
the constraints under which prosecutors operate. If a price change generates no visible
change in prosecutorial behavior, it may be because the reaction was small or difficult to
detect with this data, or because prosecutors were unable to respond, despite their interest
in doing so.
2.4 How Prosecutors Respond: Data and Empirical Strategy
My empirical work makes use of five different sources of data. The first three are individual-
level arrest, charging, and sentencing data. The fourth and fifth are the sentencing guide-
lines framework and a 2000 United States Supreme Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Combining these sources allows me to examine how prosecutors respond to a pro-defendant
change in constitutional criminal procedure.
2.4.1 Individual-Level Federal Data
All individual-level data were obtained from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center
("FJSRC").21 For arrest information, I rely on the U.S. Marshals Service's Prisoner Track-
ing System, which follows all offenders arrested for federal offenses and contains offender
and offense--related variables. For charging information, I construct defendant-level data
using charge-level records derived from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorney's Central
Charge files. For sentencing information, I use data collected for the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission's monitoring database, which contains demographic and sentencing information for
each offender sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. which is a large
majority of federal offenders.
21 See http://fjsrc.urban.org/.
The FJSRC makes available "linking data" that allows a researcher to follow a defendant
from arrest through sentencing. 22 Using this linking file, I assembled a data set of defendant-
level records that includes arrest, charging, and sentencing information.23 As I explain
below, the outcome variable I use-total number of counts-uses charging data and is
constructed by summing the total number of counts across all charges brought against each
defendant. The sentencing data report a criminal history score for each offender, which
determines whether the Apprendi decision was more or less likely to affect that person.
I use the arrest data to control for the possibility of offense manipulation on the part of
prosecutors.
I examine those offenders who were sentenced between January 1998 and December
2002. Apprendi was decided at the end of June 2000 (and took effect immediately), which
leaves me with 30 months of pre-Apprendi data and 30 months of post-Apprendi data.
To eliminate anomalous cases, observations were excluded if the record indicated that the
offender was arrested after he was sentenced; 24 if the offender had a missing total prison
sentence (including a sentence of time served); if a non-prison type of sentence was im-
posed; if the offender was being resentenced; if the sentence was clearly incorrectly coded;
if the defendant was sentenced to death; or if the offender was sentenced to community
confinement .25 My basic results are not sensitive to the loss of these observations.
I calculate the total number of counts brought against a defendant by adding up the
number of counts for those charges (by indictment or information) filed against a defendant.
I exclude observations where the record has an erroneous or missing charge date; where the
22As the FJSRC's website puts it, "[b]y joining the sequential record numbers from the linking file with the
sequential record numbers in the appropriate [analysis files], it is possible to track the course of individual
defendant-cases from arrest to prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and corrections."
23I verified that the linking of the data sets succeeded by comparing fixed demographic variables (e.g., sex,
race, and date of birth). This process indicated that some mismatches might have occurred, but FJSRC was
kind enough to verify that these cases were correctly matched using the offender's name and other non-public
data, and determined that these cases were miscoded. I exclude these cases. I also eliminate a small number
of offenders (26) where the total number of counts was over 100, but including them does not significantly
affect my results, as I show below. In addition, the data suffer from broken links, in which, for example.
there was no arrest or charging record for someone who was sentenced. I drop all cases in which I did not
have a full arrest, charging, and sentencing record. According to the FJSRC, this link failure is typically
due to missing or different identifying information (name, court docket number, etc.). Also, many arrest
and charging observations are lost because of normal attrition. Some arrestees are not ultimately charged
or sentenced. Similarly, some charged defendants are acquitted.
24 According to conversations with FJSRC, if an offender was rearrested, the new date could overwrite the
original arrest date.
25This process removed a total of 16,876 cases (or 4.678 cases, 2.910 cases, 2,384 cases, 2.474 cases, 18
cases, 1 case. and 4,411 cases. respectively).
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number of counts for the charge was recorded as 0, 99, or was missing; where the ultimate
disposition was missing, because charges without dispositions often appear to be repeats of
other charges; and where the charge was for a misdemeanor. Basic descriptive statistics for
the five years of data (in six ten-month increments) are displayed in Table 1.
I use the "total number of counts" to gauge the prosecutorial response to the procedural
change introduced by Apprendi. This measure has been used in other work studying prose-
cutorial behavior (see Wilmot and Spohn 2004), and it makes sense to focus on the number
of counts when prosecutors have two basic tools with which to seek a particular sentence (ba-
sic offenses and sentencing facts) and one of those tools has been affected by a legal change.
Wilmot and Spohn (2004) find that charging decisions (holding actual offenses constant)
significantly influence final sentences: "decisions made by prosecutors at charging have an
independent effect on sentence severity" (p.333).26 Moreover, using "counts charged" is
similar in approach to Schanzenbach and Tiller's (2005) study of judicial behavior. They
model judges as having two "instruments" of discretion-factual determinations and legal
departures, and find that when one of these becomes more difficult to use because of the
expected response of the appeals court, judges substitute toward the other.
2.4.2 Apprendi and the Sentencing Guidelines
To measure the prosecutorial response to the expansion of constitutional jury trial rights for
sentencing facts, I use Apprendi and the then-mandatory calculations required by the federal
sentencing guidelines. 27 The Apprendi decision established that "[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"
(p.490). 28 The holding expressly omitted "facts of prior conviction" (criminal history),
26Charging behavior can also affect sentences through its influence on a judge's view of a case. Wilmot
and Spohn (2004) show that "defendants charged with more than one count receive a smaller discount for
substantial assistance departures than defendants charged with only one count" (p.336).
27Prescott (2006) found that the broader jury trial rights imposed by Apprendi had the net effect of
reducing sentences, but the study was unable to determine whether or how prosecutors responded to the
decision. Lower sentences could have emerged through a number of mechanisms, with prosecutorial charging
decisions being just one possibility.
28See Prescott (2006) for a detailed explanation of the history of this case, and the jury trial rights debate
that has surrounded it and the cases that have followed. Apprendi was preceded by Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 277 (1999). but was nevertheless uniformly viewed as unexpected.
and because the sentencing guidelines use offense characteristics and an offender's criminal
history to determine a sentence, an offender's pre-determined criminal history score can be
used to identify the effects of the price increase imposed by the broader rights mandated
by Apprend'i.
To see this, notice that under Apprendi's limited holding, the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right only applies to sentencing facts (other than criminal history) that, if found,
would cause a sentence to exceed the applicable statutory maximum. Combine with this
the fact that under the federal sentencing guidelines, recidivist offenders will be, holding
all else even, closer to the applicable statutory maximum than will offenders with little
or no criminal history. Figure 1 reproduces the basic sentencing table, and illustrates
how, for a given offense level, an offender with a higher history score will be closer to any
applicable statutory maximum. Therefore, if prosecutors respond to the higher cost of
proving sentencing facts, that response should be different for recidivist offenders (relative
to new criminals) after Apprendi.2 9
2.5 Empirical Model and Results
Apprendi was an unexpected procedural shift that, in effect, raised the price of using sen-
tencing facts to increase sentences for a particular pre-determined group of offenders. But
it is unknown whether prosecutors reacted in their charging behavior, and, if so, how they
reacted. By combining Apprendi's holding, the guidelines' grid approach, and arrest, charg-
ing, and sentencing data, I am able to study the prosecutorial response to this pro-defendant
change in procedure.
2.5.1 Regression Analysis
As I described above, Apprendi raised the price for prosecutors of sentencing facts more for
defendants in high criminal history categories than for defendants in low criminal history
29 This strategy would be problematic if Apprendi made it more or less difficult to prove criminal history
facts. In that case, offenders might switch criminal history categories after Apprendi. But Prescott (2006)
shows that neither the Apprendi decision nor the behavior of prosecutors or judges is likely to have altered
the composition of criminal history groups. Moreover. my empirical approach controls for differences over
time in observable demographic changes in composition.
categories. Therefore, I begin by looking at basic changes in charging behavior across
different history groups. For each criminal history group, I estimate the following equation
by OLS:
Total Countsijt = a + 31Raceijt + 02Educationijt + 03Ageijt + f34Sexijt
+ •5NumDepijt + 36 Guidelines Yearijt + 07C'itizenijt
+ f 8Apprendit + OgLt + 01oL 2 + Eijt, (2.3)
where i indexes offenders, j indexes districts, and t indexes the month the offender was first
charged. 30 The dependant variable is total number of counts lodged against an offender
across all charges filed.
To account for the possibility of disparate charging on the basis of a defendant's personal
characteristics, I include a number of offender demographic variables: Race is a vector
that includes three dummy variables (for black, white, and Hispanic, with other omitted);
Education includes five dummies for different levels of attainment (high school, vocational
or military training, some college, college degree, and some graduate training, with no high
school diploma omitted); Age includes dummies for different age groups (18-29, 30-44, 45-
60, and greater than 60, with less than 18 omitted); Sex is one if the offender is a male;
and NumDep is the number of dependants. Because immigration crimes account for a
significant portion of the federal criminal docket, Citizen contains a dummy for whether
the offender is a U.S. citizen and a dummy for whether the offender is a U.S. resident. I also
include some simple trend controls and Guidelines Year, which contains dummy variables
indicating the IGuidelines Manual under which the defendant was sentenced, to control for
any amendments or other changes in the manuals introduced over time.
The variable Apprendi is a dummy variable equal to zero if the defendant was first
charged before or in June 2000 and equal to one thereafter. Because equation (2.3) controls
for simple time trends, the coefficient estimated on Apprendi provides a first-pass measure
of the prosecutorial reaction to the Supreme Court's decision. As explained in Section
2.4, if Apprendi had any effect on charging behavior, the change should be more evident
for higher as opposed to lower criminal history groups. We would expect, therefore, that
if prosecutors responded to Apprendi by altering their charging decisions, estimates of 08
30 Plausibly, prosecutorial manipulation may include filing additional charges at a later time. but most
offenders have all their charges filed in the same month.
would be positive or negative for high criminal history types, but close to zero for low
criminal history types.
For this reason, the results of estimating equation (2.3), shown in Table 2, are puzzling.
Although none of the estimated coefficients on Apprendi is statistically significant, the
magnitudes of the estimates (calculated separately for various criminal history category
groupings) suggest that the number of counts for low criminal history types increases post-
Apprendi, while the number of counts for high criminal history types remains essentially
constant or falls only slightly.31 These numbers are consistent with Figure 2, which graphs
the average total number of counts by month for high and low criminal history types.
Around the time of Apprendi (or a few months before, a possibility I address below), the
difference in the number of counts between low and high criminal history types begins to
increase, with the number of counts for high criminal history offenders remaining constant
or dropping slowly and the number for those with low criminal history scores increasing
(or increasing at a faster relative rate) post-Apprendi. Furthermore, the aggregate total
number of counts rises after Apprendi, at least until the last few months of the sample.32
This pattern seems a bit surprising because Apprendi raised a prosecutor's costs for a
particular group of offenders-and yet the prosecutorial demand for counts appears not to
have changed for those affected and to have increased for those who were not affected. The
model in Section 2.3, however, offers a plausible explanation. Loosely, if prosecutors view
sentences for different defendants as substitutes, and sentencing factors and base-offense
counts for a given defendant as weak complements, then the aggregate total number of
counts should rise (if the cross-defendant substitution effect outweighs the cross-defendant
income effect) and the number of counts for non-affected defendants should rise relative to
those affected by Apprendi.33
3 1This pattern is clear in the top two panels (which break down criminal history into two or three group-
ings). A similar pattern is also evident in the bottom panel, but in general the estimated coefficients on
Apprendi across the six criminal history groupings vary a lot in sign.
32 The pattern during the last few months of the sample raises some question about the long-term affect
of Apprendi or may indicate some anticipation of a broadening of the Apprendi rule to all criminal history
groups. which occurred in June 2004 with the decision in the Blakely v. Washington case, not long after my
sample ends. Alternatively, the change may be due entirely to selection effects. In order to be included in
my sample. the offender must have been sentenced by the end of fiscal year 2003, 10 months after my sample
ends. More complicated or otherwise different cases may take longer than a year to proceed to sentencing,
thus potentially skewing the results at the end of the sample period.
33 Another possible explanation is that prosecutors faced a looser budget constraint over time. More
resources, combined with shifting prices, would also generate the pattern in Figure 2.
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For instance, as sentencing facts became more expensive for high criminal history types
post-Apprendi, prosecutors might have found it optimal to move resources from sentencing
facts for high criminal history types to base-offenses for low criminal history types. This
reallocation would generate the pattern of higher aggregate count levels and of increasing
disparity in count totals between high- and low-history offenders visible in Table 2 and
Figure 2.34 Thus, although initially appearing difficult to explain, the fact that the post-
Apprendi change in charging behavior appears conspicuously present for those less affected
by Apprendi (and absent for those more likely to be covered by the decision) is entirely
compatible with a model in which optimizing prosecutors can substitute resources across
defendants.
Figure 2 also suggests a different concern. As mentioned above, around the time of
Apprendi, one could argue that the number of counts for high criminal history types does
not appear to change or, at most, drops slowly, and looks to remain essentially on a zero
growth path. The number of counts for low criminal history types, however, appears to have
been on a different path-pre-Apprendi, the number of counts may have been increasing,
but after Apprendi, the rate of growth seems to slow or even stop. Thus, if the trends were
removed, Figure 2 hints that Apprendi might have led to a relative increase in the number
of counts for high criminal history offenders (relative to the counterfactual, in which the
low criminal history counts would have continued to grow). As a consequence, Table 2
and the results below control for linear and quadratic time trends (as well as many other
independent variables that may generate the trends of the two groups visible in Figure 2),
and I do not find evidence supporting this interpretation. Nevertheless, some caution is
warranted in interpreting the results presented above and below.
As is clear by now, one of the most prominent features of Table 2 and Figure 2 is the
increasing difference, starting around the time of Apprendi, in the total number of counts
between high and low criminal history types. This development suggests that prosecutors
may have responded to Apprendi by putting relatively less effort into counts against high
34In sum, because only charged offense counts exist in the data, and not the combination of offenses and
enhancements, a rise in counts following an enhancement cost increase is fully consistent with prosecutorial
maximization as described in Section 2.3. Ideally, I would like to study the number of enhancements charged,
since the one clear empirical prediction of Section 2.3 is that the number of enhancements sought for high
criminal history types should drop post-Apprendi. Unfortunately, these data do not exist and, even if
they did, they would be difficult to quantify. Furthermore, sentencing facts are in theory "determined"
post-conviction by a judge with the help of a probation officer, and are not charged by a prosecutor.
criminal history offenders than into those against low criminal history offenders. To explore
this possibility, I use a difference-in-differences approach. One important problem with
taking this route, as I explain below, is that Apprendi did not apply to clearly defined
treatment and control groups prosecuted by separate attorneys under independent budget
constraints. Thus, what I use as my control group, may also have been treated, meaning
that the model below may not be identified. With that caveat, I estimate the following
equation:
Total Countsijt = a + P1Raceijt + 02 Educationijt + 33Ageijt + ~4Sexijt
+ 35NumDepijt + f 6 Guidelines Yearijt + P7Citizenijt
+ P0Apprendit + fLt + f 10L 2 + •31CrimHistijt
+ 312Apprendit x CrimHistijt + Eiit, (2.4)
where the variables previously defined for equation (2.3) are identical to those above.
CrimHist is comprised of two (high/low), three (high/mid/low), or six (I-VI) dummy
variables, and captures the direct effect of criminal history on the total number of counts
filed against an offender.
The interactions Apprendi x CrimHist in equation (2.4) represent the prosecutorial
response to Apprendi in terms of additional counts charged, and should be interpreted
as the differential prosecutorial reaction to the Supreme Court's pro-defendant procedural
innovation. The magnitude of the calculated response is a lower bound estimate, because in
this experiment pure "control" and "treatment" groups do not exist.35 Moreover, the OLS
coefficients on Apprendi x CrimHist must be scaled by the difference between criminal
history groups in the proportion of cases where Apprendi matters, something which I do
not observe.36
The first column in Table 3 presents my baseline results of estimating equation (2.4)
using only two criminal history categories. The data indicate that prosecutors did respond to
the increase in the price of proving sentencing facts, and that they responded by substituting
away from (charging fewer counts against) those protected by the procedural innovation.
35Apprendi was not directly relevant to recidivists who were not close to the statutory maximum, but it
did affect new criminals who had many aggravating offense facts. In addition, Apprendi did not apply to
all aggravating sentencing facts. Such facts were decided by a judge by a preponderance of evidence even
post-Apprendi unless the fact put the defendant's sentence at risk of exceeding the statutory maximum.
36If it were possible, I would use the probability that Apprendi binds as my independent variable, and
instrument for it with criminal history categories.
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The data show that those most affected by Apprendi were charged with between 0.27 and
0.31 fewer counts after the decision, relative to less affected offenders. The mean number of
counts during most of the sample period is between between 2 and 3 counts per offender,
implying that prosecutors reduced the counts charged against those protected by Apprendi
by approximately 10 percent.
Overall, these results are consistent with Hypothesis #1, and provide some evidence
against Hypotheses #0 and #2. Prosecutors appear to have substituted their resources
toward non-affected offenders. This may be because base-offense charges and sentencing
facts are weak complements under the relevant circumstances, or because prosecutors view
sentences across defendants as strong substitutes, or both. This interpretation accords with
Prescott's (2006) finding Apprendi lowered sentences for high criminal history offenders
relative to those with low criminal history scores. Although the decline in sentence length
shown in that paper may be driven by many distinct Apprendi-related mechanisms, these
results raise the possibility that prosecutorial charging behavior lies behind some of the
decline.
These numbers also have potentially important implications for our understanding of
prosecutorial goals and behavior. The estimates imply that after Apprendi, unlike after
the three-strikes laws studied by Bjerk (2005), prosecutors did not behave in ways that
effectively undermined the policy change. Instead, their actions potentially magnified the
consequences for offenders.37 The differences between the policy innovations studied may
explain the different conclusions. Bjerk examined the response of state-level prosecutors to
a change in substantive criminal law that many prosecutors found objectionable on multiple
grounds. Apprendi was put in "rights" terms and decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on a
constitutional basis.
In the remainder of Table 3, I control for possible previously omitted variables. In the
second column, I include Arrest, which is a vector of arresting-agency recorded offense
dummies, to reduce the possibility that prosecutors responded by changing the type of
crime charged rather than the number of counts. In the third and fourth columns, even
37 The results are also consistent with the claim made occasionally in the legal literature that prosecutors
dislike the severity of federal sentences, but are at least partially constrained in exercising their discretion
for a defendant's benefit (see Bowman and Heise 2001, 2002). On this story, Apprendi might have provided
prosecutors with cover for not seeking as many counts against affected defendants.
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though Apprendi applied uniformly to all districts, I add district effects and month effects
to ensure that my estimates are not driven by fixed differences in offenders or prosecutorial
tactics. For example, if over time different districts prosecuted offenders with very different
criminal history scores on average, and districts used different prosecutorial approaches,
then conceivably the data might generate the results I list in the first column. The new
estimates remain roughly the same, with offenders affected by Apprendi receiving 10% fewer
charges on average.
In Tables 4 and 5, I disaggregate the two criminal history groups used in Table 3 into
three and six criminal history groups to verify that how the offenders are combined for
analysis does not explain my results. Table 4 reports the estimates using three history
groups (low, mid, and high). If Apprendi binds more for offenders in higher criminal
history groups and is the source of changes in charging behavior, then the prosecutorial
response should be greater for groups with higher history scores. The estimated coefficients
correspond exactly to this prediction. In every column, the estimate for high-level criminal
history types exceeds in magnitude the estimate for mid-level criminal history types, and
both are substantially larger than the estimate for those offenders with low-level history
scores.38 The same is true in Table 5, where the estimated coefficients on the six groups
grow monotonically with the history score, consistent with the identification strategy and
with Hypothesis #1.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
Tables 3 through 5 suggest that prosecutors responded to Apprendi's pro-defendant exten-
sion of jury trial rights to sentencing facts by reducing the relative number of base-offense
counts charged against those defendants who were formally affected by the decision. But to
increase the confidence in the conclusion that it was Apprendi behind these results rather
than some other contemporaneous change in the criminal justice system not already con-
trolled for, I have re-estimated equation (2.4) making a number of changes to the underlying
sample and specification. My results are broadly robust to these tests. I also check to con-
firm that an Apprendi-related change in conviction rates is not at the root of my basic
findings.
3 SThe difference between the high- and mid-level estimates is statistically significant at the 1% level in
the fourth column of Table 4.
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In Table 6, I include 26 additional observations with counts of over 100, which I omitted
in earlier regressions. These are extreme outliers, with some observations reporting many
hundreds of counts. Nevertheless, Bollinger and Chandra (2005) have shown that omitting
data in such circumstances can have perverse consequences. Given the small number obser-
vations, it is not surprising that adding these observations does not much affect my results.
If anything, the magnitudes of my estimates are somewhat larger with the outliers than
without them.
In Table 7, I add additional years of charging data to my analysis. My baseline sample
includes defendants who were charged between January 1998 and December 2002. Charging
information exists for 1997 and 1996, but these data do not appear to be reported or coded
in the same way as in later years, and so they were excluded. Data also exists for at least ten
months after December 2002. I omitted these observations because, to be included in my
sample, an offender has to be both charged and sentenced before October 2003. Therefore,
if I were to incorporate offenders charged in October 2003, for instance, I would only capture
those charged and sentenced in that month. These cases are on average unrepresentative,
with high plea bargain rates and presumably more straightforward or less serious issues.
Nevertheless, if I include all of these observations, my estimates drop in magnitude by at
most 20%, and remain highly statistically significant.
In Table 8, I present estimates from a log-linear version of equation (2.4), in which
the log of total counts replaces total counts, in case the relationship between total counts
and the independent variables of interest is nonlinear. The estimates are consistent in
direction and statistical significance with those in Table 3, and suggest a percentage change
of comparable magnitude.
In Table 9, I begin to explore the timing of the Apprendi decision. Although the rule
announced in Apprendi was unexpected, prosecutors may have altered (or postponed) their
charging decisions as soon as the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case (November
29, 1999). Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the decision, it may have taken
prosecutors some time to understand the holding and deal with its administrative conse-
quences. Thus, because the months immediately surrounding the decision may have been
unrepresentative, I re-ran equation (2.4) on the original sample minus the six months before
and after the decision. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 9, and show that, if
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anything, anticipation and a slow response may have masked some of the effect attributable
to Apprendi.
This interpretation is borne out by Figure 2 and Figure 3, which show the average total
number of counts by criminal history group by month and the total number of offenders
charged by criminal history group by month, respectively. In Figure 2, a few months before
Apprendi is decided, but after certiorari was granted, the difference in average total counts
between high and low history offenders begins to grow. This may imply that a cause other
than Apprendi led to the changes in charging behavior reported in Table 3, but it may also
indicate that prosecutors were watching and perhaps anticipating the Apprendi decision.3 9
Figure 3 provides some evidence that prosecutors may have postponed charging decisions
until the outcome in (and implications of) Apprendi became clear, and that prosecutors were
occupied with the case's consequences for a short period after the opinion was released. In
the months immediately surrounding Apprendi's announcement, the number of offenders
charged per month drops substantially. This reduction begins prior to the decision and
continues until months afterward. Although there is clear seasonality to charging numbers
throughout the duration of the sample, the decline in the number of charged offenders is
most noticeable during the Apprendi period.
To further examine the possibility and consequences of anticipation effects, Table 10
shows estimates from an analogue to equation (2.4) where I have substituted three-month
period dummies (for one year pre- and two years post-Apprendi) and interaction of those
dummies with CrimHist for the variables Apprendi and Apprendi x CrimHist. The results
seem to show some Apprendi-like effect beginning three to six months before the decision
is released. Thus, some caution should be taken in interpreting the causal relationship
between Apprendi and the relative decline in counts for those more likely to be affected by
Apprendi-an unrelated trend or some other policy change may be producing the effects
I have attributed to Apprendi. But it also suggests, along with Figures 2 and 3, that
prosecutors may have anticipated the decision after certiorari was granted about 7 months
before the decision. In fact, this interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the Apprendi
effect becomes much stronger after the decision is handed down.
3 9The pattern is particularly noticeable beginning three or four months before Apprendi was decided in
June 2000. The case was argued in March 2000, and questions posed by the Justices may have signaled to
Court watchers that the holding in Apprendi was a possible outcome.
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Another potential problem with my empirical approach is that my strategy, by design,
requires a criminal history score, which is only calculated at sentencing, to identify the
effect of Apprendi. As a consequence, I am forced to omit from my analysis defendants who
are charged, but who are not ultimately convicted (or whose outcomes at the charging and
sentencing stage cannot be linked). Therefore, if Apprendi had the effect of changing the
rate of conviction for defendants, then any skewing in the distribution of offenders could
confound my empirical results. For example, equation (2.4) would generate my findings
with no change in charging decisions if Apprendi caused high criminal history defendants
with many counts to be acquitted at a higher rate than low criminal history defendants
with many counts.
Nothing in the legal literature suggests that this might have happened, and scenarios
in which a higher standard of proof for a sentencing fact might cause a jury to acquit on
all charges or cause a prosecutor to dismiss all of his base offense counts are unlikely.40
More importantly, the data do not provide evidence favoring a selection explanation. Using
individual-level arrest data, I have calculated a "predicted" distribution of offender criminal
history scores for defendants charged post-Apprendi that can be compared to the actual
distribution of criminal history scores of those sentenced post-Apprendi. To predict the
likely criminal history scores of charged defendants, I ran a multinomial logit model on
pre-Apprendi arrest data using an offender's criminal history category as the dependent
variable and a host of offender arrest characteristics (e.g., gender, race, citizenship, marital
status, age, offense, arresting agency, and district of arrest). I then used the estimated
coefficients and post-Apprendi data to predict criminal history scores for each offender who
was charged, but not necessarily convicted.
Table 11 presents the results of this comparison. For each criminal history group, I show
the difference between the actual percentage of offenders and the predicted percentage of
offenders receiving that criminal history score (first column) for each of six five-month
periods (covering the entire 30-month post-Apprendi period). Although the distributions
do differ slightly, they are very close overall. 41 For criminal history category six, the last two
40Furthermore, Figure 3, which plots the number of offenders in the high and low criminal history groups,
does not show a disproportionate change in the relative number of high criminal history types post-Apprendi.
41This illustrative comparison does not rule out the possibility that different offenders were convicted.
Even if the same number of offenders in a given history category post-Apprendi are convicted, it is possible,
periods indicate that there are fewer offenders than there "should" be, but criminal history
category four, also a high score, has in theory too many offenders in the second-to-last
period.42 Furthermore, although the results are not statistically significant, there seems to
be too few offenders in the first criminal history category, meaning that there may be too
few offenders in both very high and very low criminal history categories. The conclusion to
be drawn from Table 11 is that, although there are some significant differences between the
actual and predicted criminal history distributions, there is no strong evidence that changes
in rates of conviction might be biasing my results.
Together, these robustness checks indicate that my basic finding-showing that prose-
cutors reacted to the price increase imposed by Apprendi by reducing the relative number
of counts against those affected-appears real and substantial.
2.6 Conclusion
When writing about the significance of research into prosecutorial discretion in a 1972
article, Robert Rabin said, "A prerequisite to any system of effective controls is an un-
derstanding of the behavior to be constrained" (p.1036). This paper studies the charging
behavior of prosecutors, and attempts to identify the response of these public agents to an
innovation in criminal procedure that had the practical effect of raising the price prose-
cutors had to pay to prove sentencing facts. I begin with a simple model of prosecutorial
behavior in which prosecutors allocate their limited budgets across multiple defendants and,
for each defendant, across two types of facts. The model generates straightforward empiri-
cal hypotheses that allow inferences about prosecutorial preferences to be drawn from the
empirical response prosecutors make to Apprendi v. New Jersey's sentencing fact price
increase.
To calculate this response, I use federal arrest, charging, and sentencing data, the limited
holding of the Apprendi, and the structure of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to create
although probably unlikely, that a different high criminal history defendant was convicted after Apprendi
than would otherwise have been convicted.
42 To ensure that these last two periods are not behind my basic results, I recalculated the results presented
in Table 3 using a sample that omitted the last ten months of post-Apprendi data. The results did not change
appreciably.
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comparison groups of offenders that were differentially affected by the Supreme Court's
ruling. Because in theory Apprendi's ruling may have affected all federal defendants, I am
not able to identify treatment and control groups precisely. But with that caveat, I find
some evidence that prosecutors reduced the relative number of counts they charged against
defendants more likely to be affected by Apprendi by as much as 10 percent. These results,
when viewed through the model's hypotheses, imply that prosecutors consider criminal
defendants to be substitutes for one another, and that sentencing facts and offense facts
may be weak complements.
If the results in this paper are accurate, this reduction in counts has clear practical
significance for offenders. Because the total number of counts charged against a defendant,
at least in my data, is positively correlated with the sentence that a defendant ultimately
receives, defendants do better on average if they are charged with fewer crimes. Further-
more, Prescott (2006) found that the Apprendi ruling led to a substantial reduction (of
approximately six months on average or around 5% of the total average sentence) in sen-
tence length for those most likely to be covered by the decision. This study complements
that paper by suggesting that at least one of the ways that sentences may have been reduced
is by prosecutors reducing the relative number of counts for affected individuals. 43
For policymakers, these results impart important lessons. Prosecutors appear willing
to exercise their substantial charging discretion in ways that are not obviously beneficial to
the public. In Apprendi's case, the charging choices of prosecutors may have unwittingly
magnified the effect of the Supreme Court's decision on affected defendants. The results
of this paper also point to the fact that, even though Apprendi's broadening of Sixth
Amendment jury trial rights did not formally apply to certain defendants. cross-defendant
substitution of counts by prosecutors may nevertheless have made the decision relevant to
all federal defendants charged with crimes. The possibility of a similar effect should be
considered whenever a policy change thought to affect a limited number of defendants may
actually influence a central component, of a prosecutor's basic resource allocation problem.
43 More precisely, the reduction in sentences for high criminal history types may be at least partially
attributable to the fact that their absolute number of counts did not increase in response to Apprendi and
sentencing facts were less likely to be found because they become more expensive to prove.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics-All Criminal History Levels
-30 to -20 M -20 to -10 M -10 to 0 M 0 to 10 M 10 to 20 M 20 to 30 M
Age 33.432 33.320 33.348 33.270 33.294 33.461
(0.087) (0.079) (0.077) (0.081) (0.078) (0.068)
White (Proportion) 0.713 0.733 0.747 0.703 0.729 0.752
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male (Proportion) 0.845 0.853 0.861 0.855 0.843 0.856
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Jury Trial (Proportion) 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.018
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
U.S. Citizen (Proportion) 0.655 0.604 0.597 0.662 0.633 0.614
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
High School (Proportion) 0.194 0.179 0.177 0.189 0.183 0.176
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
College (Proportion) 0.039 0.034 0.040 0.037 0.039 0.035
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Number of Counts 2.368 2.581 2.631 2.803 2.659 2.586
(0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027)
Number of Charges 1.720 1.729 1.678 1.807 1.750 1.712
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs. 14,555 17,417 18,359 16,702 17,617 22,947
Notes: Means are presented for all five years (60 months) of the base-line sample, which runs from January 1998 to December 2002. Apprendi
v. New Jersey was decided in June 2000. Data are from the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below estimates.
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1. The Offense Level (1-43) forms the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. The Criminal History Category (I- VI) forms the horizontal axis of the Table. The intersection
of the Offense Level and Criminal History Category displays the Guideline Range in months of imprisonment. "Life" means life imprisonment. For example, the guideline
range applicable to a defendant with an Offense Level of 15 and a Criminal History Category of I11 is 24-30 months of imprisonment.
2. In rare cases, a total offense level of less than 1 or more than 43 may result from application of the guidelines. A total offense level of less than 1 is to be treated as
an offense level of 1. An olfense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.
3. The Criminal History Category is determined by the total criminal history points from Chapter Four, Part A, except as provided in §§4B1.1 (Career Offender) and











































Table 2: Difference Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) Obs
Apprendi (High: 4, 5, 6)
Apprendi (Low: 1, 2, 3)
Apprendi (High: 5, 6)
Apprendi (Mid: 3, 4)

























































































































Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust
standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi equals one for all charges
filed afterApprendi v. New Jersey was decided. The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents
significance at 1%.





-4 per. Mov. Avg.
(High Criminal
History)
- 4 per. Mov. Avg.
(Low Criminal
History)
-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Relative Months
Notes: Figure plots running total number of counts by criminal history group for five years of the sample
(month of first charge). The low criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I, II, and Ill; the






Table 3: Basic Regression Results-High and Low Criminal History










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects
Month of Charging Effects
No. of Obs.
Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I,
11, or Ill). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column





































































































Table 4: High, Mid, and Low Criminal History










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects




































































































Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHistMID
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of III or IV (and equals zero if
otherwise). Apprendi xCrimHistHIGH equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history
category of V or VI (and equals zero if otherwise). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, **
represents significance at 1%. In column (4), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects but
Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
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Table 5: Six Criminal History Categories













Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects







































































































































Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHISTX
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of X (and equals zero if otherwise),
where X is a number between 2 and 6. The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents
significance at 1%. In column (4), the Apprendi main effect is absorbed by the month effects but
Apprendi xCrimHlist is identified.
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Table 6: Outlier Observations Included










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects




















































Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I,
II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column


















































Table 7: Longer Sample










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects
Month of Charging Effects
No. of Obs.
Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I,
II, or Ill). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column





































































































Table 8: Log-Linear Specification










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects
Month of Charging Effects
No. of Obs.
Notes: The dependant variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if 1,
II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column





































































































Table 9: Omitting Twelve-Month Period Around Apprendi










Crime of Arrest Effects
District Sentenced Effects
Month of Charging Effects
No. of Obs.
Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
robust standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi xCrimHist
equals one for a post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if I,
II, or III). The symbol * represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column



































































































Figure 3: Number of Offenders Charged by Criminal History
.... ..
- - -1 -
















-2 per. Mov. Avg.
(High Criminal
History)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg.
(Low Criminal
History)
10 15 20 25 30
Relative Months of Sample
Notes: Figure plots running total number of defendants charged by criminal history group. The low
criminal history group consists of offenders in categories I, II, and III; the high-level group consists of





Table 10: Three Month Interaction Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4 Periods Before x CrimHist
3 Periods Before x CrimHist
2 Periods Before x CrimHist
1 Period Before x CrimHist
I Period After x CrimHist
2 Periods After x CrimHist
3 Periods After x CrimHist
4 Periods After x CrimHist
5 Periods After x CrimHist
6 Periods After x CrimHist
Additional Controls
Crime of Arre:st Effects
District Sentenced Effects






























































































































Notes: The dependent variable is total number of counts. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; robust
standard errors clustered on CrimHist xMonth are reported in square brackets. Apprendi x CrimHist equals one for a
post-Apprendi offender with a criminal history category of IV, V, or VI (and equals zero if 1, II, or I1l). The symbol *
represents statistical significance at 5%, ** represents significance at 1%. In column (4), the Apprendi main effect is
absorbed by the month effects but Apprendi xCrimHist is identified.
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Table 11: Actual and Predicted Criminal History Composition
History Category 1 History Category 2 History Category 3
0.488 0.488 0.000 0.109 0.107 0.002 0.152 0.154 -0.002Period 1 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
6,946 7,342 6,946 7,342 6,946 7,342
0.490 0.496 -0.006 0.111 0.106 0.005 0.156 0.152 0.004Period 2 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
10,900 11,510 10,900 11,510 10,900 11,510
0.498 0.498 0.001 0.109 0.105 0.005 0.155 0.152 0.003Period 3 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
9,078 9,720 9,078 9,720 9,078 9,720
0.488 0.497 -0.009 0.109 0.106 0.003 0.155 0.152 0.003Period 4 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
11,889 12,591 11,889 12,591 11,889 12,591
0.478 0.480 -0.002 0.112 0.107 0.004 0.159 0.156 0.003Period 5 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
11,897 12,743 11,897 12,743 11,897 12,743
0.463 0.464 -0.001 0.123 0.108 0.015 0.168 0.160 0.008Period 6 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)** (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
9,266 10,190 9,266 10,190 9,266 10,190
History Category 4 History Category 5 History Category 6
0.093 0.091 0.002 0.059 0.058 0.000 0.099 0.102 -0.003Period 1 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
6,946 7,342 6,946 7,342 6,946 7,342
0.092 0.089 0.003 0.056 0.057 -0.001 0.094 0.100 -0.006Period 2 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)*
10,900 11,510 10,900 11,510 10,900 11,510
0.091 0.091 0.000 0.053 0.058 -0.005 0.093 0.097 -0.004Period 3 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)* (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
9,078 9,720 9,078 9,720 9,078 9,720
0.094 0.089 0.004 0.057 0.057 0.000 0.097 0.099 -0.002Period 4 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
11,889 12,591 11,889 12,591 11,889 12,591
0.102 0.094 0.008 0.057 0.060 -0.003 0.092 0.101 -0.010Period 5 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)**
11,897 12,743 11,897 12,743 11,897 12,743
0.101 0.099 0.001 0.059 0.065 -0.006 0.086 0.104 -0.018Period 6 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)* (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)**
9,266 10,190 9,266 10,190 9,266 10,190
Notes: The first sub-column for each criminal history group contains the actual post-Apprendi fraction of the total number
of offenders made up by offenders in that group. The second sub-column shows the "predicted" fraction of that group,
where the criminal history category of each offender is predicted using coefficients estimated on pre-Apprendi data using
the multinomial logit model described in the text. The third sub-column shows the difference between the actual and
predicted fractions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols * and ** represent statistical significance at





Protection: The Case of Disability
Discrimination
Joint with Christine Jolls
Abstract
Studies of the effects of employment protection frequently examine protective legislation
as a whole. From a policy reform perspective, however, it is often critical to know which
particular aspect of the legislation is responsible for its observed effects. The American
with Disabilities Act (ADA), a 1990 federal law covering over 40 million Americans, is a
clear case in point. Several empirical studies have suggested that the passage of the ADA
reduced rather than increased employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.
To the extent this is true, it is crucial to credibly disentangle the different features of this
complex and multi-faceted law. Separately evaluating the distinct aspects of the ADA is
important not only for determining how the law might best be reformed if some aspects of
it produce negative employment effects, but also for improving our understanding of the
potential consequences of ADA-like provisions in race and other civil rights laws. This paper
exploits state-level variation in pre-ADA legal regimes governing disability discrimination
to separately estimate the employment effects of each of the ADA's two primary substantive
provisions. We find strong evidence that the immediate post-enactment employment effects
of the ADA are attributable to its requirement of "reasonable accommodations" for disabled
employees rather than to its potential imposition of firing costs for such employees. More-
over, the pattern of the ADA's effects across states suggests, contrary to widely-discussed
prior findings based on national-level data, that. declining disabled employment. after the
immediate post-ADA period may reflect other factors rather than the ADA itself.
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3.1 Introduction
A large literature examines the effects of employment protection on employment levels and
other labor market outcomes for protected workers. In much of this literature, "employment
protection" is taken to be a simple unitary measure, 1 and the effects of such "protection"
are identified from a single change in the legal regime. Thus, for instance, Oyer and Schae-
fer (2000) study the effects of employment protection on employee outcomes in the United
States by examining the consequences of a multifaceted antidiscrimination law, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. But relying on a complex, one-time legal innovation to identify employ-
ment effects means that there is no separate source of variation to identify which particular
components of the "employment protection" law at issue are responsible for the observed
effects. Such a limitation is unfortunate because, without a more precise understanding
of the specific cause of the labor market consequences detected, it is difficult to design or
evaluate potential policy reforms of multi-dimensional employment protection laws.
The growing literature on the employment effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) is a clear case in point. Several recent empirical studies have suggested
that the ADA, a law that broadly regulates the treatment of individuals with disabilities
in the workplace and elsewhere, has reduced the employment prospects of those individuals
(DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). To the extent this is true-a closely
debated question to which we will return-it is critical from a policy perspective to de-
termine which specific features of the ADA may be responsible. While DeLeire (2003,
pp.259-60) suggests that we "should reconsider their support of the ADA as the vehicle
for achieving that goal," policy reform targeted to improve the efficacy of the ADA-a law
passed virtually unanimously by Congress and signed with enthusiasm by a Republican
president-appears far more promising as a means of helping individuals with disabilities.
To be policy relevant, therefore, empirical work that studies the consequences of the ADA
must determine the specific source of the observed labor market effects.
Despite the ample literature on the employment effects of the ADA, the question of
why the ADA might have a negative effect on disabled employment has received surpris-
'Similarly, Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and Besley and Burgess (2004), in studying the
effects of employment protection on European and Asian unemployment, measure the level of protection or
labor regulation using single-dimension measures from OECD or other data sources.
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ingly little systematic empirical attention. If the ADA's provisions render individuals with
disabilities more costly to employ but-because of the difficulty of enforcing prohibitions on
discrimination in hiring (Donohue and Heckman 1991)-the law cannot effectively prevent
employers from refusing to hire these individuals in the first place, then it is unremarkable
that the ADA could be found to reduce disabled employment. But existing empirical work
has not resolved the question of just why the ADA might increase the costs of, and thereby
cause the disemployment of, individuals with disabilities.
Two central provisions of the ADA seem most likely to increase the cost of employ-
ing disabled individuals. First, the ADA mandates that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations" to individuals with disabilities-such as purchasing special equipment
or altering workplace structures or procedures-unless such accommodations would create
"undue hardship" for the employer. Such mandated accommodations impose obvious costs,
though the precise magnitude of these costs may be uncertain (Blanck 1996). Second,
by prohibiting discriminatory discharge on the basis of disability, the ADA creates "firing
costs" associated with the employment of individuals with disabilities. These costs reflect
the anticipated expenses (litigation and otherwise) of terminating disabled employees even
for lawful reasons; such costs arise because the legal system must now be convinced that
any termination was not discriminatory.2
The ADA, in potentially generating firing costs, parallels other civil rights statutes, such
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. The literature on Title VII's effects contains competing evidence on whether the
law has increased (contrary to the firing costs prediction) or decreased (consistent with the
prediction) employment levels of protected persons (Chay 1998; Heckman and Payner 1989;
Donohue and Siegelman 1991). In light of the empirical uncertainty about the validity of
the firing costs account, an empirical investigation of the role of firing costs in the ADA
context is an important next step in this literature.
Because the ADA imposed both a reasonable accommodations requirement and poten-
tial firing costs upon its initial enactment, existing studies comparing disabled employment
levels before and after the ADA-including the studies by DeLeire and by Acemoglu and
2Unlike prohibitions on discriminatory failure to hire, prohibitions on discriminatory termination are
likely to give rise to a significant amount of litigation by employees (Donohue and Heckman 1991).
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Angrist as well as more recent studies by Kruse and Schur (2003), Hotchkiss (2004), and
Houtenville and Burkhauser (2004)-are not well-suited to separating out the effects of the
ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement and its potential imposition of firing costs.3
In this study, we seek to isolate and evaluate the two distinct explanations for reduced
disabled employment after the ADA by exploiting the substantial state-level variation in
disability discrimination regimes that existed prior to the ADA's enactment. During the
pre-ADA period, some states' disability discrimination regimes tracked the ADA in both
requiring reasonable accommodations for disabled workers and subjecting employers to a
"traditional antidiscrimination prohibition" (forbidding discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability in hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of employment), with its associated firing
costs. During the same period, other states imposed traditional antidiscrimination prohi-
bitions but departed from the eventual approach of the ADA in not requiring employers
to make reasonable accommodations. Finally, a third group of states imposed no limits
whatsoever on private employers' treatment of disabled workers in the pre-ADA period.
By separately evaluating the effects of the ADA-with its dual imposition of a reason-
able accommodations requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition with its
accompanying firing costs-on disabled employment in each of these three distinct state
groups, we are able to provide a measure of the relative importance of the ADA's rea-
sonable accommodations requirement and its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition in
driving ADA-related disabled employment effects.
We estimate that in the years just after its enactment the ADA produced approximately
a 10% decline in disabled employment in states in which the law's reasonable accommo-
dations requirement was an innovation, compared to states in which a similar requirement
existed at the state level prior to the ADA's enactment. By contrast., we consistently
find little to no effect of the ADA's enactment on disabled employment in states in which
3Acemoglu and Angrist briefly attempt to examine the issue of the relative role of the two distinct types of
legal requirements under the ADA by testing whether "separation rates" for disabled workers fell during the
post-ADA period; they find no discernible effect on separation rates and therefore tentatively suggest that
negative effects of the ADA may result primarily from the law's reasonable accommodations requirement.
However, as Acemoglu and Angrist emphasize, the separation rate information is "plagued by considerable
measurement error," and this noise may explain their failure to find an effect of the ADA on separation
rates. In contrast to Acemoglu and Angrist, Baldwin and Schumacher (2002) find that the relative rate of
involuntary job changes for disabled compared to nondisabled workers fell between 1990 and 1993, although
again accuracy of measurement may be affecting these results. Overall, separation rate data does not seem
to be a reliable way to disaggregate the employment effects of the ADA's distinct provisions.
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the law's traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, with its associated firing costs, was an
innovation--although for reasons described below we are not able to measure the effect of
the ADA's traditional antidiscrimination prohibition as confidently as the effect of the law's
reasonable accommodations requirement. 4
The state-law variation in pre-ADA disability discrimination regimes not only allows us
to disaggregate the relationship between the ADA's enactment and post-ADA employment
patterns, but also provides a valuable source of variation for probing the robustness of the
causal relationship, if any, between the ADA and the employment trends observed over the
1990s. As the significant scholarly debate over the ADA's employment effects, culminating
in a recent book-length treatment by David Stapleton and Richard Burkhauser (2003),
clearly illustrates, a perennial concern with any study of outcomes before and after the
implementation of a new federal program is that concurrent unmeasured changes other
than the passage of the new law-including shifts in the economic, social, and technological
environment-may be the actual causes of the observed changes in outcomes. Our research,
by separately studying the effects of the ADA in those states that had similar regimes in
place prior to the ADA's enactment, in those states in which the ADA was an innovation
only with respect to imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement, and in those
states in which the ADA was a complete innovation, provides an important new lens on the
ADA's effect on disabled employment over the 1990s (see DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu
and Angrist 2001; Stapleton, Houtenville, and Goodman 2001; Bound and Waidmann 2002;
Kruse and Schur 2003; Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003; Hotchkiss 2004; Houtenville and
Burkhauser 2004).
While other authors have briefly mentioned pre-ADA state-level regimes in their analy-
ses of the ADA, our primary focus on employing state-law variation to disaggregate the
effects of the ADA's provisions leads naturally to a more comprehensive treatment of the
law's differential effects across state groups.5 Our findings support the existence of a causal
4Our finding of a clear near-term employment effect of the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement
contrasts with the more inconclusive findings of Beegle and Stock (2003), who use Census data to explore
the employment consequences of the initial enactment of state laws requiring reasonable accommodations
and who find no effects; we discuss their study at length in subsection 3.3.3 below.
5In the existing literature, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) briefly employ state-law information as an instru-
ment in their empirical analysis and, in so doing, restrict attention to a limited number of pre-ADA state-law
regimes that provided for "misdemeanor charges or civil penalties" in the event of an employer violation. We
do not. characterize state regimes along the dimension of whether or not such sanctions were available because
relationship between the ADA and declines in disabled employment in the years immediately
following the law's enactment, but beyond that period our results--contrary to the existing
work by DeLeire and by Acemoglu and Angrist-provide some evidence that disabled em-
ployment declines may not be causally linked to the ADA. In particular, although relative
disabled employment was lower in those later years than in the period immediately before
the ADA's enactment, we find no difference in the employment reduction between states in
which the ADA was and was not an innovation. We explore below various reasons why the
ADA, through its reasonable accommodations requirement, might have a short-term but
not a longer-term effect on the level of disabled employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data used
in our empirical analysis. Section 3.3 presents our basic approach and results. Section 3.4
describes a variety of robustness checks. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Pre-ADA State-Law Regimes
Tables 1, 2, Al, and A2 report the results of our detailed legal research into state disability
discrimination regimes prior to the ADA. We rely on primary sources (the actual published
text of statutes and judicial decisions) and, as described in the tables, have traced statutory
provisions through all of their pre-ADA amendments and code sections. We have also read
the pre-ADA reported case law, which provides judicial interpretations of states' statutory
provisions, plus unreported case law available on Westlaw. Judicial opinions are a crucial
data source because a number of states imposed reasonable accommodations requirements
by judicial decision rather than by statutory provision, and because in a few states (most
notably Michigan) case law holdings significantly illuminate the meaning of ambiguous or
even conflicting statutory provisions that would otherwise have been read differently.
As Tables 1 and 2 reveal, states in the pre-ADA period had varying statutory and
judicial regimes governing private employers' treatment of disabled workers. The largest
the ordinary set of sanctions-money damages along with nonmonetary relief such as reinstatement--did
not vary significantly across the states with pre-ADA disability discrimination regimes. Hotchkiss (2004)
also makes some use of certain information about pre-ADA state-level regimes: see subsection 3.3.3 below
for further discussion.
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group of states tracked the ADA in mandating some form of traditional antidiscrimination
prohibition (forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability in hiring, firing, and terms
and conditions of employment), with its associated firing costs, but differed from the ADA
in not imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement; these states are listed in Table
1, and we refer to them as "protection without accommodation" states. A second group
of states, listed in Table 2, imposed substantive requirements parallel to those ultimately
imposed by the ADA; we refer to these states as "ADA-like" states. Finally, a third group of
states (consisting of Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi),6 which we term "no protection"
states, set no limits whatsoever on private employers' treatment of disabled workers prior
to the ADA's enactment. 7
3.2.2 Disability Status and Other Individual Data
For the disability status of individuals-as well as for other variables such as employment
levels and various demographic and other controls-we draw on the March Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). Throughout, we refer to data by its year of observation (the year
preceding the March survey), and we focus our attention on all individuals aged 21 through
58, not just those in the labor force. Variables and summary statistics for the years 1988
to 1998 are reported in Table 3.
The CPS variable for disability requires some discussion.8 The CPS definition of dis-
ability comes from the March income supplement and reflects the subject's answer to the
question, "Does [respondent] have a health problem or a disability which prevents him/her
from working or which limits the kind or amount of work he/she can do?" Under the ADA,
6We address at length in subsection 3.3.3 below concerns that all of these states are from the southern
United States. We also explain how, even with those concerns, our estimated effect of imposing the ADA's
reasonable accommodations requirement-as distinguished from our estimated effect of imposing its tradi-
tional antidiscrimination prohibition-is wholly independent of the composition of the "no protection" state
group.
7All three of the "no protection" states did prohibit disability discrimination by public employers (akin
to the employment provisions of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973), but they did not prohibit such
discrimination by private employers. Naturally, given our interest in this paper in examining the effects of
the ADA, we focus on the pre-ADA state-law regimes governing private employers.
8Burkhauser and Daly (2002, pp.2 19-20) describe varying approaches to the definition of disability. As
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) note, while the CPS disability question seems to refer to the individual's status
at the time of the March survey, the question actually serves as a lead-in question for a series of questions
about disability income in the preceding year.
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meanwhile, an individual is disabled if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded
as having such an impairment. An affirmative answer to the CPS question certainly does
not map perfectly or even that closely onto the ADA's definition of disability (Schwochau
and Blanck 2000, pp.299-300).
The reasons that the CPS and ADA definitions may diverge are several. First, indi-
viduals who answer the CPS question affirmatively may be incorrectly reporting health
conditions or impairments that limit work-perhaps because they are unable to find work-
and may not in fact be truly impaired (see Kreider and Pepper 2002). Second, only certain
types of genuine impairments that may limit work have been deemed by the Supreme Court
to be covered by the ADA (Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)). Third, along-
side these respects in which the CPS measure may be broader than the ADA measure, the
CPS measure may be narrower in not including those with a record of impairment or who
are regarded as impaired, but who are not actually impaired.9
While the CPS measure would clearly provide a poor basis for some empirical conclusions--
such as the absolute number of people protected by the ADA at a given point of time--the
estimates we report are not vulnerable on this ground because our approach uses the CPS
measure to assess changes in employment levels after the ADA's enactment. Burkhauser,
Daly, Houtenville, and Nargis (2002) provide evidence from National Health Interview Sur-
vey (NHIS) data that employment changes over time for populations defined by work lim-
itations (as under the CPS) are not significantly different from employment changes over
time for populations defined by impairments (closer to the ADA's approach). Thus, we
think that the CPS disability question has sufficient overlap with the definition of disability
under the ADA that studying how those who answer "yes" to the survey question were
affected by the ADA in terms of their employment levels allows one to learn something
important about the effects of the law on disabled employment. 10
9The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claims data (available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/stats/ada.html) suggest that about 15% of EEOC claims under the ADA involve the "record" and
"regarded as" prongs of the ADA's disability definition.
10In the future, the CPS is likely to include disability-related questions that map more closely onto the
ADA's definition (see Kruse and Hale 2003, pp.6-9). No matter how precise this information. however, it
will obviously not be available for either the time period in which the ADA was passed or for the years prior
to the ADA's enactment. In this light, use of the CPS measure from the pre-ADA and immediate post-ADA
periods is a reasonable step in seeking to measure the effects of the ADA on disabled employment.
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The most important potential concern with the use of the CPS measure of disability or,
indeed, the use of any survey-based measure of disability for purposes of examining pre- and
post-ADA employment levels of individuals with disabilities is that the ADA's enactment
could itself have altered the composition of the group responding "yes" to the disability
survey question. Kruse and Schur (2003) describe several routes by which the passage of
the ADA could alter the nature of the group of individuals answering "yes" to a CPS-like
disability survey question. If such changes occurred, then apparent disemployment effects of
the ADA could actually be effects of the law on the nature of the population being counted
as disabled. In Section 3.4 below, we closely examine the time trend in affirmative answers
to the CPS disability question, and, consistent with prior work on the prospect of such
composition bias (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, p.935; Beegle and Stock 2003, pp.855-56),
we do not find evidence that compositional changes are driving our findings. 11
3.3 Empirical Approach and Results
The ADA was enacted in July of 1990, so throughout the empirical analysis we compare
employment levels in two-year periods starting in 1990 to employment levels in the two-
year period immediately preceding 1990. Because the ADA did not go into effect until
two years after its enactment, it is possible that effects lagged behind the 1990 enactment
date. Alternatively, the time immediately following enactment might have witnessed the
largest employment effects as employers in "protection without accommodation" and "no
protection" states-while facing new potential costs of employing disabled workers down
the road-were not yet restricted by ADA (or ADA-like) provisions and thus could, for
instance, discharge or refuse to hire someone because of the person's need for reasonable
accommodations without incurring any legal risk. Extensive enactment-period media cover-
age of the ADA suggests that many managerial employees learned of the ADA when it was
enacted. 12 With respect to our "pre-ADA" period of 1988-1989, because the ADA actually
received widespread media coverage as early as the latter half of 1989-when the law was
"The CPS was redesigned between the 1993 and 1994 surveys, corresponding to observation years 1992
and 1993. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001, pp.925, 951) offer analysis suggesting that the redesign does not
materially affect an understanding of the ADA's employment effects.
'
2 A search of the Lexis-Nexis News Group File for mentions of the ADA in 1990 yielded 965 hits.
already widely anticipated--our use of 1988-1989 as the period against which to measure
the law's effects will, if anything, tend to bias our estimates against finding an effect of the
ADA, as employers' behavior conceivably could have been affected as early as the second
half of 1989.13
3.3.1 Univariate Results
Mean employment levels across our three state groups provide a first view of the basic
effect of the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement and the law's traditional an-
tidiscrimination prohibition, with its associated firing costs, on employment of people with
disabilities. Table 4 reports the mean employment levels in weeks per year for disabled and
nondisabled people, before (1988-1989) and after (all subsequent pairs of years) the passage
of the ADA, separately for each of our three state groups: the "protection without accom-
modation" group, containing states with traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions but no
reasonable accommodations requirements prior to the ADA's enactment; the "ADA-like"
group, with states that had both traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions and reasonable
accommodations requirement prior to the ADA's enactment; and the "no protection" group,
containing states that imposed no restrictions on private employers' treatment of disabled
workers prior to the ADA's enactment. For ease of presentation, we use two-year windows
before and after the change in the legal setting (similar to Katz 1998 and Autor, Donohue,
and Schwab 2002), though our results are robust to windows of varying length.
Table 4a compares disabled versus nondisabled employment levels before and after the
ADA in "protection without accommodation" states with disabled versus nondisabled em-
13During the latter half of 1989, media sources frequently referred to the certain or virtually certain
passage of the ADA the following year. In the legal literature, for instance, Chatoff (1989) stated that the
ADA "inevitably will" become law, while Gardner (1989) wrote that Congress "seems almost certain to
enact" the ADA "in the very foreseeable future." In the popular media, Shapiro (1989) stated of the ADA
that "President Bush . . .guaranteed the bill's passage with his support," while Calkins (1989) quoted a
disability advocate's confident declaration that "for the first time ever, people with disabilities will have civil
rights protection under federal law equal to the protection already afforded to members of minority groups
and to women." Of particular interest are industry periodicals targeted to employers and their managerial
employees; in this category, Romeo (1989) reports in an article in Nation's Restaurant News that at a
meeting of the National Restaurant Association the "Americans with Disabilities Act was mentioned several
times"; that a member of the Association's Human Resources Committee stated that the law "will affect us
in the very near future"; and that another Association official stated that the "ADA seems certain to pass."
Similarly. an editorial entitled "Accommodating Disabled Workers in the Construction Industry," published
in October of 1989 in the Engineering News-Record, stated that passage of the ADA "seems certain to
follow."
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ployment levels before and after the ADA in "ADA-like" states. Because the absence or
presence of a pre-ADA reasonable accommodations requirement is the dimension along
which the two state groups differ, this first comparison provides a measure of the effect of
the ADA's imposition of a reasonable accommodations requirement. As Table 4a shows,
in "protection without accommodation" states, where the ADA's reasonable accommoda-
tions requirement was an innovation, disabled employment declined by 1.35 weeks per year
in 1990-1991 compared to 1988-1989, while nondisabled employment showed a far smaller
decline of 0.23 weeks per year; by contrast, in "ADA-like" states, in which the substantive
requirements of the pre-ADA state-level regimes tracked those of the ADA, disabled em-
ployment actually increased by 0.83 weeks per year in 1990-1991 compared to 1988-1989,
while nondisabled employment was virtually unchanged (a decline of 0.03 weeks per year).
Taking the difference between the two within-state-group differences for 1990-1991 com-
pared to 1988-1989, the mean-based difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimate
for the change in disabled employment generated by the imposition of a reasonable accom-
modations requirement is -1.98 weeks per year (the third column of Table 4a). Given the
base number of weeks employed for disabled persons prior to the ADA's enactment-16.25
in "protection without accommodation" states and 18.22 in "ADA-like" states-the drop of
1.98 weeks represents over a 10% decline in disabled employment. The evidence of declining
relative disabled employment in "protection without accommodation" states compared to
"ADA-like" states continues in 1991-1992 and 1992-1993, and then disappears in 1993-1994
and subsequent pairs of years-the first suggestion of a near-term but not long-term ef-
fect of the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement. We discuss this timing pattern
in further detail below. Notice the reassuring fact that in all of the near-term post-ADA
comparisons, nondisabled employment-in contrast to disabled employment-is relatively
stable between the pre- and post-ADA periods in both "protection without accommodation"
and "ADA-like" states.
Table 4b compares "no protection" states, with no pre-ADA legal restrictions on private
employers' treatment of disabled workers, to "protection without accommodation" states,
with only traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions prior to the ADA's enactment. This
comparison thus provides a measure of the effect of imposing an antidiscrimination prohi-
bition (an innovation in "no protection" states but not in "protection without accommoda-
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tion" states). Our mean-based DDD estimate for imposing such a prohibition is unstable
over the 1990-1991 through 1997-1998 "after" periods and is always small in magnitude and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Because this measure is identified based on the
experience of three small southern states (the "no protection" states, in which the ADA's
traditional antidiscrimination prohibition was an innovation), however, we explore a variety
of robustness checks on this finding in the regression analysis below.
3.3.2 Regression Framework
Our regression analysis employs a straightforward DDD specification like that used, for
example, in Gruber (1994) and Collins (2003). All regressions take the form (for each
specified two-year post-ADA period in Tables 5-6 and A3-A5):
Yijt = lo +± 3Xijt + f 2 ADAt + 03DISi + 04LPj + f 5NPj + f36ADAt x DISi
+ 07ADAt x LPj + , 8ADAt x NPj + 09DIS, x LPj + o10DISi x NPj
+ ,3iADAt x DISi x LPj + 012ADAt x DIS, x NPj + Eijt (3.1)
where Y is weeks worked; i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes years; X is a
vector of demographic and state-level economic characteristics; ADA is a dummy variable
equal to one in the post-ADA period; DIS is a dummy variable equal to one for disabled
individuals; LP is a dummy variable equal to one for states offering limited protection
in the form of a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition prior to the ADA's enactment
("protection without accommodation" states); and NP is a dummy variable equal to one
for "no protection" states. The LP and NP dummy variables measure effects relative to
those in the "ADA-like" state group.14
The coefficients of interest in equation (3.1) are the coefficients on the triple interaction
terms, ADAt x DISi x LPj and ADAt x DISi x NPj. The coefficient f11 on the first
14Instead of looking at such relative effects, one could examine separate effects within each of the three
state groups. In that model the coefficients of interest would be ADA, x DISi x LPj , ADAt x DIS, x NPj,
and ADAt x DISi x ADj, where ADj is a dummy variable equal to 1 for states in the "ADA-like" group.
Table A3 reports results from specifications that omit ADAt x DISt and instead estimate the coefficient on
ADAt x DIS, x ADj. In these specifications, the coefficients on ADAt x DISi x LPj and ADAt x DISi x NPj
measure overall effects rather than effects relative to the "ADA-like" states. Returning to the original
specification reflected in equation (3.1). because there are three (nonoverlapping) groups of states in our
study. several of the interactions between the dummy variables are always zero (in particular, LPj x NPj,
ADA4t x LP, x NP7, DIS, x LP, x NP,. and ADAt x DIS, x LPj x NPj), and thus these drop out of
equation (3.1).
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of these terms measures the change between the pre- and post-ADA periods in disabled
versus nondisabled outcomes in "protection without accommodation" states (those with
traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions but no reasonable accommodations requirements
prior to the ADA) relative to this same change in "ADA-like" states. In other words, 311
tells us how relative disabled outcomes changed in states in which the ADA's reasonable
accommodations requirement, but not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, was
new (the "protection without accommodation" group) compared to how these outcomes
changed in states in which neither substantive requirement of the ADA was new (the "ADA-
like" group).
Our approach here does not assume that the enactment of the ADA made no difference
at all in states that had substantively comparable pre-ADA protections (the "ADA-like"
states); among other possibilities, the enactment of the federal statute made available Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement and altered other procedural
aspects of pre-existing disability discrimination law, such as the availability of federal court
adjudication (see generally Neuborne 1977), and these changes may have influenced disabled
outcomes. Effects of the federal regime that are identical across states are permissible within
a triple differences framework, although such effects, if they exist, cannot be identified.
Of course, if the ADA had differential effects across the "protection without accommo-
dation" and "ADA-like" groups for reasons unrelated to the substantive legal provisions in
effect in these groups, then our estimate of 311 would pick up those additional effects along
with the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement. If, for example,
states in the "ADA-like" group tended to be systematically more vigorous in accepting and
enforcing civil rights claims brought by disabled individuals than states in the "protection
without accommodation" group, then l11 would measure not only the effect of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement but also the effect of supplementing moderate or
limited enforcement of disability discrimination law in the "protection without accommo-
dation" states with the more robust procedures provided by the ADA. 15
'
5 Any attempt to control directly for cross-state variation in pre-ADA enforcement behavior using the
number of discrimination charges brought under the various state laws would be confounded by the significant
endogeneity of charge rates and the employment level (our dependent variable). Acemoglu and Angrist (2001)
address this endogeneity issue in their use of discrimination charge data by instrumenting for state charge
rates with a variable for whether the state had a particular type of pre-ADA disability discrimination law
(one providing for "misdemeanor charges or civil penalties"), but that approach is not open to us here given
the role the state-law information already plays in our analysis.
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Nonetheless, we think it is unlikely that our estimate of O11 will pick up enforcement
differences that could confound the estimated effect on disabled employment of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement. The timing of the state-law enactments suggests
that the "ADA-like" states are not the systematically more aggressive, pro-disabled-worker
states; in most cases the states that had reasonable accommodations requirements prior to
the ADA's enactment were those that instituted disability discrimination regimes relatively
late in the game, while the "protection without accommodation" states were those "early
to the party" in protecting civil rights of disabled workers (see date columns in Tables 1
and 2). Thus, if anything, our estimate of /11 may understate the potential disemployment
effect for disabled persons of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement, given the
most plausible direction of any pre-ADA enforcement disparities across states.
While 011 measures the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement,
equation (3.1) also provides us with a direct measure of the effect of simultaneously im-
posing both a reasonable accommodations requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination
prohibition. The coefficient 012 measures the change between the pre- and post-ADA peri-
ods in disabled versus nondisabled outcomes in "no protection" states relative to this same
change in "ADA-like" states, and the difference in legal regimes between those two groups is
the absence (in the former) versus the presence (in the latter) of both a reasonable accom-
modations requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition prior to the ADA.
Thus the difference in the two groups' outcomes (1312) is a measure of the effect of imposing
both of these provisions; it then follows that the difference 012 - 11, also reported in our
tables, measures the effect of imposing only a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition. 16
All of the regressions reported below contain controls for individual i's age, race, sex,
educational attainment, marital status, and union membership; for individual or state-level
disability benefits information; and for the state unemployment rate (except where pre-
cluded by the inclusion of state effects, as noted below) and the interaction of disability
with the state unemployment rate. By the nature of the DDD methodology, our approach
controls for national time trends in employment, the general effect of disability on em-
ployment, state-group specific employment effects, and interactions of each of these factors
16Because 312 depends on outcomes in the "no protection" states-all of which are in the South-we
explore at length below whether region-specific factors could be affecting our results (and find evidence that
they are not)
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with the others. Many of our regressions also include state, year, and state-year interaction
effects, although in those specifications we are unable to identify the effects of the state
unemployment rate and of the ADAt, LPj, and NPj variables from above and their inter-
actions with each other. Importantly, because all of our regressions include the interaction
of disability with the state unemployment rate, our approach controls for the possibility
that individuals with disabilities may face especially poor employment prospects when un-
employment rates are high-an important consideration given the early 1990s recession,
which immediately followed the ADA's enactment (Kruse and Schur 2003) and thus might
otherwise have generated effects similar to those estimated here.
3.3.3 Regression Results
The top panel of Table 5 reports the results of the basic specification in equation (3.1).
Consistent with the findings in Table 4, the estimate for 311, the effect of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement, is clearly negative for the post-ADA year pairs
1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993, with estimates ranging from -1.54 to -2.51 weeks per
year. Thus, as before, imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement seems to produce
in the neighborhood of a 10% decline in disabled employment in the near-term aftermath
of the ADA's enactment. Meanwhile, again parallel to the results in Table 4, the estimate
for 012 - f11, the effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, over the
post-ADA years 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993 is small in magnitude, inconsistent
in sign, and never statistically significant."1
Thus, our results indicate that the reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA
was the source of a short-term negative effect of the law on disabled employment and, more
'
7The dependent variable in our regressions, as noted above, is the number of weeks worked during the
year. This is standard in the literature (see Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, p.925), and captures employment
consequences resulting from discharges, temporary layoffs, and changes in seasonal employment. Another
possible measure, however, is simply whether the individual was employed. To ensure that our findings are
not driven by our choice of dependent variable (and linear specification), we report in Table A4 the estimated
coefficients from a probit specification in which the dependant variable is equal to one if the individual
was employed. The same pattern we saw in Table 5 emerges: a reasonable accommodations requirement
appears to reduce the likelihood that an individual with a disability was employed, relative to a nondisabled
individual, but we find no evidence that a traditional antidiscrimination requirement had any effect on
the possibility of being employed. Again, consistent with Table 5, the reasonable accommodations effect
is short-lived. Finally, in separate, unreported work, we find no evidence that either the accommodations
requirement or the antidiscrimination mandate had any measurable effect on wages, which is consistent with
earlier studies (see Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, p.932).
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tentatively, that the law's traditional antidiscrimination prohibition may have had little
effect in the years after the ADA's enactment. The second panel in Table 5 shows that
our results are unchanged when state, year, and statexyear effects are included, and the
top panel of Table A5 verifies that the results are unchanged when state, statexyear, and
state xdisability effects (to control for compositional changes) are included.
As we have suggested at several points, a potential issue with our measure of the ef-
fect of imposing the ADA's traditional antidiscrimination provision-although not with our
measure of the effect of imposing the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement-is
the former effect is identified in part based on outcomes in the "no protection" state group,
which consists of three southern states, Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi. i8 If, between
the pre- and post-ADA periods, some unobserved shock occurred in the southern region of
the country, and that shock differentially affected disabled and nondisabled persons, then
our measure of the effect of imposing the ADA's antidiscrimination provision would cap-
ture this unobserved shock (because our measure of the effect of the ADA's traditional
antidiscrimination prohibition depends on the experience of the "no protection" states) in
addition to any ADA-related effect. Relatedly, it is possible that states with higher levels
of disabled individuals-a group that includes states in the South-experienced unobserved
labor-market changes differentially affecting disabled persons between the pre- and post-
ADA periods; again our estimate of the effect of imposing the ADA's traditional antidis-
crimination prohibition would capture these unobserved shifts because the "no protection"
group consists exclusively of southern states.19
A straightforward strategy to alleviate these concerns about a possible trend differen-
tially affecting states in the "no protection" group is simply to re-estimate equation (3.1)
on just the southern states-with their more similar populations-from each of our three
state groups. The "protection without accommodation" group in the regressions we re-
port includes Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, and Tennessee, while the "ADA-like"
18By contrast, the "protection without accommodation" and "ADA-like" groups are large and well-
balanced across the country, as shown in Tables 1 and 2; our estimate of the effect of the ADA's reasonable
accommodations requirement will not be affected by the limited size and geographic diversity of the "no
protection" group because that effect is identified solely from the comparison of employment changes in the
"protection without accommodation" group with similar changes in the "ADA-like" group.
19In terms of the representation of disabled individuals in the population across states, the mean proportion
of disabled individuals over 1988-1998 was .085 in the "no protection" states, compared to .067 in the
"protection without accommodation" states and .068 in the "ADA-like" states. See Figure 1.
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group contains Louisiana and North Carolina.20 (The "no protection" group is, as before,
Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi.) Using the number of disabled individuals in the pop-
ulation as a metric, these "southern-only" state groups are more comparable to the "no
protection" group than were the groups in the original 50-state sample. 21 Although, not
surprisingly, the precision of our estimates falls with the reduction in sample size, the top
panel of Table A6 shows that the results of estimating the basic fixed-effects specification
from the middle panel of Table 5 on the nine-state southern subsample follow the same
basic pattern as the results from the full 50-state sample.
Our finding of a significant negative employment effect of imposing a reasonable accom-
modations requirement contrasts with the conclusions of a recent paper by Beegle and Stock
(2003), whose results in some cases also point in a direction opposite that of DeLeire (2000,
2003) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). Beegle and Stock use Census data for 1970, 1980,
and 1990 to study the effects of the enactment of state laws governing disability discrimi-
nation in the pre-ADA period (whereas we examine the effects of the ADA across different
groups of states characterized by their varying pre-ADA legal regimes). Beegle and Stock
find no significant effect of the enactment of reasonable accommodations requirements (in
contrast with our finding) and, in specifications in which they include disabilityxyear fixed
effects, no significant effect of the enactment of disability discrimination law in general (in
contrast with the findings of DeLeire and of Acemoglu and Angrist). While, as just noted,
incorporating disabilityxyear fixed effects has a significant impact on Beegle and Stock's
results, the bottom panel of Table A5 shows that including these effects (along with the
other fixed effects utilized by Beegle and Stock) has little effect on our results.
The differences between Beegle and Stock's results and ours may be attributable to
various differences in econometric approach, and possibly also to the imprecision of some of
the state-law information used by Beegle and Stock. With respect to econometric approach,
Beegle and Stock's framework has some states promulgating a particular law during a
given time period while others do not, and changes in outcomes across the two groups of
20Our conclusions are robust to the definition of the South. We experimented with a number of other
southern state groupings. some of which included up to a half-dozen additional states, with similar results.
Consequently. to be conservative, we report results based on a relatively narrow definition of the South.
21The mean proportion of disabled individuals over 1988-1998 is now .087 in the 'protection without
accommodation" group and .075 in the "ADA-like" group, far higher than in the original groups and much
closer to the level (.085) observed in the "no protection" group.
143
states are then compared. In that setting, there is a risk that adjustments in the relative
labor market outcomes in the different states reflect not the policy shifts under study but
rather underlying state-level social or economic changes that simultaneously caused, or at
least occurred contemporaneously with, the changes in the state laws (see Besley and Case
2000).22 Examining the enactment of the ADA against a background of a well-established
diversity of state law, by contrast, reduces the concern about this sort of omitted-variables
bias because there is little reason to fear that the degree to which the ADA was an innovation
in a given state is correlated with state-specific social or economic changes, given that
virtually all of the state laws in question were enacted well before the passage of the ADA
(see Tables 1 and 2).23
22 As Beegle and Stock note, "[i]f laws were disproportionately passed in states where the disabled were
[already] faring better, we would expect the laws to have smaller effects and our empirical results to under-
estimate the negative impact of the legislation (relative to random assignment of the laws, including states
where the negative impact of the laws would be larger)" (p.855).
23 As mentioned, the difference between Beegle and Stock's results and ours may also stem in part from
the imprecision of some of the state-law information used by Beegle and Stock. We obtain information
exclusively from primary legal sources, while Beegle and Stock rely on secondary sources, which in some
cases prove to be inaccurate and in any event do not allow them to identify the year of a law's enactment
(just the year when the law is first referred to in the secondary source in question).
The imprecision in the information about state laws will affect Beegle and Stock's empirical analysis when
the dating errors cross decade markers, as they do in a number of cases. For instance, Beegle and Stock,
relying on a secondary source, state that Arkansas had a law, §20-14-303, prohibiting private sector disability
discrimination by 1987. However, this statute did not, in 1987, cover employment discrimination, although
it did cover private sector discrimination in other areas, such as access to restaurants and other public places.
(The full text of the statute is available in the AR-STANN87 historical legislative database on Westlaw.) In
alphabetical order, other states that are incorrectly classified by Beegle and Stock in terms of the decade in
which private sector employment discrimination laws relating to disability were enacted include Colorado,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Of this group, Colorado and
Louisiana are misclassified as to both the decade in which a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition was
enacted and the decade in which a reasonable accommodations requirement was enacted; Missouri, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island are misclassified as to the decade in which a traditional antidiscrimination
prohibition was enacted; and Massachusetts and Oregon are incorrectly classified as to the decade in which
a reasonable accommodations requirement was enacted. See Tables 1 and 2 below for state-law enactment
information. This noise in the coding of the state-law explanatory variable will tend to bias estimates
toward zero (see Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2002, p.28), and this may help to explain the difference
between Beegle and Stock's findings and ours.
Hotchkiss (2004) also makes some use of the pre-ADA state disability discrimination regimes, and differs
from Beegle and Stock in relying on primary legislative materials rather than secondary sources. However,
she nonetheless incorrectly categorizes a substantial number of states, in many instances because a state
statute prior in time to the one she located also regulated disability discrimination in employment. States
miscategorized by Hotchkiss, in terms of date of enactment, include Alaska, California. Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.
(In the case of Alaska, California, and South Dakota, Hotchkiss explicitly notes that "exact original coverage
[is] not available.") Some of the dating errors will not affect Hotchkiss's empirical results; she examines the
effects of state laws enacted between 1981 and 1991, and, thus. a dating error outside this period will not
affect her results. However. in the case of six states-Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South
Carolina. and Texas--the dating error affects the classification of states over the 1981-1991 period.
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Returning to our empirical results, the 93-94 through 97-98 columns of Table 5 show
that in this period neither imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement nor imposing
a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition had a statistically significant effect on disabled
employment: estimates for f11, the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations require-
ment, range from -0.60 to 0.70, while those for ,12 - 11, the effect of imposing a traditional
antidiscrimination prohibition, range from -0.25 to 0.87. In other words, beginning in 1993-
1994 and going forward, the ADA's enactment had statistically indistinguishable effects
across the three state groups.
What is especially striking about these later "post-ADA" years is that it is precisely in
1993-1994 that the estimated coefficient on the term ADAt x DISi, measuring the overall
effect of the ADA as well as any other economic or social trends common across states, be-
comes negative and statistically significant. Therefore, from 1993-1994 forward, movements
in relative disabled employment were downward and similar in magnitude across all three
state-law regimes-a result at odds with the differential pattern, based on pre-ADA state
legal regimes, in the early years after the ADA's enactment. The bottom panel of Table 5
underlines the point by showing that in a specification that omits state-law information (by
setting NPj = LPj = 0 in equation (3.1)), the estimated coefficients on ADAt x DISi in
1993-1994 and forward are similar to the ones in the top and middle panels, in which the
separate effects of being in the "protection without accommodation" and "no protection"
state groups are not constrained to be zero.
Thus, our results for 1993-1994 and forward, while consistent with existing findings of
a persistent decline in disabled employment over the 1990s relative to the pre-ADA period,
reveal the absence of any link between the degree of employment effects in this later period
and the degree to which the ADA was actually a legal innovation relative to pre-ADA
state law. The juxtaposition of a clear state-group pattern, in a predictable direction, in
the period immediately following the ADA's enactment (through 1992-1993) and no state-
group differences in the later years raises questions about the longevity of any negative
employment effects of the ADA's two primary requirements. These questions, as well as
possible interpretations of our results that are consistent with a longer-term negative effect
of the ADA, are discussed further in the next subsection.
145
3.3.4 Discussion
Our empirical results indicate that in the near-term after the ADA's enactment, the law's
reasonable accommodations requirement, but not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibi-
tion with its potential firing costs, had a measurable negative effect on disabled employment.
The large negative effect of the reasonable accommodations requirement on disabled em-
ployment in the period just after the ADA's enactment may reflect the fact that many
accommodations, including physical alterations to the workplace and modification of work-
place policies, impose obvious but often one-time costs on employers-costs that may well
have been exaggerated or particularly salient in employers' minds just after the ADA's pas-
sage. 24 Employers might naturally have responded to anticipated costs by curtailing their
hiring of disabled workers, particularly in the period between the ADA's enactment and
effective dates when curtailing hiring on account of accommodation costs was not illegal in
states without an existing accommodations requirement.
Further reasons that the effect of the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement
on disabled employment might have been larger in the short term include the ADA's im-
portant symbolic effect and the resulting changes in attitudes over time; the possibility
that reasonable accommodations could ultimately increase the flow of qualified disabled
applicants following a short-term reduction as disabled individuals responded to the ADA
by pursuing more education (see Jolls 2000); declining accommodation costs in response to
technological changes and judicial refinements of the ADA's requirements; and enforcement
of the ADA's prohibition on refusal to hire based on accommodation costs after the ADA's
effective date.25
The possibility that the true employment effects of the ADA are short-term rather
than longer-term effects is consistent with Kirchner (1986), who emphasizes that the con-
24 Some observers have pointed to evidence that accommodation costs may often be modest (Blanck 1996),
but measurement issues and skewed samples of accommodations suggest that relatively limited weight should
be attached to such evidence (Stein 2000, p.1677). In any event, some legally mandated accommodations-
for instance, the need to hire readers for blind employees, as specified by federal regulations (see 29 CFR
§1630.2(o))-are clearly extremely costly for employers.
25A more positive account of the short-term negative employment effect of the ADA's reasonable accom-
modations requirement is that the effect was itself evidence of reasonable accommodations to the scheduling
needs of disabled workers (see Tolin and Patwell 2003). Given that we observe declines in weeks worked, not
hours worked per week, however, and that the decline is limited to the period immediately after the ADA
was enacted, it is difficult to view the negative employment effects as the fact, rather than the consequence,
of mandated accommodation.
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sequences of laws such as the ADA may differ significantly over different time horizons. A
potential interpretation of our findings-pointing against a causal role for the ADA in the
longer-term employment trends of individuals with disabilities over the 1990s-is that the
apparent negative effect of the ADA on disabled employment in 1993-1994 and subsequent
years reflects not the impact of the ADA itself but, rather, other contemporaneous changes
disproportionately affecting individuals with disabilities. Otherwise, it is not clear why the
magnitude of the disabled disemployment effect in 1993-1994 and forward would have no re-
lationship to the degree to which the ADA was a legal innovation, when such a relationship
did appear to exist in the immediate post-enactment period.
Conceivably, the significant decline in disabled employment across all states in 1993-
1994 and forward reflects a longer-term effect of aspects of the ADA that were innovations
in all states. The ADA's enactment made available EEOC enforcement and federal court
adjudication for disability discrimination claims, and thus one possible story is that such
heightened enforcement generated firing costs sufficient to encourage disemployment. Under
this theory, firing costs in states with traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions prior to
the ADA were not large enough (because of limited enforcement) to discourage disabled
employment, so effects of the ADA were observed across all states. In terms of timing, this
story requires at least some lag between the ADA's enactment (July 1990) and effective (July
1992) dates, on the one hand, and the time at which the law affected disabled employment,
on the other. 26 On balance, our findings do not by themselves rule out a continuing link
between the ADA's enactment and disabled employment in 1993-94 and forward, but they
do appear more consistent with an alternative, more short-term account of the ADA's effects
on disabled employment.
3.4 Further Robustness Checks
This section further probes the robustness of our basic finding in Tables 4 and 5 that in
the years just after the ADA's enactment, the imposition of the law's reasonable accom-
modations requirement, but not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, produced a
2 6A story of delayed effects seems less likely a priori with reasonable accommodations requirements because.
compared to firing costs, the costs of making accommodations are more tangible and immediate.
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significant decline in disabled employment. We also examine the possible role that composi-
tion effects or preexisting state-group specific employment trends may play in our analysis.
3.4.1 Robustness to the Timing of State-Law Enactment
The upper left-hand panel of Table 6 shows the results (for post-ADA years 1990-1991,
1991-1992, and 1992-1993) of estimating the basic fixed-effects specification from the middle
panel of Table 5 on a subsample of observations from states in which the state-level pre-ADA
disability discrimination regime was already in place prior to 1980. We perform this check on
the theory that these early enactors-which, as noted earlier, are predominantly "protection
without accommodation" states-may have differed systematically in their degrees of "civil
rights orientation," and thus in their enforcement environments, from the later enactors.
The fact that in two of the three regressions the estimated magnitude of /11 is even larger
than in Table 5 suggests that the estimates based on the full 50-state sample may understate
the effect of imposing an accommodations requirement.2 7
The robustness of our estimate of 311 in a sample of states with more uniform enactment
dates also responds to the possible concern that, if there are either lags or bursts in state
law effectiveness shortly after a state law is put on the books, then our 50-state results may
be confounded by the different average enactment dates across the "protection without
accommodation" and "ADA-like" state groups. Our estimate of 312 - 311, the effect of
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, is also quite stable across the broader
(all states) and narrower (pre-1980 enactors only) samples.
3.4.2 Robustness to Variation in Employer-Size Coverage Thresholds
Pre-ADA state legal regimes varied significantly in the numerical employer-size thresholds
they established for coverage by the state legal regime (see Tables 1 and 2). To address
any concerns of bias arising from these significantly varying thresholds, we re-estimated the
basic fixed-effects specification from the middle panel of Table 5 using only observations from
states with employer-size coverage thresholds of 15 employees (the ultimate ADA threshold)
27We view this possibility with a good deal of caution, however, because only three states in the "ADA-like"
group (Colorado, Oregon, and Washington) had their pre-ADA regimes in place prior to 1980.
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or higher.28 Our results, reported in the upper right-hand panel of Table 6, show a negative
effect of imposing an accommodations requirement and essentially no effect of imposing an
antidiscrimination prohibition. The robustness of our findings to variation on employer-
size coverage thresholds provides further support for our earlier suggestion that "protection
without accommodation" and "ADA-like" states are not differentially affected by the ADA's
enactment because of a difference in the general civil-rights orientation, as such a difference
would probably correlate with the aggressiveness of small-employer coverage.
3.4.3 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Disability Benefits
Around the time the ADA was enacted, the generosity of federal disability benefits was
increasing substantially (Bound and Waidmann 2002). Higher disability benefit levels pro-
vide an independent ground for reduced disabled employment because higher benefit levels
reduce disabled individuals' need or perhaps desire for wage-based income. The increase
in the number of disabled individuals receiving disability benefits, as well as the decrease
in weeks worked for individuals with disabilities, over the 1990s are apparent from the
summary statistics reported in Table 3.
While all of the regressions reported thus far contain controls for disability benefits,
the shift in federal disability benefit levels is actually of less concern for our study than
for prior studies that compare overall disabled employment outcomes before and after the
ADA's enactment (DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Our DDD framework
examines disabled employment levels in one group of states relative to disabled employment
levels in other state groups, and thus changes in federal benefits levels are unlikely to matter
for our results.
Still, changes in federal disability benefits could affect our analysis if for some reason
the resulting changes in disabled individuals' need or desire for wage income (and thus their
work incentives) differed systematically across our three state groups. Autor and Duggan
(2003), for instance, note that work incentives depend on the relationship between disability
benefit levels and wages, and thus states experiencing smaller wage increases (or larger wage
declines) would tend to have more individuals receiving federal disability benefits at any
2 8 0nly one state, Delaware, had a threshold of greater than 15 employees.
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given level of these benefits. If wage levels across states were for some reason correlated with
pre-ADA state-law disability discrimination regimes, then the effects of changes in federal
disability benefits generosity (mediated through the Autor-Duggan mechanism) might be
captured by, and therefore bias, our results.
The regressions reported thus far control for disability benefits receipt using a dummy
variable for whether individuals received federal disability benefits through either the Dis-
ability Insurance (DI) program or the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. 29 Be-
cause such individual disability benefit receipt may be a consequence as well as a cause of
employment; status, this approach raises potential endogeneity issues, although Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) find empirically that approaches taking account of these endogeneity
issues yield results similar to those that do not. Nonetheless, we explore alternatives to the
use of individual disability benefit receipt by including, in lieu of such individual informa-
tion, state-level DI and SSI applications and receipts in the population from Social Security
Administration records.
The lower panel of Table 6 reports the results of re-estimating the basic fixed-effects
specification from the middle panel of Table 5 using, respectively, the percent of the state
population receiving disability benefits interacted with the disability status dummy variable
(left-hand panel) and the percent of the state population applying for disability benefits
interacted with the disability status dummy variable (right-hand panel).30 Our results
for the effects of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement versus a traditional
antidiscrimination prohibition are, once again, consistent with our benchmark estimates
from Table 5.
3.4.4 Robustness to Variation in Economic Environment
Our basic specification controls for variation in states' economic environments by including
state unemployment rate and the interaction of disability status and state unemployment
rate. However, because unobservable economic variation across states might be influencing
29The CPS provides information on receipt of benefits from the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance (OASDI) and SSI programs. However, because our sample does not include individuals 59 and older,
OASDI benefits should be exclusively from the DI program.
30 Including state fixed effects means we cannot separately identify main effects of the new disability
benefits variables.
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our results, we re-estimated the basic fixed-effects specification from the middle panel of
Table 5 without state unemployment rate information; if removing these controls does not
affect our results, unobservable economic differences are unlikely to be playing an important
role. The results, shown in the upper panel of Table A6, are again similar to those in the
benchmark specification reported in Table 5.
3.4.5 Composition of the Disabled Group
With the use of a survey-based disability measure, such as the CPS measure used in our
analysis, comes the possibility of law-driven changes in the composition of the group answer-
ing the survey question affirmatively. If the group of individuals identifying themselves as
disabled in the CPS changed in shape or size as a result of the ADA's enactment, then mea-
sured changes in disabled employment levels between the pre- and post-ADA periods may
capture differences in the composition of the group answering "yes" to the survey question
rather than employer-side effects of the new legal regime. Kruse and Schur (2003, p.49), for
instance, find evidence from Survey of Income and Program Participation data of higher
numbers of individuals reporting severe limitations in 1993 than in 1991, and it would not
be surprising for those with severe limitations to have lower chances of employment.
An important advantage of the framework we employ is that changes over time in the
shape or size of the group of individuals identifying themselves as disabled in response
to the CPS question will not affect our analysis unless these changes vary with the pre-
ADA legal regime of the state in which an individual lives. While nationwide changes
certainly seem plausible, state-varying changes are less likely. This is not to say that they
are inconceivable, however; one obvious possibility is that legal reform may make disability
more socially accepted and thus lead more people to identify themselves as disabled. If
this were the case, then changes in disability identification with the ADA could be more
substantial in states in which the ADA was a more significant innovation.
For state-group specific changes in individuals' identification as disabled to confound
our results, one of three things would have to be the case. First, significant, innovation
through the ADA in the "protection without accommodation" and "no protection" states
might for some reason have made individuals with worse employment prospects than those
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who identified as disabled prior to the ADA more likely to identify themselves as disabled.
This might produce an apparent disemployment effect for disabled people in the states
in which the ADA was a significant innovation. However, if anything it would be those
closest to the line between disability and nondisability, and thus those with relatively good
employment prospects, who would switch to identifying as disabled in a state in which the
ADA was a significant innovation (say because the innovation made disability more socially
acceptable). Put another way, it is difficult to tell a story in which those who are severely
limited switch from answering the CPS question "no" to answering it "yes" when the ADA
constitutes a significant innovation in their state, while those who are less severely limited
do not exhibit a similar change.3 1
The second possibility for a confounding effect on our results is that individuals with
reasonably good employment prospects became less likely in the wake of significant legal
innovation through the ADA in "protection without accommodation" or "no protection"
states to identify themselves as disabled, precisely because the reform helped them to obtain
and retain jobs (see Kirchner 1986, p. 8 3 ). Again, this type of compositional shift might
produce an apparent disemployment effect for disabled persons in states in which the ADA
was a significant innovation. If the legal reform did lead to a decline in the reporting of
disability, then the proportion of disabled individuals should either shrink or grow more
slowly in "protection without accommodation" and "no protection" states than in "ADA-
like" states.
Figure 1 graphs the proportion of disabled individuals over time across our three state
groups from 1988 to 1998, while Figure 2 presents corresponding fourth-order polynomial
trend lines. 32 Over the 1988-1998 period, disability rates did not decline in states in which
the ADA was a significant innovation relative to "ADA-like" states. Measuring changes
between 1988 and the post-ADA years 1990-1993, Figure 1 shows that the proportion of
individuals answering the CPS disability question affirmatively increased more in "no pro-
31Even if it is the case (as suggested by Kruse and Schur 2003, p.49) that the proportion of disabled
individuals who report severe disabilities has increased on a nationwide basis in the post-ADA years, it is
unclear how this effect could plausibly be correlated with the degree to which the ADA was a significant
legal innovation in a given state.
32 As suggested in Section 3.3 above, the difference between the "no protection" group and the other two
state groups in terms of the absolute levels of disabled individuals seems to reflect in large part the higher
concentration of individuals with disabilities in the southern states.
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tection" states than in "ADA-like" states for year pairings 1988-1991 and 1988-1993, while
this proportion increased more in "ADA-like" states than in "no protection" states for year
pairings 1988-1990 and 1988-1992. Figure 1 also shows that over 1990 and 1991 (relative
to 1988) the proportion of individuals with disabilities increased more in "ADA-like" states
(implying slower growth in "protection without accommodation" states). But the same
trend was apparent in 1989, even before the ADA was enacted. In 1992 and 1993 (the other
years in which we find a negative effect of the ADA on disabled employment in "protection
without accommodation" states relative to "ADA-like" states), by contrast, Figure 1 shows
that disability rates are virtually identical across the two state groups, as they also were in
the 1988 start year.
A final possible source of composition bias, suggested by Autor and Duggan (2003),
is that states in which the ADA was a significant legal innovation also for some reason
happened to be states that were experiencing smaller wage increases or larger wage declines
around the time of the ADA's enactment; as described above, individuals in such states
would both tend to be more likely to identify as disabled (to get federal disability benefits)
and tend to be more likely not to be employed (again to be eligible for federal disability
benefits). This effect could produce a spurious correlation between the ADA's enactment
and employment effects across states if for some reason state-level wage changes were corre-
lated with pre-ADA state disability discrimination regimes. The regression results reported
above (Tables 5 and 6), however, show that our results are robust to a range of controls for
disability benefits receipts and applications.
In sum, although we cannot entirely rule out an effect on our results of changes in the
composition of the group responding affirmatively to the CPS disability question, our basic
finding of a negative near-term effect of the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement
on disabled employment does not appear to be driven by such changes.
3.4.6 Preexisting State-Group Specific Trends in Disabled Employment
Our conclusion that declining disabled employment in "protection without accommoda-
tion" states relative to "ADA-like" states in the near-term post-ADA period reflects the
ADA's imposition of a reasonable accommodations requirement rests on the premise that
the observed pattern of effects did not predate the ADA "experiment." Figure 3 graphs
disabled employment trends in the "protection without accommodation" and "ADA-like"
states from 1987, the first observation year in which the general disability status question
was asked in the CPS, to 1992, the last year in which disabled employment in the two state
groups moved in significantly different ways.3 3 These data paint a reassuring picture in
which disabled employment moved roughly in tandem across the two state groups prior to
1990 and then diverged markedly in 1990-1992 (see Figure 3). A longer pre-ADA window
would obviously be preferable, but the available data point to a genuine break in trend
upon the ADA's enactment.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses pre-ADA state-law variation to disaggregate the disabled employment ef-
fects of the two central provisions of the ADA, its reasonable accommodations requirement
and its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition with associated firing costs. Our effort to
disaggregate the ADA's effects in this way reflects a desire to evaluate policy reforms more
tailored and more politically realistic than the broadscale recommendation that the ADA be
abandoned (see DeLeire 2003). However, our empirical approach ultimately yielded a more
profound challenge to the existing literature that suggests ongoing negative employment
effects of the ADA. Our results indicate that while the ADA's reasonable accommodations
requirement had a significant negative effect on disabled employment in the near-term after
the ADA's enactment, the law may well have had no causal link to the declines in disabled
employment through much of the 1990s.
33 As the results reported above suggest, convergence between the two state groups began in 1993. As the
earlier results from Table 4 also show, nondisabled employment was relatively stable in both state groups
over the relevant period. so Figure 3 focuses on disabled employment.
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Table 1: Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination -
"Protection Without Accommodation" States
In the states listed in this table, pre-ADA statutory or judicial law imposed traditional antidiscrimination
prohibitions but no reasonable accommodations requirements on private employers:
Traditional Reasonable Employer-
Antidiscrimination Accommodations Size
Statutory Section(s) Prohibition - Requirement - Threshold for


















































































































































Original statutory section differed from statutory section in effect immediately prior to the ADA: See Table
Al for details.
t Substantive amendment(s) subsequent to adoption: See Table A I for details.
Potential ambiguity over the existence of a reasonable accommodations requirement: See Table A2 for
legal description and effect on our results of alternative characterizations.
a Number of employees, as of 1989. The column lists the number of individuals a firm had to employ before
it was subject to coverage by the state's disability discrimination law.
h Neither statutory nor judicial law provided an employer-size threshold for coverage.
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Table 2: Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination -
"ADA-Like" States
In the states listed in this table, pre-ADA statutory or judicial law imposed both traditional
antidiscrimination prohibitions and reasonable accommodations requirements on private employers:
Traditional Reasonable Employer-
Antidiscrimination Accommodations Size
Prohibition - Requirement - Threshold for
Date Adopted Date Adopted Coveragea
Arizona 41-1463(B) 1985 1985 15
Colorado 24-34-402(1)(a)* 1977 1977 b  I
Delaware 19:723(b), 724(a), 724(e)(2) 1988 1988 20
Idaho 67-5909(1) 1988 1988 10
Iowa 601A.6(1)(a)* 1972 1987 ',c 4
Louisiana 46:2254(A), (C) 1980 1980 15
Massachusetts 151B:4(16)" 1972 t  1983 6
Minnesota 363.03:1(2), (6) 1973 1983' d
New Mexico 28-1-7(A), (J)* 1973t 1983 4
North Carolina 168A-4, 5(a)* 1973t 1985 15
Oregon 659.425(1) 1973' 1979 6
Pennsylvania 43:955(a), (b) 1974 1985c 4
Rhode Island 28-5-7(1)* 1973: 1986 4
Vermont 21:495(a)(1), 495d(6)* 1973 1981 1
Virginia 51.5-41(A), (C)* 1975 1985 n/ae
Washington 49.60.180 1973 1978 c  8
Wisconsin 111.321, 322(1), 34(1)(b)* 1965' 1981' 1
Wyoming 27-9-105(a), (d) 1985 1985 2
Original statutory section differed from statutory section in effect immediately prior to the ADA: See Table
Al for details.
Substantive amendment(s) subsequent to adoption: See Table Al for details.
Potential ambiguity over the timing of adoption of a reasonable accommodations requirement: See Table A2
for details.
a Number of employees, as of 1989. The column lists the number of individuals a firm had to employ before it
was subject to coverage by the state's disability discrimination law.
h Statutory language is somewhat ambiguous but is clarified by an administrative regulation, 3 CCR 708-1,
Rule 60.2(C).
' Judicial interpretation: lowa--Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d
192 (Iowa 1987); Pennsylvania--Jenks v. Avco Corp., 940 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 1985); Washington-Holland
v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1978). In the case of Washington, the 1978 decision briefly mentions the
existence of an administrative regulation requiring reasonable accommodations, but this regulation plays only a
minor role in the court's opinion.
d Applicable only to employers with 50 or more employees.
Neither statutory nor judicial law provided an employer-size threshold for coverage.
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Table 4a: Means Analysis by State, Time, and Disability Status:
"Protection Without Accommodation" States versus "ADA-Like" States















16.25 14.90 14.67 14.34 14.43 14.47 14.33 14.00 13.48
(0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
[5,680] [6,101] [6,298] [6,486] [6,521] [6,058] [5,677] [5,741] [5,684]
-1.35 -1.57 -1.91 -1.82 -1.78 -1.92 -2.25 -2.77
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
40.68 40.45 40.23 40.19 40.48 40.94 41.26 41.64 42.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
[88,6301 [93,4491 [92,335] [89,4071 [86,473] [80,671] [75,509] [75,872] [76,201]
-0.23 -0.46 -0.49 -0.20 0.25 0.58 0.96 1.34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
-1.12 -1.12 -1.42 -1.62 -2.03 -2.50 -3.21 -4.10
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
18.22 19.05 19.26 17.79 16.51 15.79 15.97 15.98 14.65
(0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
[2,680] [2,881] [2,923] [2,8681 [2,928] [2,8621 [2,6771 [2,6171 [2,471]
0.83 1.04 -0.43 -1.71 -2.43 -2.25 -2.24 -3.57
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61)
41.50 41.47 41.48 41.75 42.04 42.36 42.55 42.81 43.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
[40,849] [40,727] [40,2381 [38,892] [39,111] [36,821] [33,504] [33,818] 134,2071
-0.03 -0.02 0.25 0.54 0.86 1.05 1.31 1.54
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
0.86 1.05 -0.68 -2.25 -3.29 -3.30 -3.55 -5.11
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
-1.98 -2.17 -0.74 0.62 1.26 0.80 0.35 1.00
(0.73) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
Notes: Means reflect average weeks worked by state group, disability status (disabled versus nondisabled), and time
period. All estimates are weighted using CPS survey weights. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath mean
estimates, and the numbers of observations in each state group-time period-disability status cell are in square brackets
below mean estimates. See Tables I and 2 and the text for the states in each group.
Table 4b: Means Analysis by State, Tunime, and Disability Status:
"No Protection" States versus "Protection Without Acconanodation" States















12.19 10.40 11.39 11.11 10.57 11.58 11.41 10.64 10.70
(0.88) (0.81) (0.85) (0.84) (0.86) (0.93) (0.90) (0.91) (0.93)
[473] [533] [532] [524] [477] [450] [466] [450] [432]
-1.79 -0.80 -1.08 -1.62 -0.61 -0.78 -1.55 -1.49
(1.19) (1.23) (1.22) (1.23) (1.28) (1.26) (1.26) (1.28)
39.89 39.96 40.22 40.34 40.75 41.01 41.55 41.94 42.03
(0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
[5,222] [5,337] [5,289] [5,085] [4,816] [4,592] [4,499] [4,446] [4,309]
0.07 0.32 0.45 0.85 1.12 1.66 2.05 2.14
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
-1.85 -1.12 -1.53 -2.47 -1.73 -2.44 -3.60 -3.63
(1.25) (1.28) (1.27) (1.29) (1.33) (1.32) (1.32) (1.34)
16.25 14.90 14.67 14.34 14.43 14.47 14.33 14.00 13.48
(0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
[5,680] [6,101] [6,298] [6,486] [6,521] [6,058] [5,677] [5,741] [5,684]
-1.35 -1.57 -1.91 -1.82 -1.78 -1.92 -2.25 -2.77
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
40.68 40.45 40.23 40.19 40.48 40.94 41.26 41.64 42.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
[88,630] [93,449] [92,335] [89,407] [86,473] [80,671] [75,509] [75,872] [76,201]
-0.23 -0.46 -0.49 -0.20 0.25 0.58 0.96 1.34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
-1.12 -1.12 -1.42 -1.62 -2.03 -2.50 -3.21 -4.10
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
-0.73 -0.01 -0.11 -0.85 0.30 0.06 -0.40 0.48
(1.31) (1.34) (1.33) (1.35) (1.39) (1.38) (1.38) (1.40)
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Notes: Means reflect average weeks worked by state group, disability status (disabled versus nondisabled), and time
period. All estimates are weighted using CPS survey weights. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath mean
estimates, and the numbers of observations in each state group-time period-disability status cell are in square brackets
below mean estimates. See Tables I and 2 and the text for the states in each group.
Table 5: Basic Regression Results
Basic Specification 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
CoefE on ADA*DIS 1.23 1.67 0.51 -0.99 -1.92 -1.46 -1.23 -2.67
(0.63) (0.78) (0.51) (0.52) (0.49) (0.61) (0.70) (0.58)
[0.93] [0.96] [0.98] [0.88] [0.82] [0.92] [0.93] [0.88]
CoefL on ADA*DIS*LP -2.14 -2.51 -1.54 -0.08 0.70 0.12 -0.60 0.02
(0.69) (0.73) (0.68) (0.76) (0.68) (0.79) (0.88) (0.74)
[1.07] [1.04] [1.10] [1.04] [0.98] [1.05] [1.07] [0.99]
Coelf on ADA*DIS*NP -2.63 -1.96 -1.12 -0.34 1.57 0.44 -0.56 0.24
(0.86) (0.94) (0.87) (1.22) (1.44) (1.19) (0.87) (0.68)
[1.21] [1.24] [1.23] [1.19] [1.33] [1.30] [1.05] [1.07]
CoefE on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.49 0.55 0.42 -0.25 0.87 0.32 0.04 0.22
Coeft on ADA*DIS*LP (0.71) (0.76) (0.96) (1.24) (1.38) (1.11) (0.80) (0.68)
[0.96] [0.97] [0.98] [1.00] [1.17] [1.07] [0.76] [0.82]
Specification with State,
Year, and State*Year 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Fixed Effects
Coe•E on ADA*DIS 1.33 1.72 0.55 -0.96 -1.89 -1.41 -1.19 -2.68
(0.59) (0.72) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.58) (0.70) (0.50)
[0.77] [0.82] [0.80] [0.69] [0.67] [0.77] [0.79] [0.74]
CoefE on ADA*DIS*LP -2.22 -2.56 -1.54 -0.06 0.76 0.14 -0.61 0.11
(0.62) (0.63) (0.50) (0.64) (0.57) (0.69) (0.78) (0.58)
[0.84] [0.85] [0.88] [0.81] [0.79] [0.88] [0.89] [0.81]
CoefE. on ADI)A*DIS*NP -2.76 -2.03 -1.17 -0.36 1.59 0.42 -0.55 0.27
(0.66) (0.82) (0.79) (1.18) (1.49) (1.07) (0.78) (0.52)
[0.96] [1.07] [1.05] [1.06] [1.22] [1.21] [0.90] [0.90]
CoeE on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.53 0.53 0.37 -0.30 0.83 0.29 0.06 0.16
Coelf on ADA*DIS*LP (0.44) (0.60) (0.85) (1.17) (1.42) (0.95) (0.57) (0.48)
[0.69] [0.82] [0.88] [0.94] [1.11] [1.05] [0.65] [0.68]
Specification Omitting State-
Law Variables, but Including 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98State, Year, and State*Year
Fixed Effects
CoefE on ADA*DIS -0.14 0.24 -0.29 -0.94 -1.29 -1.29 -1.65 -2.65
(0.37) (0.53) (0.46) (0.36) (0.28) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
[0.39] [0.48] [0.47] [0.37] [0.34] [0.36] [0.38] [0.36]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: The dependent variable is weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA
period is as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets
below coefficient estimates. All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include the
individual control variables listed in the text plus controls for state unemployment rate (in regressions without state,
year, and state*year fixed effects) and the interaction of disability and state unemployment rate. See equation (3.1)
for further details.
Table 6: Robustness Checks
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(3) Specification with State-Level Disability
Benefits Receipt Information










































Notes: The dependent variable is weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA period is
as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below coefficient estimates,
and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets below coefficient
estimates. All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include state, year, and state*year
fixed effects. Control variables are as stated in Table 5. In the upper panel of the present table, columns (1)-(3) use
observations from states in which the state-level pre-ADA disability discrimination regime was in place prior to 1980;
columns (4)-(6) use observations from states with ADA-like employer-size thresholds. See Tables I and 2 for details on
employer-size thresholds; observations from Tennessee and Virginia, whose pre-ADA statutory and judicial law did not
specify an employer-size threshold, are not included in the samples used in column (4)-(6). In the lower panel, columns
(1 )-(3) replace individual receipt of disability benefits with the percent of the state population receiving disability
benefits interacted with disability status; columns (4)-(6) replace individual receipt of disability benefits with the percent
of the state population applying for disability benefits interacted with disability status. Fixed effects preclude inclusion
of the percent of the state population receiving or applying for disability benefits alone.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Individuals Reporting Disability
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Note: All trendlines are fourth-order polynomials.
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Figure 3: "ADA-Like" and "Protection Without Accommodation"
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Figure 4: "ADA-Like" and "Protection Without Accommodation"
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Table Al: Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by
Private Employers - Original Statutory Sections and Substantive
Pre-ADA Amendments
Protection Substantive Pre-ADA Amendments
Without Original Statutory
Accommodation Section(s) Date of Nature of
States Amendment(s) Amendment(s)
Alaska 18.80.220(1) 1987 Broadened coverage to mental as well
as physical disability
California Lab. 1420(a) 1975 Broadened coverage to "medical
conditions" as well as physical
disability
Connecticut 31-126(a) 1978; 1979 Broadened coverage to mental
retardation (1978) and mental disorders
(1979) as well as physical disability
Florida 13-261(1) n/a n/a
(later 23.167(1))
Hawaii n/a 1981 Broadened scope of liability
Illinois 38:65-23(1) (later 48- n/a n/a
853-3(a))
Maryland 49B:19(a) n/a n/a
Michigan n/a 1980 Broadened scope of liability
Missouri 296.020(1) n/a n/a
Montana 1974 S.L. ch. 77, sec. 3 1975 Broadened coverage to mental as well
(later 64-306(a)) as physical disability and broadened
scope of liability
Nevada n/a 1973; 1981 Added protection for use of guide dogs
(1973); broadened coverage to "aural"
as well as "physical" and "visual"
handicaps (1981)
New Jersey n/a 1978 Broadened coverage to mental as well
as physical disability and broadened
scope of liability
Tennessee n/a 1986; 1987 Broadened scope of liability (1986);
corrected omission of private employers
from 1986 amendment (1987)
Texas Art. 4419e(f) (later Hum. 1983 Broadened scope of liability
Res. Code 121.003(f))
West Virginia 5-11-9(a) n/a n/a
(continues on next page)
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Table Al (Continued): Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by
Private Employers - Original Statutory Sections and Substantive
Pre-ADA Amendments
"ADA-Like" Original Statutory Substantive Pre-ADA Amendments
States Section(s) Date of Nature of
Amendment(s) Amendment(s)
Colorado 24-34-306(1)(a) n/a n/a
Iowa 105A.7(1)(a) n/a n/a
Massachusetts 149:24K 1983 Broadened scope of liability
Minnesota n/a 1987; 1989 Altered definition of "undue hardship"
(1987); refined definition of
reasonable accommodations (1989)
New Mexico 4-33-7(A) 1987 Broadened coverage to "medical
conditions" as well as physical and
mental disabilities
North Carolina 168-6 1985 Made various revisions to liability
provisions
Oregon n/a 1979 Broadened scope of liability
Rhode Island 28-5-7(A) 1981 Broadened coverage to mental as well
as physical disability
Vermont 21:498(a) n/a n/a
Virginia 40.1-28.7 (later 51.01- n/a n/a
41(A),(C))
Wisconsin 111.32(5)(a), 111.36(4) 1967; 1975; 1981 Rephrased and clarified prohibitions
(later 111.325) (1967, 1975, 1981)
Notes: The original statutory section often differs from the source reported in Tables I and 2 because states
frequently renumbered their statutes in this period. The substantive amendments reported in this table are
amendments to pre-ADA statutory sections imposing traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions or reasonable
accommodations requirements, and do not reflect changes in other statutory sections of states' disability
discrimination laws.
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Table A2: Effects of Alternative Characterizations of Pre-ADA State Laws
Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by Private Employers
Effect on Results for Post-ADAState Legal Description Years 90-91, 91-92, and 92-93
California Prior to 1981, Cal. Govt. § 12994 expressly
stated that accommodations were not required.
In 1981, the section was amended to provide that
an employer shall not be required "to make any
accommodation for an employee who has a
physical handicap that would produce undue
hardship to the employer." There is no pre-ADA
caselaw indicating whether the 1981 amendment
was meant to impose affirmatively a requirement
of reasonable accommodations unless such
accommodations would be an undue hardship.
Delaware Law prohibiting disability discrimination by
private employers was not enacted until 1988.
Law prohibiting disability discrimination by
private employers was not enacted until 1988,
and the statutory language is somewhat
ambiguous as to the existence of a reasonable
accommodations requirement.
The Iowa Supreme Court adopted a reasonable
accommodations requirement in 1987 as a
freestanding interpretation of the statutory
language, but earlier courts had mentioned and
applied administrative regulations requiring
reasonable accommodations.
Michigan Limited accommodation provision, not expressly
requiring reasonable accommodations, was
adopted in 1976. Administrative decisional law,
summarized in Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express
Co., 339 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983),
adopted a reasonable accommodations
requirement, but in 1986 the Michigan Supreme
Court, in Carr v. General Motors Corp., 389
N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1986), adopted a conception
of the Michigan statute inconsistent with the
administrative decisional law's reasonable
accommodations requirement.
Categorizing California as an "ADA-like" state,
rather than a "protection without accommodation"
state, does not alter the basic pattern of our results.
Our estimates of ,11 (the effect of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement) are
somewhat smaller in magnitude and slightly less
precise. Our estimates of 812 - APi (the effect of
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision)
remain insignificant in all years.
Categorizing Delaware as a "no protection" state,
rather than an "ADA-like" state, has virtually no
effect on our estimates of f3I (the effect of imposing
a reasonable accommodations requirement). Our
estimates of 812 - Pil (the effect of imposing a
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain
insignificant in all years.
Categorizing Idaho as a "no protection" state or a
"protection without accommodation" state, rather
than an "ADA-like" state, has virtually no effect on
our estimates of 8fI (the effect of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement). Our
estimates of 812 - Pi, (the effect of imposing a
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain
insignificant in all years.
This change cannot affect our results (because the
timing of state law adoption does not enter into our
categorization of states).
Categorizing Michigan as an "ADA-like" state,
rather than a "protection without accommodation"
state, reduces the absolute magnitude of our
estimates of fi (the effect of imposing a reasonable
accommodations requirement) by about 10%, while
the precision of the estimates generally improves.
Our estimates of /A2 - ,11 (the effect of imposing a
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain
insignificant in all years.




Table A2 (continued): Effects of Alternative Characterizations of Pre-ADA State Laws
Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by Private Employers
Effect on Results for Post-ADAState Legal Description Years 90-91, 91-92, and 92-93
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania's reasonable accommodations
requirement was imposed only by an
intermediate court, rather than by the state's
highest court.
South Dakota Limited accommodation provision, not expressly
requiring reasonable accommodations, was
adopted in 1986.
Texas Remedy provisions refer to reasonable
accommodations (Civ. Art. 5221 k:6.01(d) and
7.01(f)).
Wisconsin The Wisconsin legislature adopted a
reasonable accommodations requirement in
1981, but in the preceding period some
Wisconsin lower courts judicially imposed a
reasonable accommodations requirement (e.g.,
Teggatz v. Labor & Industry Review Comm'n,
1978 WL 3436 (Cir. Ct. Wisc.)), while others
did not impose such a requirement (e.g.,
Samens v. Labor & Industry Review Comm'n,
1981 WL 11474 (Cir. Ct. Wisc.)).
Categorizing Pennsylvania as a "protection without
accommodation" state, rather than an "ADA-like"
state, does not alter the basic pattern of our results.
Our estimates of AI, (the effect of imposing a
reasonable accommodations requirement) are
somewhat smaller in magnitude and slightly less
precise. Our estimates of /fl2 - 6I (the effect of
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision)
remain insignificant in all years.
Categorizing South Dakota as an "ADA-like" state,
rather than a "protection without accommodation"
state, improves the precision of our estimates of f3I
(the effect of imposing a reasonable
accommodations requirement), with little effect on
their magnitudes. Our estimates of P12 - f1, (the
effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination
provision) remain insignificant in all years.
Categorizing Texas as an "ADA-like" state, rather
than a "protection without accommodation" state,
does not alter the basic pattern of our results. Our
estimates of /,j (the effect of imposing a reasonable
accommodations requirement) are somewhat
smaller in magnitude and also somewhat less
precise. Our estimates of .812 - ,II (the effect of
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision)
remain insignificant in all years.
This change cannot affect our results (because the
timing of state law adoption does not enter into our
categorization of states).
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Table A3: Basic Regression Results - Overall State-Group Effects
Specification with 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
ADA*DIS*AD
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -0.91 -0.84 -1.03 -1.08 -1.21 -1.34 -1.84 -2.64
(0.41) (0.55) (0.65) (0.60) (0.46) (0.51) (0.53) (0.51)
[0.57] [0.57] [0.63] [0.60] [0.54] [0.53] [0.56] [0.56]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -1.40 -0.29 -0.61 -1.33 -0.34 -1.02 -1.80 -2.42
(0.58) (0.57) (0.70) (1.08) (1.34) (1.02) (0.61) (0.59)
[0.77] [0.80] [0.74] [0.79] [1.05] [0.96] [0.62] [0.75]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*AD 1.23 1.67 0.51 -0.99 -1.92 -1.46 -1.23 -2.67
(0.63) (0.78) (0.51) (0.52) (0.49) (0.61) (0.70) (0.58)
[0.93] [0.96] [0.98] [0.88] [0.82] [0.92] [0.93] [0.88]
Specification with
ADA*DIS*AD and State,Sand tate, 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Year, and State*Year
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -0.90 -0.84 -0.99 -1.02 -1.13 -1.27 -1.79 -2.58
(0.33) (0.44) (0.53) (0.47) (0.32) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
[0.39] [0.46] [0.54] [0.47] [0.41] [0.42] [0.44] [0.40]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -1.43 -0.31 -0.63 -1.32 -0.30 -0.99 -1.74 -2.41
(0.29) (0.44) (0.65) (1.07) (1.40) (0.89) (0.46) (0.44)
[0.57] [0.69] [0.69] [0.80] [1.02] [0.96] [0.54] [0.63]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*AD 1.32 1.72 0.55 -0.96 -1.89 -1.41 -1.19 -2.68
(0.59) (0.72) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.58) (0.70) (0.50)
[0.77] [0.82] [0.80] [0.69] [0.67] [0.77] [0.79] [0.74]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: Results duplicate the first two panels of Table 5 except that state-group effects are overall effects for each
state group rather than effects in the "protection without accommodation" and "no protection" groups relative to
"ADA-like" states. ADA*DIS*AD replaces ADA*DIS in all regressions in this table. The dependent variable is
weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA period is as stated. Robust standard
errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below coefficient estimates, and robust standard
errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets below coefficient estimates. All
regressions are OLS regressions and employ CPS survey weights. Control variables are as stated in Table 5.
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Table A4: Basic Regression Results, Probit Specification, Coefficients
Probit Specification 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Coeff. on ADA*DIS 0.063 0.056 -0.035 -0.075 -0.107 -0.108 -0.108 -0.211
(0.043) (0.048) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.054) (0.061) (0.049)
[0.069] [0.0701 [0.075] [0.071] [0.0701 [0.0761 [0.079] [0.076]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -0.137 -0.134 -0.061 -0.012 0.017 0.015 0.001 0.045(0.052) (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.056) (0.070) (0.081) (0.066)
[0.086] [0.084] [0.090] [0.0881 [0.0881 [0.092] [0.094] [0.0891
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -0.202 -0.156 -0.062 -0.048 0.028 -0.002 -0.039 -0.014
(0.069) (0.048) (0.109) (0.145) (0.115) (0.098) (0.125) (0.129)
[0.128] [0.131] [0.127] [0.117] [0.107] [0.112] [0.119] [0.1201
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.065 -0.022 0.000 -0.037 0.011 -0.017 0.040 -0.058
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.064) (0.050) (0.114) (0.146) (0.113) (0.097) (0.131) (0.132)[0.120] [0.124] [0.1171 [0.107] [0.095] [0.1001 [0.1061 [0.106]
Probit Specification with
State, Year, and State*Year 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*DIS 0.068 0.059 -0.035 -0.076 -0.104 -0.103 -0.104 -0.211
(0.041) (0.047) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.054) (0.064) (0.039)
[0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.046] [0.045] [0.053] [0.058] [0.053]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -0.144 -0.140 -0.059 -0.009 0.018 0.013 0.000 0.052(0.047) (0.051) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.062) (0.074) (0.050)
[0.057] [0.055] [0.058] [0.057] [0.055] [0.062] [0.066] [0.059]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -0.214 -0.163 -0.061 -0.040 0.035 -0.002 -0.038 -0.010
(0.080) (0.046) (0.088) (0.106) (0.101) (0.087) (0.091) (0.086)
[0.090] [0.095] [0.087] [0.080] [0.075] [0.077] [0.078] [0.080]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.070 -0.024 -0.002 -0.031 0.017 -0.015 -0.038 -0.062
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.074) (0.035) (0.089) (0.105) (0.095) (0.076) (0.080) (0.084)
[0.082] [0.089] [0.082] [0.075] [0.067] [0.067] [0.065] [0.068]
Probit Specification Omitting
State-Law Variables, but Including 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
State, Year, and State*Year
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*DIS -0.029 -0.025 -0.067 -0.080 -0.090 -0.094 -0.106 -0.176
(0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033) (0.030)
[0.027] [0.031] [0.031] [0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the person was employed during the year (i.e.,
the number of weeks worked was greater than zero). The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA period is
as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below coefficient
estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets below
coefficient estimates. All regressions are probit regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include the individual
control variables listed in the text plus controls for state unemployment rate (in regressions without state, year, and
state*year fixed effects) and the interaction of disability and state unemployment rate. See equation (3.1) for further
details.
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Table A5: Alternative Fixed Effects Specifications
Specification with State,
State*Year, and State*Disabled 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*I)IS 1.07 1.26 -0.06 -1.13 -1.84 -1.32 -1.02 -2.32
(0.55) (0.66) (0.42) (0.52) (0.51) (0.60) (0.72) (0.48)
[0.46] [0.51] [0.59] [0.50] [0.51] [0.56] [0.54] [0.50]
Coeff. on ADA*I)IS*LP -2.10 -2.53 -1.74 -0.21 0.63 0.05 -0.72 0.00
(0.63) (0.64) (0.51) (0.62) (0.56) (0.69) (0.79) (0.58)
[0.53] [0.55] [0.67] [0.60] [0.59] [0.63] [0.62] [0.55]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -2.48 -1.65 -0.50 0.03 1.86 0.75 0.12 0.83
(0.63) (0.79) (0.82) (1.20) (1.44) (1.08) (0.83) (0.64)
[0.72] [0.80] [0.89] [0.90] [0.94] [1.01] [0.75] [0.77]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.38 0.89 1.24 0.24 1.23 0.70 0.84 0.83
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.44) (0.60) (0.88) (1.14) (1.32) (0.88) (0.53) (0.47)[0.61] [0.72] [0.85] [0.84] [0.85] [0.891 [0.61] [0.66]
Specification with State, Year,
State*Year, and Year*Disabled 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -2.69 -3.04 -1.98 -0.53 0.30 -0.35 -1.00 -0.25
(0.81) (0.81) (0.64) (0.64) (0.55) (0.78) (0.89) (0.70)
[0.62] [0.64] [0.68] [0.61] [0.56] [0.68] [0.69] [0.58]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -4.66 -3.99 -3.12 -2.27 -0.18 -1.42 -2.17 -1.02
(0.75) (0.87) (0.69) (1.04) (1.38) (1.04) (0.81) (0.61)
[0.75] [0.84] [0.75] [0.90] [1.09] [1.10] [0.77] [0.66]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -1.96 -0.94 -1.14 -1.75 -0.48 -1.07 -1.17 -0.76
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.47) (0.57) (0.56) (0.99) (1.33) (0.89) (0.36) (0.32)
[0.57] [0.67] [0.61] [0.85] [1.04] [0.99] [0.55] [0.48]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: The dependent variable is weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA
period is as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets
below coefficient estimates. All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include the
fixed effects specified in the table. Control variables are stated in Table 5. In the upper panel of this table, the fixed
effects preclude the estimation of the coefficients on ADA, LP, NP, ADA*LP, ADA*NP, DIS*LP, and DIS*NP
from the basic specification in equation (1). In the lower panel, the fixed effects preclude the estimation of the
coefficients on ADA, LP, NP, ADA*LP, ADA*NP, DIS*LP, DIS*NP, and ADA*DIS from this specification.
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Table A6: Additional Robustness Checks
(1) Sample Includes Only
Observations from 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Southern States
Coeff. on ADA*DIS 0.32 0.93 0.06 -0.81 -1.56 -0.74 -1.05 -4.08
(1.02) (0.69) (0.57) (0.56) (0.49) (0.83) (0.98) (1.05)
[1.49] [1.06] [0.29] [0.23] [0.64] [0.28] [1.10] [1.36]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -1.33 -1.75 -1.78 -0.85 0.59 0.04 0.86 3.50
(1.26) (1.06) (1.17) (1.07) (0.99) (1.42) (1.52) (1.46)
[1.59] [1.18] [0.93] [1.29] [0.73] [0.85] [1.35] [1.49]
Coeff. on AI)A*DIS*NP -1.68 -1.21 -0.69 -0.43 1.69 -0.05 -0.79 1.70
(1.18) (0.99) (0.90) (0.97) (1.03) (1.28) (1.01) (1.15)
[1.53) [1.17] [0.76] [1.07] [1.43] [0.83] [1.05] [1.33]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.35 0.54 1.09 0.42 1.10 -0.10 -1.64 -1.81
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.94) (1.05) (1.22) (1.21) (1.30) (1.47) (1.29) (1.21)[0.58] [0.65] [1.12] [1.64] [1.34] [1.13] [0.84] [0.72]
No. of Observations 41,793 41,786 41,157 40,813 39,169 37,612 37,832 37,593
(2) Specification Omitting
State-Level Unemployment 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Variables
Coeff. on ADA*DIS 1.34 1.72 0.57 -0.98 -1.91 -1.41 -1.14 -2.44
(0.54) (0.57) (0.31) (0.46) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (0.44)
[0.75] [0.76] [0.76] [0.68] [0.68] [0.77] [0.78] [0.72]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -2.22 -2.56 -1.53 -0.08 0.73 0.13 -0.63 0.05
(0.63) (0.64) (0.51) (0.64) (0.58) (0.70) (0.77) (0.54)
[0.85] [0.85] [0.88] [0.81] [0.79] [0.87] [0.89] [0.81]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -2.77 -2.03 -1.20 -0.30 1.76 0.55 -0.34 0.65
(0.61) (0.72) (0.72) (1.16) (1.45) (1.00) (0.73) (0.48)
[0.95] [1.03] [1.031 [1.05] [1.20] [1.19] [0.89] [0.90]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -0.55 -0.53 0.34 -0.22 1.02 0.42 0.29 0.60
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.43) (0.53) (0.76) (1.15) (1.40) (0.90) (0.42) (0.38)
[0.68] [0.78] [0.81] [0.91] [1.07] [1.00] [0.60] [0.66]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: The dependent variable is weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA
period is as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets
below coefficient estimates. All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include state,
year, and state*year fixed effects. Control variables are as stated in Table 5 minus state unemployment rate and the
interaction of disability and state unemployment rate in the lower panel. The southern states used in the upper panel
are as stated in the text.
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Table A7: Fixed Effects Specifications with Time-Varying Covariates
Basic Specification 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Coeff. on ADA*DIS 0.97 2.16 1.90 0.14 -0.51 -0.42 0.98 -0.08
(1.97) (2.14) (1.81) (1.99) (1.78) (1.68) (1.91) (1.97)
[2.45] [2.32] [2.19] [2.15] [1.91] [1.90] [2.03] [2.02]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -2.31 -2.74 -1.71 -0.27 0.47 -0.19 -0.53 0.34
(0.63) (0.70) (0.69) (0.80) (0.72) (0.80) (0.93) (0.76)
[0.95] [0.96] [1.05] [1.02] [0.92] [1.01] [1.03] [0.94]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -3.66 -3.39 -2.68 -1.86 0.14 -0.59 -1.14 -0.09
(0.86) (0.91) (0.92) (1.33) (1.56) (1.27) (0.95) (0.76)
[1.21] [1.20] [1.15] [1.18] [1.37] [1.35] [1.12] [1.06]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -1.35 -0.65 -0.97 -1.59 -0.33 0.40 -0.61 -0.43
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.74) (0.72) (0.93) (1.27) (1.40) (1.09) (0.66) (0.61)
[0.95] [0.90] [0.79] [0.90] [1.16] [1.07] [0.73] [0.72]
Specification with State,
Year, and State*Year 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
Fixed Effects
Coeff. on ADA*DIS -0.58 -0.01 -0.63 -1.96 -2.27 -2.53 -0.74 -0.79
(1.76) (1.91) (1.59) (1.60) (1.39) (1.50) (1.76) (1.70)
[2.14] [2.03] [1.91] [1.75] [1.58] [1.68] [1.81] [1.76]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP -2.39 -2.74 -1.67 -0.18 0.69 -0.02 -0.53 0.34
(0.61) (0.63) (0.54) (0.70) (0.59) (0.70) (0.83) (0.62)
[0.83] [0.84] [0.89] [0.84] [0.791 [0.88] [0.90] [0.81]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP -3.45 -2.62 -1.65 -0.76 1.41 0.15 -0.52 0.81
(0.70) (0.80) (0.80) (1.25) (1.55) (1.11) (0.83) (0.66)
[0.99] [1.05] [0.99] [1.10] [1.27] [1.27] [1.01] [0.92]
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP - -1.06 0.12 0.03 -0.58 0.72 0.17 0.01 0.47
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP (0.49) (0.59) (0.81) (1.19) (1.45) (0.98) (0.52) (0.52)
[0.76] [0.82] [0.76] [0.95] [1.14] [1.09] [0.73] [0.66]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
Notes: The dependent variable is weeks worked per year. The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989. The post-ADA
period is as stated. Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets
below coefficient estimates. All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include the
fixed effects specified in the table. Control variables are stated in Table 5, but in each panel control variables are
free to vary for each included year.
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